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A Multi-Level View of LLM Intentionality
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Re: A Multi-Level View of LLM Intentionality
#22I'm not sure the definition of "intention" the article suggests is a useful one. He tries to make it sound like he's being conservative: > That is, we should ascribe intentions to a system if and only if it helps to predict and explain the behaviour of the system. Whether it really has intentions beyond this is not a question I am attempting to answer (and I think that it is probably not determinate in any case). And…
Not because of their capabilities or behaviors, but because we know how they work (mechanically at least) and it is incompatible with useful definitions of the word "intent." I've never seen this deter anyone. I can't understand how people that know how they work can have such ridiculous ideas about llms. I'd add though that inference is clearly fixed but there is some more subtlety about training. Gradient descent c…
The most useful definitions have predictive power.
When you say upsetting things to bing chat, you'll find the conversation prematurely end.
You can cry all you want about how bing isn't really upset. How it doesn't really have intention to end the chat but those are evidently useless defitions because the chat did end.
A definition that treats Bing as an intentful system is more accurate to what happens in reality.
Re: A Multi-Level View of LLM Intentionality
#23I'm not sure the definition of "intention" the article suggests is a useful one. He tries to make it sound like he's being conservative: > That is, we should ascribe intentions to a system if and only if it helps to predict and explain the behaviour of the system. Whether it really has intentions beyond this is not a question I am attempting to answer (and I think that it is probably not determinate in any case). And…
Uh, hold on. That's not what's meant by intentionality. No one is talking about what a machine intends to do. In philosophy, and specifically philosophy of mind, "intentionality" is, briefly, "the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs" [0]. So the problem with this guy's definition of intentionality is, first, that it's a redefinition. If…
Some philosophers take that position. Dennett, explicitly cited in the article, wrote The Intentional Stance (1987) about exactly the approach to intentionality taken in the article. His approach is accepted by many philosophers.
As you point out, the approach you cite can't be used in a materialist metaphysical position. That's a pretty severe problem for that definition! So Dennett's approach, or something like it, has major advantages.
Re: A Multi-Level View of LLM Intentionality
#24I'm not sure the definition of "intention" the article suggests is a useful one. He tries to make it sound like he's being conservative: > That is, we should ascribe intentions to a system if and only if it helps to predict and explain the behaviour of the system. Whether it really has intentions beyond this is not a question I am attempting to answer (and I think that it is probably not determinate in any case). And…
Uh, hold on. That's not what's meant by intentionality. No one is talking about what a machine intends to do. In philosophy, and specifically philosophy of mind, "intentionality" is, briefly, "the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs" [0]. So the problem with this guy's definition of intentionality is, first, that it's a redefinition. If…
Also, you are obviously wrong (or rhetorical?) when you say "No one is talking about what a machine intends to do." We certainly do! You can say "No one should" or other normative condemnations but then we're arguing on different territory.
Re: A Multi-Level View of LLM Intentionality
#25Earlier quoted context omitted.
Not because of their capabilities or behaviors, but because we know how they work (mechanically at least) and it is incompatible with useful definitions of the word "intent." I've never seen this deter anyone. I can't understand how people that know how they work can have such ridiculous ideas about llms. I'd add though that inference is clearly fixed but there is some more subtlety about training. Gradient descent c…
The most useful definitions have predictive power. When you say upsetting things to bing chat, you'll find the conversation prematurely end. You can cry all you want about how bing isn't really upset. How it doesn't really have intention to end the chat but those are evidently useless defitions because the chat did end. A definition that treats Bing as an intentful system is more accurate to what happens in reality.
That might be useful in helping a child learn to use it, it has no value when actually studying neural networks. You could equally pretend the sun sets every night because it's upset from shining all day.
Re: A Multi-Level View of LLM Intentionality
#26Earlier quoted context omitted.
The most useful definitions have predictive power. When you say upsetting things to bing chat, you'll find the conversation prematurely end. You can cry all you want about how bing isn't really upset. How it doesn't really have intention to end the chat but those are evidently useless defitions because the chat did end. A definition that treats Bing as an intentful system is more accurate to what happens in reality.
That might be useful in helping a child learn to use it, it has no value when actually studying neural networks. You could equally pretend the sun sets every night because it's upset from shining all day.
>That might be useful in helping a child learn to use it
It is useful for anyone looking to use such systems. A LLM piloted robot could potentially pick up a knife and stab you because you obstructed some goal or said mean words and pretending it didn't have intent to do so won't bring you back to life. Acting like it does could help avoid such a scenario.
>You could equally pretend the sun sets every night because it's upset from shining all day.
No you couldn't.
The conversation ended prematurely because of your input. There is zero ambiguity on the relation.
But because you ascribe intent to bing, you can predict (accurately) that saying nice things will not end the conversation.
LLMs act like they have intent. This is a matter of conceding they do or not. Conceding so is more useful because it has more accurate predictive power than the alternative. This becomes plain when LLMs are allowed more actions than just conversation.
>it has no value when actually studying neural networks.
On the contrary. Now you know that certain things are unnecessary to build a system that acts like it has intent.
Re: A Multi-Level View of LLM Intentionality
#27Earlier quoted context omitted.
The article provides a very clear reason for using the idea of "intention": that framing helps us understand and predict the behavior. In contrast framing a mathematical function as having "intention" doesn't help. The underlying mechanism isn't relevant to this criterion. Clearly the system we're understanding as "intentional" has state; we can engage in multi-round interactions. It doesn't matter that we can separa…
A mathematical function isn't a mechanism. It has no causal power.
Sure, but we're talking mathematical functions that have been given physical form, by attaching them to input and output devices. Or, am I missing something? For other examples, see anything automated with a motor, and some decision tree, semi chaotic or not.
Re: A Multi-Level View of LLM Intentionality
#28Earlier quoted context omitted.
The most useful definitions have predictive power. When you say upsetting things to bing chat, you'll find the conversation prematurely end. You can cry all you want about how bing isn't really upset. How it doesn't really have intention to end the chat but those are evidently useless defitions because the chat did end. A definition that treats Bing as an intentful system is more accurate to what happens in reality.
That might be useful in helping a child learn to use it, it has no value when actually studying neural networks. You could equally pretend the sun sets every night because it's upset from shining all day.
>You could equally pretend the sun sets every night because it's upset from shining all day.
That would describe quite a lot of ancient religious beliefs about the Sun
Re: A Multi-Level View of LLM Intentionality
#29Earlier quoted context omitted.
Ascribing human properties to computers and software has always seemed very bizarre to me. I always assume people are confused when they do that. There is no meaningful intersection between biology, intelligence, and computers but people constantly keep trying to imbue electromagnetic signal processors with human/biological qualities very much like how children attribute souls to teddy bears. Computers are mechanical…
He was inspired by lesswrong which from my scan more mysticism and philosophy (with a handful of self importance) than anything about how computers work. Advanced technology is magic to laypeople. It's like how some people believe in homeopathy. If you don't understand how medicine works, it's just a different kind of magic.
I guess that might be tied up with human biology, the need to attribute agency to inanimate objects. That one is a worthwhile puzzle to figure out but most people seem more mesmerized by blinking lights and shiny gadgets than any real philosophical problems.
Re: A Multi-Level View of LLM Intentionality
#30Earlier quoted context omitted.
Can we say ChatGPT or its future versions would be like an instantiation of the Boltzmann Brain concept if it has internal qualia? The "brain" comes alive with the rich structure only to disappear after the chat session is over.
Cool way of putting it. Let's run with that. A good actor can be seen as instantiating a Boltzmann Brain while on stage -- especially when improvising (as always may be needed). Maybe each of us is instantiating some superposition of Boltzmann Brains in everyday life as we wend our way through various social roles... From now on I'll listen for the subtle popping sounds as these BBs get instantiated and de-instantiat…
In a sense, we are facilitating BBs generation by providing it with rich mathematical space. The rich structure makes BBs more probable than normal randomness allows for.