Cool trick - they're using HTTP auth URLs[1] so that the @ sign is doing a lot of the heavy lifting (plus some clever unicode slashes). It's an old school phishing trick, with the additional layer of looking like a genuine zip file. Not sure if this trick would be too effective in real life, Firefox and likely others will give you warnings when logging into a site like this, as this form of HTTP auth is way deprecate…
Deceptive example for malicious usage of .zip domain
21–30 of 44 posts
Re: Deceptive example for malicious usage of .zip domain
#22How is this different from paypal.com@notpaypal.com?
What you have in your comment is an email address, where anti-phishing training has hopefully helped users to identify non-authentic or at least suspicious domains. We (should) know to look at the part after the "@" in an email. This trick is a URL, not an email address. It looks like a valid URL, because we are accustomed to checking the hostname for authenticity. But the URL in the post is crafted to look like the…
Re: Deceptive example for malicious usage of .zip domain
#23Can't wait for the .exe domain.
Re: Deceptive example for malicious usage of .zip domain
#24Cool trick - they're using HTTP auth URLs[1] so that the @ sign is doing a lot of the heavy lifting (plus some clever unicode slashes). It's an old school phishing trick, with the additional layer of looking like a genuine zip file. Not sure if this trick would be too effective in real life, Firefox and likely others will give you warnings when logging into a site like this, as this form of HTTP auth is way deprecate…
I haven’t seen this combination of Unicode forward slashes and http auth before. I would have fallen for it. Does anyone maintain a kind of “phishing URL menagerie” of interesting cases like this?
In this case, the browsers I use don't fall for it. Hovering over the link shows the real domain. The browser I use on my work iphone also does something sensible, but I can't remember what. Obviously I can't hover on that device.
Re: Deceptive example for malicious usage of .zip domain
#25https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/archive/refs/tags/@... I get a: "404: Not Found" from the site "codeload.github.com"
Re: Deceptive example for malicious usage of .zip domain
#26Earlier quoted context omitted.
I haven’t seen this combination of Unicode forward slashes and http auth before. I would have fallen for it. Does anyone maintain a kind of “phishing URL menagerie” of interesting cases like this?
Sort of. The browser vendors work hard to keep deceptive links and sites from fooling users. In this case, the browsers I use don't fall for it. Hovering over the link shows the real domain. The browser I use on my work iphone also does something sensible, but I can't remember what. Obviously I can't hover on that device.
Re: Deceptive example for malicious usage of .zip domain
#27Cool trick - they're using HTTP auth URLs[1] so that the @ sign is doing a lot of the heavy lifting (plus some clever unicode slashes). It's an old school phishing trick, with the additional layer of looking like a genuine zip file. Not sure if this trick would be too effective in real life, Firefox and likely others will give you warnings when logging into a site like this, as this form of HTTP auth is way deprecate…
Re: Deceptive example for malicious usage of .zip domain
#28Here's the original source by the author: https://scribe.rip/@bobbyrsec/the-dangers-of-googles-zip-tld... While I think that we really don't need a .zip domain, this trick falls apart when not shown as an image. Hovering over either URL should tip you off. Firefox shows the actual link in the bottom left.
> Hovering over either URL should tip you off. Firefox shows the actual link in the bottom left. Most people don't even know what a URL is, let alone how to discover this kind of deception by looking at the hover info.
Re: Deceptive example for malicious usage of .zip domain
#29> 28. Abuse Prevention and Mitigation [...] all registered domain names will be subject to a Domain Name Anti-Abuse Policy (“Abuse Policy”). The Abuse Policy will provide CRR with broad power to suspend, cancel, or transfer domain names that violate the Abuse Policy. We plan to post the Abuse Policy on a publicly facing website at nic.zip⁄abuse
The policy document in question cannot, in fact, be found at that* address (because they're using a wildcard URL-rewriting redirect for nic.zip that ends up pointing to a bogus URL on registry.google).
* Actually, anyone familiar with IANA applications will be aware that the applications posted publicly end up, coincidentally enough, mangling all references to URLs because slashes get transformed into U+2044 FRACTION SLASH, so if you actually tried to dereference that, you'll end up on a path dealing in punycode TLDs—specifically "xn--zipabuse-g03d" in this case, which has not (yet) been delegated to anyone.
Re: Deceptive example for malicious usage of .zip domain
#30I am not sure what this does that cant be made with a href tag with text and a tooltip.
There are lots of contexts where you can't use an href tag. Twitter maybe?