Is there a way to prevent websites from the broader Internet from making network requests to my local network? I can't imagine why this should be allowed by default. (Not to suggest bringing back IE's Local Intranet Zone permission...)
They generally can't, because of CORS. The only reason this "hack" works is because the timing of the rejection is different between non-resolving domain request and resolving-but-rejected request. But if you run something on https://192.168.2.1 it can't be accessed from a web app running on https://my-own-domain.com unless the service running at 192.168.2.1 allows the "Origin" my-own-domain.com.
Brute-forcing a macOS user’s real name from a browser using mDNS
21–30 of 168 posts
Re: Brute-forcing a macOS user’s real name from a browser using mDNS
#22As part of my standard (and pretty lame) OPSEC I always change the default names that apple gives its devices (like "Joiqj's iPhone") to a more generic name (like "iPhone"). Nice to see that it was good practice.
I do the opposite: one of my laptops is named "Peter's iPhone" (hint: my name is not Peter, nor do I own an iPhone) and I've also set all my Bluetooth to random Bluetooth headset or mouse models.
Re: Brute-forcing a macOS user’s real name from a browser using mDNS
#23As part of my standard (and pretty lame) OPSEC I always change the default names that apple gives its devices (like "Joiqj's iPhone") to a more generic name (like "iPhone"). Nice to see that it was good practice.
It might sound a bit silly, but I've had pretty good results just naming my devices after Pokemon. Whenever I have a new device, I open the Pokemon DB[0], choose one at random, and then add it to my .csv file of device names -> what they are and what role they perform. [0]: https://www.pokemon.com/uk/pokedex
Re: Brute-forcing a macOS user’s real name from a browser using mDNS
#24In the example above, the difference is four milliseconds for a valid address versus five seconds for an invalid one. This is surprising --- I'd expect a DNS lookup failure to be much faster than a default connection timeout which comes after a successful DNS lookup. That said, I've always found the s-mac-xxxx to be a bit of an odd choice, especially considering it's from a company that advertises privacy as a huge s…
Unlike regular DNS where you're asking a single server at a single IP for a yes/no answer, mDNS is multicast, so no single server can authoritatively say no†. You can only detect that there are no records when the lookup times out because no servers have responded.
† Not technically true, a device can say no if it knows it owns that name.
Re: Brute-forcing a macOS user’s real name from a browser using mDNS
#25Earlier quoted context omitted.
They generally can't, because of CORS. The only reason this "hack" works is because the timing of the rejection is different between non-resolving domain request and resolving-but-rejected request. But if you run something on https://192.168.2.1 it can't be accessed from a web app running on https://my-own-domain.com unless the service running at 192.168.2.1 allows the "Origin" my-own-domain.com.
Technically they can make the request. The server will receive and respond to the request. CORS is applied by the browser which prevents the response from being read. This is why CORS doesn't prevent a request from mutating something on a server. A CSRF token does.
Re: Brute-forcing a macOS user’s real name from a browser using mDNS
#26In the example above, the difference is four milliseconds for a valid address versus five seconds for an invalid one. This is surprising --- I'd expect a DNS lookup failure to be much faster than a default connection timeout which comes after a successful DNS lookup. That said, I've always found the s-mac-xxxx to be a bit of an odd choice, especially considering it's from a company that advertises privacy as a huge s…
In addition to the sibling's comment, the other factor is that they received a "connection refused" -- RST, not a connection timeout.
Re: Brute-forcing a macOS user’s real name from a browser using mDNS
#27Is there a way to prevent websites from the broader Internet from making network requests to my local network? I can't imagine why this should be allowed by default. (Not to suggest bringing back IE's Local Intranet Zone permission...)
Re: Brute-forcing a macOS user’s real name from a browser using mDNS
#28As part of my standard (and pretty lame) OPSEC I always change the default names that apple gives its devices (like "Joiqj's iPhone") to a more generic name (like "iPhone"). Nice to see that it was good practice.
It might sound a bit silly, but I've had pretty good results just naming my devices after Pokemon. Whenever I have a new device, I open the Pokemon DB[0], choose one at random, and then add it to my .csv file of device names -> what they are and what role they perform. [0]: https://www.pokemon.com/uk/pokedex
Back in college my boss named a sun workstation lab with aleutian islands, and another after indonesian islands. (Some of those were fun to remember, there was an umnak and an unimak.) The servers were named after seas and oceans. We tried to name a new lab of windows machines after bugs, but the department nixed that.
Re: Brute-forcing a macOS user’s real name from a browser using mDNS
#29As part of my standard (and pretty lame) OPSEC I always change the default names that apple gives its devices (like "Joiqj's iPhone") to a more generic name (like "iPhone"). Nice to see that it was good practice.
Re: Brute-forcing a macOS user’s real name from a browser using mDNS
#30Earlier quoted context omitted.
I do the opposite: one of my laptops is named "Peter's iPhone" (hint: my name is not Peter, nor do I own an iPhone) and I've also set all my Bluetooth to random Bluetooth headset or mouse models.
My hotspot on my phone is "FBI van 4"