Earlier quoted context omitted.
While you think this is a producer problem, it's simply a userland market. Just like in the 90s when viruses primarily went to windows, it' wasn't some magical property of windows, it was the market of users available. Also, following this logic, it then becomes survivorship bias, in that the more attacks they get, the more researchers spend time looking & documenting.
> it' wasn't some magical property of windows no, it really was windows
GitLab discovers widespread NPM supply chain attack
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Re: GitLab discovers widespread NPM supply chain attack
#22Not all the npm packages, but always an npm package
While you think this is a producer problem, it's simply a userland market. Just like in the 90s when viruses primarily went to windows, it' wasn't some magical property of windows, it was the market of users available. Also, following this logic, it then becomes survivorship bias, in that the more attacks they get, the more researchers spend time looking & documenting.
Re: GitLab discovers widespread NPM supply chain attack
#23Earlier quoted context omitted.
> it' wasn't some magical property of windows no, it really was windows
It really wasn't. MacOS classic was full of vulnerabilities as was OS/2 and Linux up through 2004. Windows dominated because it was the biggest ecosystem.
Re: GitLab discovers widespread NPM supply chain attack
#24Earlier quoted context omitted.
You don't think bad actors don't have access to entire countries worth of stolen identities to use for supply chain attacks?
This was largely the reason I rejected "real name verification" ideas at GitHub after the xz attack. (Especially if they are state sponsored) it's not that hard for a dedicated actor (which xz certainly was) to get a quality stolen identity. The inevitable evolution of such a feature is a button on your repo saying" block all contributors from China, Russia, and N other countries". I personally think that's the antit…
Re: GitLab discovers widespread NPM supply chain attack
#25Something helpful here would be to enable developers to optionally identify themselves. Not Discord-style where only the platform knows their real identity, but publically as well.
So, EV code signing certificates? Windows has that, and it'll verify that right in the OS. Git for instance, shows as being signed by CN = Johannes Schindelin O = Johannes Schindelin S = Nordrhein-Westfalen C = DE Downside is the cost. Certificates cost hundreds of dollars per year. There's probably some room to reduce cost, but not by much. You also run into issues of paying some homeless person $50 to use their ide…
Re: GitLab discovers widespread NPM supply chain attack
#26Earlier quoted context omitted.
This was largely the reason I rejected "real name verification" ideas at GitHub after the xz attack. (Especially if they are state sponsored) it's not that hard for a dedicated actor (which xz certainly was) to get a quality stolen identity. The inevitable evolution of such a feature is a button on your repo saying" block all contributors from China, Russia, and N other countries". I personally think that's the antit…
That would be easily defeated by a VPN. The inevitable evolution would be some kind of in-person attestation of identity backed up with some kind of insurance on the contributor's work, and, well you're converging on the employer-employee relationship then.
Re: GitLab discovers widespread NPM supply chain attack
#27Surely in this day and age we can fairly trivially find out these come from the usual suspects - China, Russia, Iran, etc. Being in such a digital age, where our economies are built on this tech...is this not effectively (economic) warfare? Why are so many governments blase about it?
Proving the attack is state-sponsored is difficult (as any attack you attribute to a country can very well be a false-flag operation), and “state sponsorship” is itself a spectrum; for example, you could argue India’s insufficient action against tech-support scammers is effectively state-sanctioned. This can of course be resolved, but here’s the kicker: our own governments equally enjoy this ambiguity to do their own…
Re: GitLab discovers widespread NPM supply chain attack
#28Re: GitLab discovers widespread NPM supply chain attack
#29Something helpful here would be to enable developers to optionally identify themselves. Not Discord-style where only the platform knows their real identity, but publically as well.
This is what macOS codesigning does. Notarization goes one step further and anchors the signature to an Apple-owned CA to attest that Apple has tied the signature to an Apple developer account.
In principle, what’s stopping the technique from targeting macos CI runners which improperly store keys used for Notorization signing? Or… is it impossible to automate a publishing step for macos? Does that always require a human to do a manual thing from their account to get a project published?
Re: GitLab discovers widespread NPM supply chain attack
#30Does anyone know why NPM seems to be the only attractive target? Python and Java are very popular, but I haven't heard anything in those ecosystems for a while. Is it because something inherently "weak" about NPM, or simply because, like Windows or JavaScript, everyone uses it?