21–30 of 67 posts
Does the current spec take into account that unscrupulous ISPs (I'm thinking about hotel WiFi in particular) can strip the header before forwarding a request to a server?
An issue sidestepped by this article is whether the statement in the second paragraph is correct: > ... tech and ad companies who say they comply with Do Not Track could simply ignore the flag set by IE 10 and track those who use that browser. That doesn't quite work. Web servers don't know what browser is on the other end of a connection. Yes, they know the "User-Agent:" line, but that is not the same thing. Claimin…
So don't forge your headers. I don't see how this would be slippery at all.
Now imagine if Chrome made incognito browsing the default and you had to access a submenu to get a cookie keeper. Disrupt the web!
I don't think google is going to be the one leading the charge against targeted advertising.
Good for privacy litigation. "My client had DNT in her browser set to 'on' and the company intentionally ignored this and tracked her actions on the web, vioalting her right to privacy and causing monetary damages in the amount of $________." Web developers might hate it, but DNT could be potentially good for end-users who want to make privacy claims. It's just one extra header. A few extra bytes. Meanwhile things li…
The whole concept of DNT is just stupid. It's misleading users and won't work. By telling users you have better privacy simply because your browser adds a random header tag onto requests you're misleading them. Sites have no obligation to obey it and it will give users a false sense of security. We already have proven, well defined method of DNT already: private browsing. This works by simply removing resources after…
> Sites have no obligation to obey it and it will give users a false sense of security. Until appropriate legislation comes into play. It worked reasonably well with the Do Not Call lists.
A number of large ad networks have already announced support for DNT. Sure, there will always be sites that ignore the header, but there's also a realistic chance that it will give users a meaningful choice about how their behavioral data is used by many of the biggest sites they use most often.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
> then there is nothing left to track Isn't that the whole point? Websites may not have interest in tracking disabling policies, but a lot of people do. Maybe these advertising companies ought to incentivize users to opt-in to sell their data instead of the other way around.
The whole business model is that users don't care if they're tracked, so let's track them (and others) and do things for them that we couldn't before I can see Google fully implementing DNT on the basis that users don't care, and for the few that do they're happy to comply But making it default to on, especially if no one gives a damn is the death knell to the whole business model Suddenly you have to pay for everyth…
I wonder if we'll see sites who honor the header, but require that it be off in order to access content.
What is the situation if a user agent, on installation/upgrade, asks a user to update their DNT status but in doing so defaults to on? The user has to explicitly agree to turning this setting on (as they have to accept the configuration before proceeding), and is able to turn it off, but most people will just click through anyway.
The whole concept of DNT is just stupid. It's misleading users and won't work. By telling users you have better privacy simply because your browser adds a random header tag onto requests you're misleading them. Sites have no obligation to obey it and it will give users a false sense of security. We already have proven, well defined method of DNT already: private browsing. This works by simply removing resources after…
> Sites have no obligation to obey it and it will give users a false sense of security. Until appropriate legislation comes into play. It worked reasonably well with the Do Not Call lists.
It's a lot harder to detect, and probably harder yet to prove, when they're engaging in illicit tracking.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Sites have no obligation to obey it and it will give users a false sense of security. Until appropriate legislation comes into play. It worked reasonably well with the Do Not Call lists.
Or if a large portion of the industry decides to voluntarily adopt the standard, to counter the threat of legislation. A number of large ad networks have already announced support for DNT. Sure, there will always be sites that ignore the header, but there's also a realistic chance that it will give users a meaningful choice about how their behavioral data is used by many of the biggest sites they use most often.
It is not default, the user has to choose.