Earlier quoted context omitted.
It gets even worse when platforms blindly render img tags or the equivalent. Then no user interaction is required to exfil - just showing the image in the UI is enough.
Yup - all the basic HTML injection and xss attacks apply. All the OWASP webdev 101 security issues that have been mostly solved by web frameworks are back in force with AI.
Data Exfiltration from Slack AI via indirect prompt injection
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Re: Data Exfiltration from Slack AI via indirect prompt injection
#22Essentially a context-aware security monitor for LLMs.
Re: Data Exfiltration from Slack AI via indirect prompt injection
#23Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yup - all the basic HTML injection and xss attacks apply. All the OWASP webdev 101 security issues that have been mostly solved by web frameworks are back in force with AI.
Can’t upvote you enough on this point. It’s like everyone lost their collective mind and forgot the lessons of the past twenty years.
I think this has it backwards, and actually applies to every safety and security procedure in any field.
Only the experts ever cared about or learned the lessons. The CEOs never learned anything about security; it's someone else's problem. So there was nothing for AI peddlers to forget, they just found a gap in the armor of the "burdensome regulations" and are currently cramming as much as possible through it before it's closed up.
Re: Data Exfiltration from Slack AI via indirect prompt injection
#24Some external links (eg Confluence) are getting interposed and redirected through a slack URL at https://slack.com/openid/connect/login_initiate_redirect?log..., with login_hint being a JWT.
Re: Data Exfiltration from Slack AI via indirect prompt injection
#25The key thing to understand here is the exfiltration vector. Slack can render Markdown links, where the URL is hidden behind the text of that link. In this case the attacker tricks Slack AI into showing a user a link that says something like "click here to reauthenticate" - the URL attached to that link goes to the attacker's server, with a query string that includes private information that was visible to Slack AI a…
It gets even worse when platforms blindly render img tags or the equivalent. Then no user interaction is required to exfil - just showing the image in the UI is enough.
We've seen that one (now fixed) in ChatGPT, Google Bard, Writer.com, Amazon Q, Google NotebookLM and Google AI Studio.
Re: Data Exfiltration from Slack AI via indirect prompt injection
#26Basically, LLM apps that post to link-enabled chat feeds are all vulnerable. What is even worse, if you consider link previews, you don't even need human interaction.
Re: Data Exfiltration from Slack AI via indirect prompt injection
#27Earlier quoted context omitted.
It gets even worse when platforms blindly render img tags or the equivalent. Then no user interaction is required to exfil - just showing the image in the UI is enough.
Yup - all the basic HTML injection and xss attacks apply. All the OWASP webdev 101 security issues that have been mostly solved by web frameworks are back in force with AI.
LLM-based chatbots rarely have XSS holes. They allow a very strict subset of HTML to be displayed.
The problem is that just supporting images and links is enough to open up a private data exfiltration vector, due to the nature of prompt injection attacks.
Re: Data Exfiltration from Slack AI via indirect prompt injection
#28Earlier quoted context omitted.
This isn't a permission issue. The attacker puts a message into a public channel that injects malicious behavior into the context. The victim has permission to see their own messages and the attacker's message.
It’s effectively a subtle phishing attack (where a wrong click is game over). It’s clever, and the probably the tip of the iceberg of the sort of issues we’re in for with these tools.
Re: Data Exfiltration from Slack AI via indirect prompt injection
#29This is why I wrote https://github.com/gregretkowski/llmsec . Every LLM system should be evaluating anything coming from a user to gauge its maliciousness.