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One Head, Two Brains: The origins of split-brain research (2015)

theatlantic.com

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Re: One Head, Two Brains: The origins of split-brain research (2015)

#21

Post by spiderfarmer »

selcuka wrote: post #17
jstanley wrote: post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If consciousness doesn't arise from the brain, it seems to be suspiciously well correlated with the brain. I think consciousness arises from the brain.

> I think consciousness arises from the brain. I tend to agree, but it doesn't fully explain Benj Hellie's vertiginous question [1]. Everyone seems to have brains, but for some reason only I am me. If we were able to make an atom-by-atom accurate replica of your brain (and optionally your body, too), with all the memories intact, would you suddenly start seeing the world from two different pair of eyes at the same ti…

New commits.

Re: One Head, Two Brains: The origins of split-brain research (2015)

#22

Post by trescenzi »

selcuka wrote: post #17
jstanley wrote: post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If consciousness doesn't arise from the brain, it seems to be suspiciously well correlated with the brain. I think consciousness arises from the brain.

> I think consciousness arises from the brain. I tend to agree, but it doesn't fully explain Benj Hellie's vertiginous question [1]. Everyone seems to have brains, but for some reason only I am me. If we were able to make an atom-by-atom accurate replica of your brain (and optionally your body, too), with all the memories intact, would you suddenly start seeing the world from two different pair of eyes at the same ti…

I don’t understand how this refutes physicalism. Only my eyes are hooked up to my brain. If you duplicate the whole system there would be a duplicate that would begin experiencing its own version of reality.

Re: One Head, Two Brains: The origins of split-brain research (2015)

#23

Post by selcuka »

trescenzi wrote: post #22
selcuka wrote: post #17

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I think consciousness arises from the brain. I tend to agree, but it doesn't fully explain Benj Hellie's vertiginous question [1]. Everyone seems to have brains, but for some reason only I am me. If we were able to make an atom-by-atom accurate replica of your brain (and optionally your body, too), with all the memories intact, would you suddenly start seeing the world from two different pair of eyes at the same ti…

I don’t understand how this refutes physicalism. Only my eyes are hooked up to my brain. If you duplicate the whole system there would be a duplicate that would begin experiencing its own version of reality.

> I don’t understand how this refutes physicalism.

Maybe it doesn't and there is a plausible explanation, that's why it has been an unanswered question. But it's definitely an astonishing question.

You instincitively say that even if you duplicate the whole system "you" would remain as "you" (or "I", from your point of view), and the replica would be someone else. In this context you claim that there is a new consciousness now, but there was supposed to be one, because our initial assumption was consciousness == brain.

You are right if you define consciousness as being able to think, but when you define it as what makes you "you", then it becomes harder to explain who the replica is. It has everything (all the neurons) that makes you "you", but it is still not "you".

The above may not make sense as it is difficult for a layman such as me to explain the vertiginous question to someone else. I suggest you to read the relevant literature.

Re: One Head, Two Brains: The origins of split-brain research (2015)

#24

Post by trescenzi »

selcuka wrote: post #23
trescenzi wrote: post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don’t understand how this refutes physicalism. Only my eyes are hooked up to my brain. If you duplicate the whole system there would be a duplicate that would begin experiencing its own version of reality.

> I don’t understand how this refutes physicalism. Maybe it doesn't and there is a plausible explanation, that's why it has been an unanswered question. But it's definitely an astonishing question. You instincitively say that even if you duplicate the whole system "you" would remain as "you" (or "I", from your point of view), and the replica would be someone else. In this context you claim that there is a new conscio…

Oh yes if the question is if the duplicate is also _me_ then I understand the concern. That’s a much more complicated question. But when it comes to perspective it’s easy to answer. Which I guess is literally what the wiki page says it makes more sense as you state it though.

Thanks for the additional explanation. I have read a good deal from Nagel to Chalmers and somehow missed this particular question.

Re: One Head, Two Brains: The origins of split-brain research (2015)

#25

Post by ssfrr »

selcuka wrote: post #23
trescenzi wrote: post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don’t understand how this refutes physicalism. Only my eyes are hooked up to my brain. If you duplicate the whole system there would be a duplicate that would begin experiencing its own version of reality.

> I don’t understand how this refutes physicalism. Maybe it doesn't and there is a plausible explanation, that's why it has been an unanswered question. But it's definitely an astonishing question. You instincitively say that even if you duplicate the whole system "you" would remain as "you" (or "I", from your point of view), and the replica would be someone else. In this context you claim that there is a new conscio…

Say I walk into a machine, and then I walk out, and also an exact duplicate walks out of a nearby chamber. My assumption is that we’d both feel like “me”. One of us would have the experience of walking into the machine and walking out again, and the other would have the experience of walking into the machine and being teleported into the other chamber.

Im probably lacking in imagination, or the relevant background, but I’m having trouble thinking of an alternative.

Re: One Head, Two Brains: The origins of split-brain research (2015)

#26

Post by selcuka »

ssfrr wrote: post #25
selcuka wrote: post #23

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I don’t understand how this refutes physicalism. Maybe it doesn't and there is a plausible explanation, that's why it has been an unanswered question. But it's definitely an astonishing question. You instincitively say that even if you duplicate the whole system "you" would remain as "you" (or "I", from your point of view), and the replica would be someone else. In this context you claim that there is a new conscio…

Say I walk into a machine, and then I walk out, and also an exact duplicate walks out of a nearby chamber. My assumption is that we’d both feel like “me”. One of us would have the experience of walking into the machine and walking out again, and the other would have the experience of walking into the machine and being teleported into the other chamber. Im probably lacking in imagination, or the relevant background, b…

> My assumption is that we’d both feel like “me”.

You assume that both would feel like you, but there is no way you can prove it. The other can be a philosophical zombie [1] for all you know.

Would the "current you" feel any different after the duplication? Most people, including me, would find this counterintuitive. What happens if the other you travels to the other end of the world? What would you see? The question is not how the replica would think and act from an outside observer's perspective, but would it have the same consciousness as you. Would you call the replica "I"?

Or to make it more complex, what would happen if you save your current state to a hard disk, and an exact duplicate gets manufactured 100 years after you die, using the stored information?

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie

Re: One Head, Two Brains: The origins of split-brain research (2015)

#27

Post by kristiandupont »

selcuka wrote: post #26
ssfrr wrote: post #25

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Say I walk into a machine, and then I walk out, and also an exact duplicate walks out of a nearby chamber. My assumption is that we’d both feel like “me”. One of us would have the experience of walking into the machine and walking out again, and the other would have the experience of walking into the machine and being teleported into the other chamber. Im probably lacking in imagination, or the relevant background, b…

> My assumption is that we’d both feel like “me”. You assume that both would feel like you, but there is no way you can prove it. The other can be a philosophical zombie [1] for all you know. Would the "current you" feel any different after the duplication? Most people, including me, would find this counterintuitive. What happens if the other you travels to the other end of the world? What would you see? The question…

Like GP, I feel that I might be imagining imagination here, but I really don't follow what this is supposed to reveal.

>Would you call the replica "I"?

The two would start out identical and immediately start to diverge like twins. They would share memories and personality but not experience? What am I missing here?

Re: One Head, Two Brains: The origins of split-brain research (2015)

#28

Post by peterlada »

selcuka wrote: post #17
jstanley wrote: post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If consciousness doesn't arise from the brain, it seems to be suspiciously well correlated with the brain. I think consciousness arises from the brain.

> I think consciousness arises from the brain. I tend to agree, but it doesn't fully explain Benj Hellie's vertiginous question [1]. Everyone seems to have brains, but for some reason only I am me. If we were able to make an atom-by-atom accurate replica of your brain (and optionally your body, too), with all the memories intact, would you suddenly start seeing the world from two different pair of eyes at the same ti…

It would be a fork. Identical experience until that point but bifurcated from the point of fork since it no longer occupies the same physical space

Re: One Head, Two Brains: The origins of split-brain research (2015)

#29

Post by polishdude20 »

kristiandupont wrote: post #27
selcuka wrote: post #26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> My assumption is that we’d both feel like “me”. You assume that both would feel like you, but there is no way you can prove it. The other can be a philosophical zombie [1] for all you know. Would the "current you" feel any different after the duplication? Most people, including me, would find this counterintuitive. What happens if the other you travels to the other end of the world? What would you see? The question…

Like GP, I feel that I might be imagining imagination here, but I really don't follow what this is supposed to reveal. >Would you call the replica "I"? The two would start out identical and immediately start to diverge like twins. They would share memories and personality but not experience? What am I missing here?

I too don't get what's being missed.

Re: One Head, Two Brains: The origins of split-brain research (2015)

#30

Post by jstanley »

selcuka wrote: post #17
jstanley wrote: post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If consciousness doesn't arise from the brain, it seems to be suspiciously well correlated with the brain. I think consciousness arises from the brain.

> I think consciousness arises from the brain. I tend to agree, but it doesn't fully explain Benj Hellie's vertiginous question [1]. Everyone seems to have brains, but for some reason only I am me. If we were able to make an atom-by-atom accurate replica of your brain (and optionally your body, too), with all the memories intact, would you suddenly start seeing the world from two different pair of eyes at the same ti…

I feel like this is just a totally stupid question.

The brain has inputs, internal processing, and outputs. The conscious experience happens within the internal processing.

If you make a second copy, then that second copy will also have conscious experience, but it won't share any inputs or outputs or internal state with the first copy.

If you were to duplicate your computer, would the second computer share a filesystem with the first one? No. It would have a copy of a snapshot-in-time of the first computer's filesystem, but henceforth they are different computers, each with their own internal state.

You could argue that there are ways to do it which make it unclear which is the "original" computer and which is the "copy". That's fine, that doesn't matter. They both have the same history up to the branching point, and then they diverge. I don't see the problem.

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