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Gpg.fail

gpg.fail

21–30 of 376 posts

Re: Gpg.fail

#21

AFAICT this is GnuPG specific and not OpenPGP related? Since GnuPG has pulled out of standards compliance anyway there are many better options. Sequoia chameleon even has drop in tooling for most workflows.

no, some clearsig issues are a problem in openpgp standard itself

Re: Gpg.fail

#22

Werner Koch from GnuPG recently (2025-12-26) posted this on their blog: https://www.gnupg.org/blog/20251226-cleartext-signatures.htm... Archive link: https://web.archive.org/web/20251227174414/https://www.gnupg...

This feels pretty unsatisfying: something that’s been “considered harmful” for three decades should be deprecated and then removed in a responsible ecosystem.

(PGP/GPG are of course hamstrung by their own decision to be a Swiss Army knife/only loosely coupled to the secure operation itself. So the even more responsible thing to do is to discard them for purposes that they can’t offer security properties for, which is the vast majority of things they get used for.)

Re: Gpg.fail

#23

Werner Koch from GnuPG recently (2025-12-26) posted this on their blog: https://www.gnupg.org/blog/20251226-cleartext-signatures.htm... Archive link: https://web.archive.org/web/20251227174414/https://www.gnupg...

This feels pretty unsatisfying: something that’s been “considered harmful” for three decades should be deprecated and then removed in a responsible ecosystem. (PGP/GPG are of course hamstrung by their own decision to be a Swiss Army knife/only loosely coupled to the secure operation itself. So the even more responsible thing to do is to discard them for purposes that they can’t offer security properties for, which is…

Well python discarded signing entirely so that's one way to solve it :)

Re: Gpg.fail

#24

Seems to be down? Here's a thread with a summary of exploits presented in the talk: https://bsky.app/profile/filippo.abyssdomain.expert/post/3ma...

Maybe the site is overloaded. But as for the "brb, were on it!!!!" - this page had the live stream of the talk when it was happening. Hopefully they'll replace it with the recording when media.ccc.de posts it, which should be within a couple hours.

> this page had the live stream of the talk when it was happening

As they said, they were on it...

Re: Gpg.fail

#25
post #23

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This feels pretty unsatisfying: something that’s been “considered harmful” for three decades should be deprecated and then removed in a responsible ecosystem. (PGP/GPG are of course hamstrung by their own decision to be a Swiss Army knife/only loosely coupled to the secure operation itself. So the even more responsible thing to do is to discard them for purposes that they can’t offer security properties for, which is…

Well python discarded signing entirely so that's one way to solve it :)

Both CPython and distributions on PyPI are more effectively signed than they were before.

(I think you already know this, but want to relitigate something that’s not meaningfully controversial in Python.)

Re: Gpg.fail

#26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Haven't read it since it is down, but based on other comments, it seems to be an issue with cleartext signatures. I haven't seen those outside of old mailing list archives. Everyone uses detached signatures nowadays, e.g. PGP/MIME for emails.

If I understood their first demo correctly, they verified a fedora iso with a detached signature. The booted iso then printed "hello 39c3". https://streaming.media.ccc.de/39c3/relive/1854

It was a cleartext signature, not a detached signature.

Edit: even better. It was both. There is a signature type confusion attack going on here. I still didn't watch the entire thing, but it seems that unlike gpg, they do have to specify --cleartext explicitly for Sequoia, so there is no confusion going on that case.

Re: Gpg.fail

#27

Werner Koch from GnuPG recently (2025-12-26) posted this on their blog: https://www.gnupg.org/blog/20251226-cleartext-signatures.htm... Archive link: https://web.archive.org/web/20251227174414/https://www.gnupg...

This feels pretty unsatisfying: something that’s been “considered harmful” for three decades should be deprecated and then removed in a responsible ecosystem. (PGP/GPG are of course hamstrung by their own decision to be a Swiss Army knife/only loosely coupled to the secure operation itself. So the even more responsible thing to do is to discard them for purposes that they can’t offer security properties for, which is…

GPG is indeed deprecated.

Most people have never heard of it and never used it.

Re: Gpg.fail

#29
post #27

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This feels pretty unsatisfying: something that’s been “considered harmful” for three decades should be deprecated and then removed in a responsible ecosystem. (PGP/GPG are of course hamstrung by their own decision to be a Swiss Army knife/only loosely coupled to the secure operation itself. So the even more responsible thing to do is to discard them for purposes that they can’t offer security properties for, which is…

GPG is indeed deprecated. Most people have never heard of it and never used it.

Can you provide a source this? To my understanding, the GnuPG project (and by extension PGP as an ecosystem) considers itself very much alive, even though practically speaking it’s effectively moribund and irrelevant.

(So I agree that it’s de facto dead, but that’s not the same thing as formal deprecation. The latter is what you do explicitly to responsibly move people away from something that’s not suitable for use anymore.)

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