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Smoke in the cabin of two 737 MAX caused by Load Reduction Device system [video]

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Re: Smoke in the cabin of two 737 MAX caused by Load Reduction Device system [video]

#21
post #18

[flagged]

Boeing has been in the media for a variety of corporate misconduct reasons, and the court cases were held in the US, which attracts the attention of the American media, which is a self-amplifying echo chamber which global consequences. I don’t doubt there were similar Airbus cases, but to suggest that the redirected attention is wholly due to an interference campaign is a bit far fetched in my opinion.

These are the most comparable times in the history of Airbus:

https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/one-hundred-seconds-of-c...

https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/thinking-like-a-computer...

Unlike with Boeing they didn't feature intentional obfuscation and fraud, but very similar themes of the airplane's software model of what's going on diverging from the pilots' and resulting in disaster.

Along with stories like the Therac-25, this is one of my "favorite" engineering stories relevant to my profession.

Re: Smoke in the cabin of two 737 MAX caused by Load Reduction Device system [video]

#22
post #19
post #2

This is a issue that may also affect Airbus aircraft, but so far, it has only caused problems on two Boeing planes. Like MCAS, it was not disclosed to pilots, prompting the FAA to recommend design changes and notify flight crews. https://simpleflying.com/boeing-cfm-international-update-737...

It's not clear that is does affect Airbus does it? It looks like only the LEAP-1b engines are affected by this, and I was under the impression that LEAP-1b was 737-MAX-only? (A320 has LEAP-1a as far as I can see).

he covers this in the video, but both engines have the same LRD (Load reduction device), but it's more about how the bleed system is done on if it's an impact or not, and he doesn't know if the other planes have the same flaw or not.

Re: Smoke in the cabin of two 737 MAX caused by Load Reduction Device system [video]

#23

I found this to be a fascinating dive into a potentially serious safety concern. I was impressed how simple the mitigations could be based on the recommendations in the report. I find the evidence credible for an attempt to burry the issue, but honestly I don't understand the motivation. At this stage I feel Boeing and the FAA could really stand to gain some good press from being extra proactive about such issues. Es…

From what I've read, CFM and Boeing committed back in December to making the software fix that's suggested in the video. https://aerospaceglobalnews.com/news/bird-strike-incident-se...

Why FAA and EASA didn't require any procedure changes in the interim to prevent the issue is a very good question.

Re: Smoke in the cabin of two 737 MAX caused by Load Reduction Device system [video]

#24
post #21
post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Boeing has been in the media for a variety of corporate misconduct reasons, and the court cases were held in the US, which attracts the attention of the American media, which is a self-amplifying echo chamber which global consequences. I don’t doubt there were similar Airbus cases, but to suggest that the redirected attention is wholly due to an interference campaign is a bit far fetched in my opinion.

These are the most comparable times in the history of Airbus: https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/one-hundred-seconds-of-c... https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/thinking-like-a-computer... Unlike with Boeing they didn't feature intentional obfuscation and fraud, but very similar themes of the airplane's software model of what's going on diverging from the pilots' and resulting in disaster. Along with stories like th…

From the article:

> Although it got off to a rocky start, the A320 went on to achieve a better safety record than most traditional aircraft types. And although there have been a couple of close calls, no Airbus has ever crashed because of the sort of computer failure that skeptics so deeply feared.

Airbus didn't just fight the need to improve their designs. They just kept improving on their designs and fixed what needed to be fixed.

I'm not sure why Boeing and Airbus are being treated equivalently by you and the other commenter. Especially since the two situations are nothing alike. Boeing hid MCAS to avoid a new type rating. The Airbus A320 just had new types of systems that would continue to be iterated on over time and were simply new.

Re: Smoke in the cabin of two 737 MAX caused by Load Reduction Device system [video]

#26

[flagged]

This is still being investigated. It also doesn't seem to be a widespread and common issue requiring the full brunt of internet outrage. I'm beginning to wonder if you're arguing in good faith.

You realize that the difference between this incidence and the one in this HN post is that the FAA made a recommendation in a report (IN 2023) for how to resolve the smoke issue, and it still hasn't been implemented by Boeing? That couldn't be the issue, it must be a conspiracy.

Re: Smoke in the cabin of two 737 MAX caused by Load Reduction Device system [video]

#27
post #24
post #21

Earlier quoted context omitted.

These are the most comparable times in the history of Airbus: https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/one-hundred-seconds-of-c... https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/thinking-like-a-computer... Unlike with Boeing they didn't feature intentional obfuscation and fraud, but very similar themes of the airplane's software model of what's going on diverging from the pilots' and resulting in disaster. Along with stories like th…

From the article: > Although it got off to a rocky start, the A320 went on to achieve a better safety record than most traditional aircraft types. And although there have been a couple of close calls, no Airbus has ever crashed because of the sort of computer failure that skeptics so deeply feared. Airbus didn't just fight the need to improve their designs. They just kept improving on their designs and fixed what nee…

> I'm not sure why Boeing and Airbus are being treated equivalently by you and the other commenter.

I think you misunderstood my intention in posting these links. I'm actually not sure how, since I pointed out clearly in the original text how the cases are very different. I posted them with the intent of "this is arguably the most like that, which is still very different". Maybe to hammer it down more, I gauge the Boeing case to be criminal, the Airbus examples not, and it's worth comparing the manufacturer conduct in these cases.

The common theme is software assists increasing complexity and the likelihood of the operator's thinking to diverge from the machine. I find that interesting personally and professionally (I make safety-critical vehicles with high degrees of automation for a living). If you want some interesting reading, I still recommend them.

Re: Smoke in the cabin of two 737 MAX caused by Load Reduction Device system [video]

#28
post #27
post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

From the article: > Although it got off to a rocky start, the A320 went on to achieve a better safety record than most traditional aircraft types. And although there have been a couple of close calls, no Airbus has ever crashed because of the sort of computer failure that skeptics so deeply feared. Airbus didn't just fight the need to improve their designs. They just kept improving on their designs and fixed what nee…

> I'm not sure why Boeing and Airbus are being treated equivalently by you and the other commenter. I think you misunderstood my intention in posting these links. I'm actually not sure how , since I pointed out clearly in the original text how the cases are very different. I posted them with the intent of "this is arguably the most like that, which is still very different". Maybe to hammer it down more, I gauge the B…

> very similar themes

implies that Airbus and Boeing should be treated similarly. When the issue isn't necessary the automation or software, it's how each company behaves in situations where there are serious faults or deficiencies with their designs.

Re: Smoke in the cabin of two 737 MAX caused by Load Reduction Device system [video]

#29
post #28
post #27

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I'm not sure why Boeing and Airbus are being treated equivalently by you and the other commenter. I think you misunderstood my intention in posting these links. I'm actually not sure how , since I pointed out clearly in the original text how the cases are very different. I posted them with the intent of "this is arguably the most like that, which is still very different". Maybe to hammer it down more, I gauge the B…

> very similar themes implies that Airbus and Boeing should be treated similarly. When the issue isn't necessary the automation or software, it's how each company behaves in situations where there are serious faults or deficiencies with their designs.

> implies that Airbus and Boeing should be treated similarly.

Honestly, I think that's you misreading the language.

> how each company behaves in situations where there are serious faults or deficiencies with their designs

Which the comparison can illustrate. Rather than downvoting me and somehow trying to hide information, why don't you just double-down on what I did and extend the argument? I see exactly no reason for conflict here. What I originally wrote (this is misconduct, this is not) seems to exactly agree with you.

In any case, I suppose I have more of a creator's view and am more interested in what makes a good software assist vs. a bad one, and for me any assist implicated or involved in an incident are interesting data points in the spectrum.

Re: Smoke in the cabin of two 737 MAX caused by Load Reduction Device system [video]

#30

I found this to be a fascinating dive into a potentially serious safety concern. I was impressed how simple the mitigations could be based on the recommendations in the report. I find the evidence credible for an attempt to burry the issue, but honestly I don't understand the motivation. At this stage I feel Boeing and the FAA could really stand to gain some good press from being extra proactive about such issues. Es…

From what I've read, CFM and Boeing committed back in December to making the software fix that's suggested in the video. https://aerospaceglobalnews.com/news/bird-strike-incident-se... Why FAA and EASA didn't require any procedure changes in the interim to prevent the issue is a very good question.

Can they force an install? Or will it be a choice?

I like Mentor Pilot and Air Disasters, so I know I’ve heard of a few where the problem that caused an accident was already known and a fix was available but the airline just chose not to do it because they had that option. Or it was scheduled but hadn’t been performed yet because it wasn’t thought to be that critical.

Having the FAA mandate the fix seems like it would be a much better option.

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