Live data from Hacker News

Claude for Chrome

anthropic.com

21–30 of 433 posts

Re: Claude for Chrome

#21
I love all the new AI improvements, but this is a _hard_ no for me.

Attack surface aside, it's possible that this AI thing might cancel a meeting with my CEO just so it can make time to schedule a social chat. At the moment, the benefits seem small, and the cost of a fallout is high.

Re: Claude for Chrome

#22
Having played a LOT with browser use, playwright, and puppeteer (all via MCP integrations and pythonic test cases), it's incredibly clear how quickly Claude (in particular) loses the thread as it starts to interact with the browser. There's a TON of visual and contextual information that just vanishes as you begin to do anything particularly complex. In my experience, repeatedly forcing new context windows between screenshots has dramatically improved the ability for claude to perform complex intearctions in the browser, but it's all been pretty weak.

When Claude can operate in the browser and effectively understand 5 radio buttons in a row, I think we'll have made real progress. So far, I've not seen that eval.

Re: Claude for Chrome

#23
post #9

Most browser extensions you need to manually enable in incognito mode. This is an extension that should be disabled in normal mode and only enabled in incognito mode!

In my opinion, if it shouldn’t be enabled in normal mode, it certainly shouldn’t be enabled in Incognito Mode either where it will give you a false sense of security.

Re: Claude for Chrome

#24
post #6

> Malicious actors can hide instructions in websites, emails, and documents that trick AI into taking harmful actions without your knowledge, including: > * Accessing your accounts or files > * Sharing your private information > * Making purchases on your behalf > * Taking actions you never intended This should really be at the top of the page and not one full screen below the "Try" button.

It's insane how we're throwing out decades of security research because it's slightly annoying to have to write your own emails.

The absolute disregard is astonishing. How big of an incident will it take for any restraint to exist? Folks on HN are at least somewhat informed of the risks and can make choices, but the typical user still expects some modicum of security when installing an app or using a service.

Re: Claude for Chrome

#25
I don't think we will get to a point where we can safely mitigate the risks associated with this. It is almost futile to pull this off at scale, and the so called "benefits" are not worth the tradeoff.

Re: Claude for Chrome

#26
Personally, the only way I’m going to give an LLM access to a browser is if I’m running inference locally.

I’m sure there’s exploits that could be embedded into a model that make running locally risky as well, but giving remote access to Anthropic, OpenAI, etc just seems foolish.

Anyone having success with local LLMs and browser use?

Re: Claude for Chrome

#28
post #6

> Malicious actors can hide instructions in websites, emails, and documents that trick AI into taking harmful actions without your knowledge, including: > * Accessing your accounts or files > * Sharing your private information > * Making purchases on your behalf > * Taking actions you never intended This should really be at the top of the page and not one full screen below the "Try" button.

It's insane how we're throwing out decades of security research because it's slightly annoying to have to write your own emails.

When we felt we were getting close to flight, people were jumping off buildings in wing suits.

And then, the Wright Bros. cracked the problem.

Rocketry, Apollo...

Same thing here. And it's bound to have the same consequences, both good and bad. Let's not forget how dangerous the early web was with all of the random downloadables and popups that installed exe files.

Evolution finds a way, but it leaves a mountain of bodies in the wake.

Post reply on HN