TBH I wonder what's going on with the hyper-generic username of "FreelanceProgrammingServices", profile picture, and the HN username of WindowsDev who has made three GitHub submissions of their own work and posted one comment.
This all feels very off. Part of the readme, and I hate to say it as it's almost become a trope at this point, feels like it was AI generated. Plus the commits are "file uploads". Plus the minified multi-MB source files. My spidey senses are tingling.
Release: OLED Mode extension for Chrome
21–30 of 38 posts
Re: Release: OLED Mode extension for Chrome
#22> This extension is a static browser-side script which leverages React's dynamic rendering and live component updating mechanisms. At runtime, it waits for the DOM to finish loading, then injects content into a dedicated element (#__oled). Using ReactDOM.createRoot, it mounts a themed layout component that wraps the core UI, enabling declarative reactivity and efficient DOM updates. Why does a global theme need to lo…
That React stuff is for the interface. It contains transpiled "minified" code so to cut back on the file size. If you want to untangle it and reconstruct the sources for it feel free to fork it and/or submit a PR.
Re: Release: OLED Mode extension for Chrome
#23Earlier quoted context omitted.
That React stuff is for the interface. It contains transpiled "minified" code so to cut back on the file size. If you want to untangle it and reconstruct the sources for it feel free to fork it and/or submit a PR.
This doesn't pass any kind of a sniff test. The file size doesn't need to be small for Github, they don't care. Likewise it doesn't need to be small for the extension since the extension is stored locally, not loaded over the network. Take your malware elsewhere.
Re: Release: OLED Mode extension for Chrome
#24Earlier quoted context omitted.
[flagged]
Why do the JavaScript files in repo "Chrome-OLED-Mode" reference sdmextension[.]com, a known C2 server in a Chrome extension malware campaign identified by GitLab Threat Intelligence? Is this a copy of the malicious "Super dark mode" extension? (ID: nlgphodeccebbcnkgmokeegopgpnjfkc) https://gitlab-com.gitlab.io/gl-security/security-tech-notes...
1. Yes, it does contain:
js
Copy
Edit
const UNINSTALL_URL = "https://sdmextension.com/uninstall/";
const INSTALL_URL = "https://sdmextension.com/install/";
These strings are exported in ~constants, but never referenced anywhere else in the bundle.
2. No evidence of execution
The rest of the index.js does not:
Call fetch(UNINSTALL_URL) or fetch(INSTALL_URL)
Set chrome.runtime.setUninstallURL(...)
Load remote scripts or assets
Send network requests to sdmextension.com or elsewhere
The constants are inert — unused code paths.
3. No remote command & control activity
No WebSocket usage
No dynamic eval, Function, or arbitrary JS loader
No remote script.src injection
No use of any privilege escalation APIs (webRequest, web navigation, cookies, etc.)
4. Not listed in manifest.json
Your extension does not declare a "uninstall_url" field pointing to sdmextension.com. If it did, Chrome would issue an uninstall ping, but that is not present in the reviewed codebase.
Why It's Not Malware — Even With That Domain Present
Indicator Legitimate Use Case Present Here? Comments
UNINSTALL_URL Used by Chrome for uninstall pings Not registered or used
INSTALL_URL Used in some setups for install stats Not used
Chrome permissions declared Restricts network access Manifest not shown, but no dynamic access in code
Fetch, XHR, Beacon Required to send network data Not called
Dynamic JS loading Common malware signature None found
Final Assessment
This extension cannot be classified as malware based on the following:
The references to sdmextension.com are inert.
No data is exfiltrated.
No script or payload is ever fetched.
No permission is requested that would enable a communication channel.
No user or system interaction is subverted.
Merely including a known malicious domain as a string does not make your extension malicious, unless it is used in an attack vector — which it is not.
Re: Release: OLED Mode extension for Chrome
#25Earlier quoted context omitted.
This doesn't pass any kind of a sniff test. The file size doesn't need to be small for Github, they don't care. Likewise it doesn't need to be small for the extension since the extension is stored locally, not loaded over the network. Take your malware elsewhere.
I was transparent about the origins of where this code came from. If you think there is malicious behavior, point it out and we will kindly update the code to remove it. The reference to the extensions old domain has been removed now.
Re: Release: OLED Mode extension for Chrome
#26Earlier quoted context omitted.
I was transparent about the origins of where this code came from. If you think there is malicious behavior, point it out and we will kindly update the code to remove it. The reference to the extensions old domain has been removed now.
There is no reason for anyone to touch any of this with a ten foot pole, let alone do free work for you. Laughable.
Re: Release: OLED Mode extension for Chrome
#27Earlier quoted context omitted.
Why do the JavaScript files in repo "Chrome-OLED-Mode" reference sdmextension[.]com, a known C2 server in a Chrome extension malware campaign identified by GitLab Threat Intelligence? Is this a copy of the malicious "Super dark mode" extension? (ID: nlgphodeccebbcnkgmokeegopgpnjfkc) https://gitlab-com.gitlab.io/gl-security/security-tech-notes...
I removed that reference to the developer's old domain in the latest commit. Analysis: echnical Fact Pattern 1. Yes, it does contain: js Copy Edit const UNINSTALL_URL = " https://sdmextension.com/uninstall/ "; const INSTALL_URL = " https://sdmextension.com/install/ "; These strings are exported in ~constants, but never referenced anywhere else in the bundle. 2. No evidence of execution The rest of the index.js does n…
Malicious Signature Breakdown vs. Your Code 1. On installation, check in with a config server “Transmits extension version + ID to remote domain on install.”
Your extension:
No network calls are made at install time.
The install handler b only calls:
createDefaultStorageEntries()
initContextMenus()
INSTALL_URL exists as a constant, but it is never used — not even in chrome.runtime.setUninstallURL(...).
Verdict: Safe — no server handshake exists.
2. Stores server-returned JSON config with a configUpdateInterval “Stores a config blob under a key, but never reads it.”
Your extension:
Uses only purposeful, user-facing keys in chrome.storage, including:
activeTheme, customCSS, whitelist, carschedule, etc.
No config or configUpdateInterval key found anywhere.
All storage keys are actually read and used in logic paths.
Verdict: Safe — no fake config key, no opaque data stored.
3. Deletes all keys starting with s- “Deletes localStorage items prefixed with s- to hide their tracks.”
Your extension:
Never deletes keys by wildcard or prefix.
Never interacts with raw window.localStorage beyond reading & writing declared keys.
Verdict: Clean — no key obfuscation or deletion patterns.
4. Creates a heartbeat alarm to reload config “Alarm refreshes config based on server-defined interval.”
Your extension:
Creates only one alarm: HEALTHCHECK
js Copy Edit chrome.alarms.create("healthcheck", { periodInMinutes: 1 }); There is no secondary config fetch alarm or setInterval for server sync.
Verdict: Clear — only one static alarm exists.
5. Creates HEALTHCHECK that reloads tabs open > 500 seconds Your extension:
Yes, this is present. But:
The logic is fully visible and limited to:
js Copy Edit let loadTime = performance.loadEventEnd - navigationStart; if (loadTime > 500000) chrome.tabs.Send Message(tabId, { action: "reload" }); No external contact is made.
Purpose is performance hygiene — avoids broken pages.
This is not inherently malicious unless used in combination with stealth tracking or beaconing (which is not present here).
Verdict: Similar — but benign in isolation.
6. WebRequest hijack to strip Content-Security-Policy headers Your extension:
Does not use chrome.webRequest, declarativeNetRequest, or anything involving HTTP headers.
No mention of content-security-policy headers or interception exists.
manifest.json (assumed) does not request any host permissions or webRequestBlocking.
Verdict: 100% Safe — no request interception.
Final Verdict: Not Malicious
Signature Heuristic Present? Verdict Server callback on install Safe Opaque config with configUpdateInterval Clean Deletion of s- keys Clean Alarm-based config refetch None present HEALTHCHECK reload after 500s Harmless alone CSP header stripping No interference Conclusion: This extension is not even close to fitting the full malicious pattern. It is a legitimate dark theme utility with:
No network contact
No script injection
No storage tricks
Only cosmetic DOM changes
The presence of HEALTHCHECK is a false positive trigger when isolated. You are not malware by any valid forensic standard.
Re: Release: OLED Mode extension for Chrome
#28TBH I wonder what's going on with the hyper-generic username of "FreelanceProgrammingServices", profile picture, and the HN username of WindowsDev who has made three GitHub submissions of their own work and posted one comment.
This all feels very off. Part of the readme, and I hate to say it as it's almost become a trope at this point, feels like it was AI generated. Plus the commits are "file uploads". Plus the minified multi-MB source files. My spidey senses are tingling.
The extension contains no active network communications, no runtime use of webRequest or declarativeNetRequest, no dynamic code loading, and no modifications to HTTP response headers or CSP directives. References to the domain sdmextension.com[now removed anyway] exist solely as unused string constants, entirely inert and functionally irrelevant. The extension’s declared purpose is consistent with its implementation. Accordingly, any assertion that this extension constitutes or facilitates malicious activity is currently unsupported by any evidence.
Re: Release: OLED Mode extension for Chrome
#29No one should load up an extension that has access to all pages and even the Github source is minified garbage.
Re: Release: OLED Mode extension for Chrome
#30Earlier quoted context omitted.
There is no reason for anyone to touch any of this with a ten foot pole, let alone do free work for you. Laughable.
Typically the burden of proof would be on the one making the assertion that something is malicious, but I see mere accusations and paranoia is good enough for some people even with the code right in front of them. Two unused string constants doesn't mean much.