To be clear, the point of storing a secret token on your phone and then typing over some codes that prove you have access to the secret still, is to provide 2FA. If you use oathtool on your laptop, and the password is stored there as well, you're back to 1FA That can be fine if that's what you want, but if you wanted 2FA: - FreeOTP: https://f-droid.org/packages/org.fedorahosted.freeotp - someone forked that and calle…
De-Googling TOTP Authenticator Codes
21–30 of 138 posts
Re: De-Googling TOTP Authenticator Codes
#22For years I've managed all my TOTP codes with KeepassXC. Not a single problem, great software.
Just consider that storing TOTP codes in the password manager negates the advantage of two factors authentication, namely the added security of needing a second device. This would keep your logins safe even if somebody managed to breach your KeePassXC database.
Like with all things it depends on your threat model.
If your threat model includes risk of leaking all data from your password manager – then yeah, it worsens your security.
Otherwise it still covers all other risks:
1. it makes bruteforce basically impossible
2. it makes phishing harder (assuming that your password manager supports autofill and that it checks domains correctly)
3. it lowers the risks if a single password leaks
Re: De-Googling TOTP Authenticator Codes
#23I'd be more curious to know what the traffic data google maps alternative is.
I use (Apple) Maps, personally.
Re: De-Googling TOTP Authenticator Codes
#24To be clear, the point of storing a secret token on your phone and then typing over some codes that prove you have access to the secret still, is to provide 2FA. If you use oathtool on your laptop, and the password is stored there as well, you're back to 1FA That can be fine if that's what you want, but if you wanted 2FA: - FreeOTP: https://f-droid.org/packages/org.fedorahosted.freeotp - someone forked that and calle…
The risk factor is mainly that someone got the password from a web application hack not that they logged into your computer and accessed your password manager. In the web app scenario it is still a second factor.
But I'm not saying you should care about this. Everyone can make their own risk assessment, especially if you know about common attacks like the data breaches that you mention
Re: De-Googling TOTP Authenticator Codes
#25Earlier quoted context omitted.
The risk factor is mainly that someone got the password from a web application hack not that they logged into your computer and accessed your password manager. In the web app scenario it is still a second factor.
If you use a password manager, or another mechanism that makes each password unique and unguessable, the password and the "2FA" seed token are both the same type of secret string, and both are stored on the same disk. There is no added benefit to 2FA if you store the 2FA secret next to the password when both are generated securely But I'm not saying you should care about this. Everyone can make their own risk assessm…
Re: De-Googling TOTP Authenticator Codes
#26Earlier quoted context omitted.
You are allowed to have two separate databases, with different passwords. You can even store them on different devices!
It’s still one device.
Re: De-Googling TOTP Authenticator Codes
#27Earlier quoted context omitted.
You are allowed to have two separate databases, with different passwords. You can even store them on different devices!
It’s still one device.
Something that you have can be your own pc.
Re: De-Googling TOTP Authenticator Codes
#28To be clear, the point of storing a secret token on your phone and then typing over some codes that prove you have access to the secret still, is to provide 2FA. If you use oathtool on your laptop, and the password is stored there as well, you're back to 1FA That can be fine if that's what you want, but if you wanted 2FA: - FreeOTP: https://f-droid.org/packages/org.fedorahosted.freeotp - someone forked that and calle…
One password could be leaked and if the password alone gives the access, that is 1FA.
If the combination of two tokens forces the each login require access to that laptop and you need some password to unlock the password vault, this adds 2FA layers to services which are not the password manager.
Re: De-Googling TOTP Authenticator Codes
#29To be clear, the point of storing a secret token on your phone and then typing over some codes that prove you have access to the secret still, is to provide 2FA. If you use oathtool on your laptop, and the password is stored there as well, you're back to 1FA That can be fine if that's what you want, but if you wanted 2FA: - FreeOTP: https://f-droid.org/packages/org.fedorahosted.freeotp - someone forked that and calle…
Re: De-Googling TOTP Authenticator Codes
#30To be clear, the point of storing a secret token on your phone and then typing over some codes that prove you have access to the secret still, is to provide 2FA. If you use oathtool on your laptop, and the password is stored there as well, you're back to 1FA That can be fine if that's what you want, but if you wanted 2FA: - FreeOTP: https://f-droid.org/packages/org.fedorahosted.freeotp - someone forked that and calle…
It is not necessarily 1FA even if just use the laptop. One password could be leaked and if the password alone gives the access, that is 1FA. If the combination of two tokens forces the each login require access to that laptop and you need some password to unlock the password vault, this adds 2FA layers to services which are not the password manager.
Either your laptop is compromised or the server. In either case, if they get access to the password, they also get access to the 2FA secret if that resides in this vault together with the password. Just a password alone is safer than 2FA alone because that at least gets hashed and isn't stored in plain text on the server side