The DNS protocol is just text over udp. When making a DNS request, your system will open a socket, write "google.com" in it and read for a response. The server, if it is properly configured as a DNS server, will reply with the appropriate DNS record, again as text. Google.com is a cname to some subdomain used for load balancing, so the server will simply reply "CNAME blabla.google.com" and may optionally also resolve blabla.google.com to save you the trouble of making another request.
The DNS protocol, defined in some RFC, says that I have to make a request a certain way, and that the server has to respond a certain way. One of these ways is that for top level domains that don't exist (for ex. .time is not a currently existing tld), the server is supposed to reply nxdomain, but in reality there is no technical measure stopping it from replying with anything it wants, such as the current time.
In fact, generally speaking, the expectation that the server operators will not fuck you over is the only thing preventing public (and indeed private) DNS operators from returning you bogus data. This is mitigated somewhat by HTTPS, but DNS records themselves are infinitely fakeable with no recourse.