Earlier quoted context omitted.
There's also the opposite pressure. As a CO, you can demote people, but they're still under your command. To be effective you can't just rely on shedding dead weight like in the civilian sector. You're stuck with the subordinates you get more or less, so to hit your goals you practically have to actually invest in your subordinates, mainly by coaching and mentoring them. And you can quiet quit in the military just as…
How would you compare the whole chain of command aspect? I worked with an ex-military guy in a small company (just under 100 headcount size) and his ideas about how a rigid hierarchy was supposed to work often clashed with the horizontal/start-up style of management everyone else had.
US Army Field Manual on Leadership (1990) [pdf]
21–30 of 129 posts
Re: US Army Field Manual on Leadership (1990) [pdf]
#22Nothing the military puts out on leadership should be taken very seriously because of the UCMJ and because unhappy people can't quit with serious repercussions. Anyone can make a team be productive when you can overwork people, if things don't get done you threaten to take their money and threaten a demotion, no one can quit to get away from you, and there is a steady stream of bodies to use. Civilian leaders have to…
> Civilian leaders have to actually balance keeping people happy and getting things done. I disagree. There are plenty of workers who don't respond productively to being treated well. Many take advantage and play games to avoid work. Being nice doesn't change anything. What gets things done is spelling everything out. All roles and responsibilities are crystal clear. Commitment to agreed upon schedules and plans is r…
Re: US Army Field Manual on Leadership (1990) [pdf]
#23Another good book in this vein is "Turn the ship around!": https://davidmarquet.com/turn-the-ship-around-book/ Which is written by a navy submarine captain, about how he turned one of the lowest performing crews into a high performing crews that went on to become leaders elsewhere. It really spoke to helping align motivation, and making a path forward for success, which actually is somewhat easier in the military bec…
Aren't there also many dead ends in the military?
Re: US Army Field Manual on Leadership (1990) [pdf]
#24Earlier quoted context omitted.
There's also the opposite pressure. As a CO, you can demote people, but they're still under your command. To be effective you can't just rely on shedding dead weight like in the civilian sector. You're stuck with the subordinates you get more or less, so to hit your goals you practically have to actually invest in your subordinates, mainly by coaching and mentoring them. And you can quiet quit in the military just as…
How would you compare the whole chain of command aspect? I worked with an ex-military guy in a small company (just under 100 headcount size) and his ideas about how a rigid hierarchy was supposed to work often clashed with the horizontal/start-up style of management everyone else had.
Not op, but…
It depends on how “ex” this vet was and what his MOS was. Specifically:
1. A lot of modern military leadership (esp. in the battlefield) is about giving the folks on the frontlines (figuratively and literally) the information and autonomy they need to make the best decisions for the mission. Some older vets may not have experienced this shift.
2. Some MOSes lend themselves to a strict hierarchy and SOPs, often because it’s just prudent for the job at hand. Others are not as highly structured.
Re: US Army Field Manual on Leadership (1990) [pdf]
#25Earlier quoted context omitted.
Just curious: Have you served (in the military)?
Yes, 02-05, OEF/OIF 11b got out as an E4. I was incredibly unimpressed with military leadership. You can read about my old BC if you're interested: https://journalnow.com/colonels-wife-in-middle-of-military-w...
* Grew up in the USAF, served in the USN
Re: US Army Field Manual on Leadership (1990) [pdf]
#26Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Civilian leaders have to actually balance keeping people happy and getting things done. I disagree. There are plenty of workers who don't respond productively to being treated well. Many take advantage and play games to avoid work. Being nice doesn't change anything. What gets things done is spelling everything out. All roles and responsibilities are crystal clear. Commitment to agreed upon schedules and plans is r…
Schedules and plans in software engineering bring neither clearness nor happiness.
Schedules are more than deadlines. As long as progress is being made and what's being delivered stays on a similar timeline with other dependent projects, it's fine.
Plans are more than implementation details. If the solution meets requirements, it's fine.
Re: US Army Field Manual on Leadership (1990) [pdf]
#27Nothing the military puts out on leadership should be taken very seriously because of the UCMJ and because unhappy people can't quit with serious repercussions. Anyone can make a team be productive when you can overwork people, if things don't get done you threaten to take their money and threaten a demotion, no one can quit to get away from you, and there is a steady stream of bodies to use. Civilian leaders have to…
There's also the opposite pressure. As a CO, you can demote people, but they're still under your command. To be effective you can't just rely on shedding dead weight like in the civilian sector. You're stuck with the subordinates you get more or less, so to hit your goals you practically have to actually invest in your subordinates, mainly by coaching and mentoring them. And you can quiet quit in the military just as…
> To be effective you can't just rely on shedding dead weight like in the civilian sector.
You can though. You shuffle the complete duds/ineffective people off to S&T or an ops shop where they can't get anyone killed. You micromanage the unmotivated and threaten with article 15s. The completely unfit? They're "encouraged" to be failure to adapt or to go AWOL.
Re: US Army Field Manual on Leadership (1990) [pdf]
#28Nothing the military puts out on leadership should be taken very seriously because of the UCMJ and because unhappy people can't quit with serious repercussions. Anyone can make a team be productive when you can overwork people, if things don't get done you threaten to take their money and threaten a demotion, no one can quit to get away from you, and there is a steady stream of bodies to use. Civilian leaders have to…
Leadership in the military works different than in other institutions. It is one of the only systems that I know of where authority is bound with responsibility. As a leader you are held to account for your actions and the actions of your subordinates because of your authority over them(IMO police should be held to at least this standard if not higher as they are granted permission to assault, detain or use lethal force against anyone as they see fit). It is common for NCOs to be reprimanded for the failings of the subordinates because it is often characterized that the leader failed them because they did not train or oversee them properly. There is some fault tolerance built in (with leaders spot checking leaders below them by checking their subordinates) but the system will break down if you have multiple levels of failed leaders within the chain of command.
The truth in the military though, is that this authority is mostly an illusion. There are many terrible leaders that do not understand this. They believe once you attain a position you are entitled to give whatever orders you like and that people cannot refuse them. This is true in civilian life as well as military. However, a good leader knows that their subordinates grant them authority over them. Understanding that, this is where much of the military leadership philosophy comes into play: lead by example, taking care of your team, morale, etc. These things are of much more critical importance in military roles because of the levels of risk, tension, and stress are often very high.
Re: US Army Field Manual on Leadership (1990) [pdf]
#29Another good book in this vein is "Turn the ship around!": https://davidmarquet.com/turn-the-ship-around-book/ Which is written by a navy submarine captain, about how he turned one of the lowest performing crews into a high performing crews that went on to become leaders elsewhere. It really spoke to helping align motivation, and making a path forward for success, which actually is somewhat easier in the military bec…
This is an interesting point. Being an ex-submariner, I do miss the unambiguous nature of knowing precisely what I needed to do next in terms of career progression. We had manuals for everything (big thick ones on the nuclear side), and anyone that was ahead of you had already learned what you were studying, so in (most) cases, you could ask questions and get reasonable answers. Everything was laid out in qualifications and each qualification had a static set of requirements that were well documented.
Re: US Army Field Manual on Leadership (1990) [pdf]
#30Earlier quoted context omitted.
There's an argument to be made that the military employs socialization tactics often found in cults, such as group mentality--I'll be the first to concede that. But the notion that the military's 'objective' is the "continuous exploitation of lower level persons" is utter nonsense. The objective of the U.S. Military is to fight and win wars. There's been a lot of social science put into the military on how best to ac…
> But the notion that the military's 'objective' is the "continuous exploitation of lower level persons" is utter nonsense. Is it? > The objective of the U.S. Military is to fight and win wars. Is it? > The most effective leaders care for and inspire their subordinates, which yields more cohesive teams and higher productivity. The military teaches this constantly. The military programs people, like hypnosis + operant…
The only reason to even have a military is to have the ability to fight and win wars. If your military can't do that, it's not worth having at all.
> The military programs people, like hypnosis + operant conditioning, to respond instantly and consistently to stimuli.
Is this based on personal experience? If so, how recent? My experience in the military is several decades old, but the above is not a good description of what I experienced then.