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F-Droid site certificate expired

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Re: F-Droid site certificate expired

#21
post #17
post #16

Earlier quoted context omitted.

CRLs are becoming bulky, and OCSP have some privacy implications (telling the CA which websites you visit), plus most browsers are set to soft fail if there's an outage and the request can't be made instead of a hard fail and making the website inaccessible, reducing the security and usefulness of OCSP. Short-lived certificates fixes these issues from an end-user standpoint.

There are new solutions for CRL just last month: https://hacks.mozilla.org/2025/08/crlite-fast-private-and-co...

Yup. If your primary goal was fast, efficient certificate revocation, then having certs that still take 90 days to expire rather than 2 years is not the solution you'd come up with.

CRLite updates every 12 hours.

Re: F-Droid site certificate expired

#22
post #14
post #3

Because those ephemeral LE certificates are such a great idea...

DANE would be better than LE, but weirdly the massive companies building browsers don't want to provide support. Spooky! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS-based_Authentication_of_Na...

You’re just moving your root of trust to DNS then?

With certificates we’re doing multi perspective validation.

DNS root of trust is silly. DNSSEC is not a proper root of trust

Re: F-Droid site certificate expired

#23
post #14
post #3

Because those ephemeral LE certificates are such a great idea...

DANE would be better than LE, but weirdly the massive companies building browsers don't want to provide support. Spooky! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS-based_Authentication_of_Na...

DANE is not a good idea. It makes DNS the CA. DNS doesn't have any stringent security requirements to its design or operation, as CAs do. It depends on a problematic protocol (that, among other things, limits the ability to deal with different operational and failure modes). And just because a nameserver provides a record, doesn't mean an authorized domain owner wanted that record to be an authorized secure transport. (not to mention, it would force people choose domain TLDs based on political positions, rather than, say, a desire for an easy to remember name)

It's weak security and introduces more problems than it solves. If we're going to get rid of CAs, we should consider a better solution, not a worse one.

Re: F-Droid site certificate expired

#25
post #18
post #11

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's because CRLs/OCSP sucks so now short expiration is rolling out.

CRL doesn’t suck it is just not easy problem on web scale. But seems like there is feasible solution: https://hacks.mozilla.org/2025/08/crlite-fast-private-and-co...

AKA they suck in this context

Re: F-Droid site certificate expired

#26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It is, if your objective is to closely centralize the web. If you make https mandatory, via scare tactics, only people with certificates will have websites. If you make ephemeral certificates mandatory by taking advantage of a monopoly, then only big SSL providers who can afford it will survive. Then, when you have only two or three big SSL providers, it's way easier to shut someone off by denying them a certificate,…

You don't need short expirations for that. CRLs/OCSP already provided a mechanism for certificates to be revoked before they expire. However, short expirations severely limit the damage an attacker can do if they steal your private key. And they avoid the situations where an organization simply forgets to renew a cert, because automating something so infrequent is genuinely difficult from an organizational standpoint…

CRL/OCSP had limited effect in practice. A revoked certificate would, if I remember correctly, continue to be accepted by many if not most browsers (by market share).

Re: F-Droid site certificate expired

#27
post #3

Because those ephemeral LE certificates are such a great idea...

It is, if your objective is to closely centralize the web. If you make https mandatory, via scare tactics, only people with certificates will have websites. If you make ephemeral certificates mandatory by taking advantage of a monopoly, then only big SSL providers who can afford it will survive. Then, when you have only two or three big SSL providers, it's way easier to shut someone off by denying them a certificate,…

Meanwhile, in the real world:

- We went from the vast majority of traffic being unencrypted, allowing any passive attacker (from nation state to script kiddie sitting in the coffee shop) to snoop and any active attacker to trivially tamper with it, to all but a vanishing minority of connections being strongly encrypted. The scare tactics used to sell VPNs in YouTube ads used to all be true, and no longer are, due to this.

- We went from TLS certificates being unaffordable to hobbyists to TLS certificates being not only free, but trivial to automatically obtain.

- We went from a CA ecosystem where only commercial alternatives exist to one where the main CA is a nonprofit run by a foundation consisting mostly of strong proponents of Internet freedom.

- Even if you count ZeroSSL and Let's Encrypt as US-controlled, there is at least one free non-US alternative using the same protocol, i.e. suitable as a drop-in replacement (https://www.actalis.com/subscription).

- Plenty of other paid but affordable alternatives exist from countless countries, and the ecosystem seems to be getting better, not worse.

- While many other paths have been used to attempt to censor web sites, I haven't seen the certificate system used for this frequently (I'm sure there are individual court orders somewhere).

- If the US wanted to put its full weight behind getting a site off the Internet, it would have other levers that would be equally or more effective.

- Most Internet freedom advocates recognize that the migration to HTTPS was a really, really good thing.

Re: F-Droid site certificate expired

#28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It is, if your objective is to closely centralize the web. If you make https mandatory, via scare tactics, only people with certificates will have websites. If you make ephemeral certificates mandatory by taking advantage of a monopoly, then only big SSL providers who can afford it will survive. Then, when you have only two or three big SSL providers, it's way easier to shut someone off by denying them a certificate,…

Great explanation and very apt for out time when we regularly hear of people being banned/debanked/jailed for their political views in western countries.

Yeah WebPKI is basically perfectly designed to facilitate deplatforming.

Re: F-Droid site certificate expired

#29

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It is, if your objective is to closely centralize the web. If you make https mandatory, via scare tactics, only people with certificates will have websites. If you make ephemeral certificates mandatory by taking advantage of a monopoly, then only big SSL providers who can afford it will survive. Then, when you have only two or three big SSL providers, it's way easier to shut someone off by denying them a certificate,…

Meanwhile, in the real world: - We went from the vast majority of traffic being unencrypted, allowing any passive attacker (from nation state to script kiddie sitting in the coffee shop) to snoop and any active attacker to trivially tamper with it, to all but a vanishing minority of connections being strongly encrypted. The scare tactics used to sell VPNs in YouTube ads used to all be true, and no longer are, due to…

Meanwhile, in the real world:

- We now provide a completely free certs for a malicious web-sites

- Degraded encryption value so much it's not even indicated anymore (remember the green bar for EV?)

- Pavlov-trained everyone to dumb-click through 'this page is not secure' warnings

- SNI exists and even without it anything not on CDN is blocked very easily

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