From Reform to Ruin in the USSR

The post mentions parallels to the Qing Dynasty, but I want to elaborate on that a little more: whenever an authoritarian system which derives its authority from something other than nationalism (Imperial authority for the Qing, Communist ideology and the Party for the USSR) tries to modernize and liberalize, the danger is that this awakens slumbering nationalism which tears the system apart faster than it can safely adapt.

This is exactly what happened to the Qing: the Chinese population never really liked the Qing, but when it was a mostly hands-off distant authority, they lived with it. But when the Qing attempted to become a modern country with high state capacity, this woke up slumbering Han nationalism which proceeded to tear down the dynasty.

And that's what happened in the USSR too: early Soviet leaders correctly guessed that Russian nationalism had to be suppressed in the Soviet system, or else with the majority of the population and territory, Russia would end up dominating the rest of the country. And to their credit, they mostly made good on this: Russia didn't have too much of an outsized impact on or benefit from the Soviet economy, and representation from other states in the political elite was pretty good. But as soon as Gorbachev opened things up, Russian nationalism asserted itself and wanted to throw off the "unfair treatment", and the USSR immediately fell apart.

There are contemporary examples today, too: I argue this same pattern is what has been happening in Burma. When the junta had total control, they were able to force the patchwork of ethnic groups to mostly get along; as soon as a little democracy got introduced, the Buddhist majority started genociding everyone else.

If you want to open up an autocracy, you have to pay very close attention to whatever forces it has long been suppressing.

My point was that the US went on and on with operation cyclone as it tried to turn Afghanistan into the Soviet Union's Vietnam and then did it to ourselves a few decades later. Incredible self-own.

that's right. its fall was a world historic tragedy that unleashed the worst instincts of the capitalist class.

A huge part of China's success stems from the fact that Nixon opened up U.S. markets to China, along with U.S. investment capital. It was a key strategic decision made by the United States to counter Soviet influence in Asia. China's reforms were merely an adaptation to the new opportunities that arose from this shift.

Another important factor was China's significantly larger population compared to the Soviet Union, combined with notably lower labor costs. All these factors eventually propelled the country to great prosperity. Without them, I think China today wouldn't look much different from any other East Asian country.

The Soviets simply didn't have such opportunities. Leaving aside the fact that Western countries never offered them a similar deal, Soviet labor simply couldn't match the industrial productivity enabled by the cheap workforce of East Asian countries.

The USSR had vast land and abundant natural resources, but its population density was relatively low. Additionally, it already possessed advanced technologies and a well-developed industrial base. From the U.S. perspective, such a country looked more like a potential (and actual) competitor rather than just another member of the Western economic system.

I'm not a big fan of a planned economy. And I believe that the lack of social freedoms and democratic institutions, typical of Western countries, was a major factor in the Soviet collapse. But regardless of the decisions and reforms Soviet authorities could have made after World War II, I think the country was doomed either way.

The Soviet Union simply didn't have a large enough population to effectively develop such an enormous landmass. After WWII, significant male losses and the effects of the second demographic transition led to continuous population decline. The only reasonable course of action would have been to relinquish part of its global influence and territory, which it eventually did — but perhaps too late. However, the authorities of any country rarely want to give up power, and the Soviets were no exception.

As for turning points, I don't think it was the NEP. More likely, the Communist (October) Revolution itself was the crucial historical moment. The Russian Empire was a relatively promising state, evolving in the right direction. It was gradually building democratic institutions and transitioning to a liberal economy. Its industrial development was progressing similarly to other European countries — perhaps with some lag, but still moving forward.

Perhaps the real turning point in Russian history was when radicals, driven by controversial economic and social ideas, inherited a wealthy country and used its potential for large-scale social experiments.

Incidentally, a strongly held view by the CCP is that Gorbachev "lost" the USSR due to his lack of consolidated political power and it's a "mistake" that they are most desperate to avoid, and explains in part Xi's rise to unquestioned supreme leader with complete control within the party and over the provinces. (An interesting case is point is how they stripped down Bo Xilai, the CCP Secretary for Chongqing once he became too popular with his constituents--now serving life in prison.) To borrow from Islam, "there is no God but the CCP, and Xi is his prophet."