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The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]

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21–30 of 113 posts

Re: The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]

#21
post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"F-35 is bad" is just an internet meme with little to support it.

It's more like the F35 over promises and under delivers compared to what it is expected to replace. The F15 comes with a 20,000 hour airframe, while the F35 comes with a 8000 hour airframe. The F15 can get to target much faster, much farther, and still have fuel to do something when it gets there. The F15 can carry 12 AIM-120s (or 24 depending), while the F35 can carry 4. The F15's a great interceptor. The F35 is a g…

This is why both platforms were designed to be used together as a team. F-35 provides sensor fusion and the F-15 is the missile truck. That also allows the F-35 to continue to evade detection, since launching attacks tends to get you noticed by the enemy.

Modern air combat can't be measured in direct comparison like this, or even thought of in terms of "we should be using X instead of Y"

The F-35 costs are also going down relative to it's peer group as the export market has grown significantly. The F-35s issue is that it's misunderstood, not that it doesn't meet expectations.

Re: The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]

#22
post #10

For those of you using CA Harvest Software Change Manager, it has it's origins with Hughes Aircraft and the software written for the F-15. It was sold commercially as CCC/Harvest by Softool Corp starting in the late 1970's. Looks like Broadcom is the newest owner. It's still being used - the last time I encountered it was in 2009 at a large bank.

[deleted]

Re: The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]

#23

> OSD, however, refused to tolerate this kind of intransigence and in May 1966 McNamara ordered a joint review of the commonality issue. Conducted over the next 18 months, the review confirmed that the needs of the Air Force and Navy could not be met by a single airframe. The two services argued that attempts to merge their requirements would produce, at exorbitant cost, a grotesque mutation with increased weight, an…

". The first time the opponents showed up [in the training area] they had wing tanks along with a bunch of missiles. I guess they figured that being in a dirty configuration wouldn’t really matter and that they would still easily outmaneuver us. By the end of the week, though, they had dropped their wing tanks, transitioned to a single centerline fuel tank and were still doing everything they could not to get gunned by us. A week later they stripped the jets clean of all external stores, which made the BFM fights interesting, to say the least"

(source attached to this post https://www.f-16.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=54012 )

F35 can hold their own quite well. Disregard the 2015 report with the limiting software, this is where they are at, and things will only improve with the new engine

Re: The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]

#24
post #3

The "Dissent and Decision" section is fun. Reads very much as a battle over egos and personalities rather than the technical merits of a particular aircraft.

That tends to happen because military procurement is always a set of compromises, so there lies a tremendous amount of room for basically arguing about how to weigh the different requirements/criteria/mission sets. Also while the article vindicates Sprey's want of having a lightweight fighter, the reality is that while lightweight fighters did come, they quickly became exactly what Sprey would not have wanted (once t…

The 16 wouldnt exist if not for the 15. It, and the 18, were a direct reaction to the size and complexity of the 15. The 16 even shared the same engine, making it very much the little brother of the 15.

Re: The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]

#25
post #19

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's more like the F35 over promises and under delivers compared to what it is expected to replace. The F15 comes with a 20,000 hour airframe, while the F35 comes with a 8000 hour airframe. The F15 can get to target much faster, much farther, and still have fuel to do something when it gets there. The F15 can carry 12 AIM-120s (or 24 depending), while the F35 can carry 4. The F15's a great interceptor. The F35 is a g…

Isn’t the F22 the successor to the F15, being air superiority fighters?

It was, but since 22 production has stopped and there are plenty of 15s around, the 35 is often paird up with the 15 for wargaming. Doctrine and training is always dictated by practicalities like which aircraft you have to play with.

Re: The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]

#26
post #3

The "Dissent and Decision" section is fun. Reads very much as a battle over egos and personalities rather than the technical merits of a particular aircraft.

That tends to happen because military procurement is always a set of compromises, so there lies a tremendous amount of room for basically arguing about how to weigh the different requirements/criteria/mission sets. Also while the article vindicates Sprey's want of having a lightweight fighter, the reality is that while lightweight fighters did come, they quickly became exactly what Sprey would not have wanted (once t…

Wikipedia disagrees and claims the last BVR missile engagement at BVR range was 30 years ago and BVR missiles are usually combat ineffective.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beyond-visual-range_missile

BVR is kind of a cold war tech; "its WW3 shoot down all the soviet bombers" it doesn't have another mission at this time. To risky to use.

Re: The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]

#27
post #3

The "Dissent and Decision" section is fun. Reads very much as a battle over egos and personalities rather than the technical merits of a particular aircraft.

That tends to happen because military procurement is always a set of compromises, so there lies a tremendous amount of room for basically arguing about how to weigh the different requirements/criteria/mission sets. Also while the article vindicates Sprey's want of having a lightweight fighter, the reality is that while lightweight fighters did come, they quickly became exactly what Sprey would not have wanted (once t…

The Boyd biography by Robert Coram tells the story of the battle between the Fighter Mafia and the Bomber Generals. It also talks about, what I'd at best call regulatory capture. There was an outrageous series of events around procurement of the Bradley fighting vehicle. An excerpt from the craziness that ensued:

"The Bradley was a tragedy waiting to happen. It was packed with ammunition, fuel, and people. The thinnest of aluminum armor surrounded it. So Burton sent the Army’s ballistic research laboratory $500,000 to test the Bradley, and he insisted the testing use real Soviet weapons. The Army agreed. But the first of the “realistic” tests consisted of firing Rumanian-made rockets at the Bradley rather than Soviet-made ones. The Army buried the fact that the Rumanian weapons had warheads far smaller than those used by the Soviets. To further insure that the Bradley appeared impregnable, the Army filled the internal fuel tanks with water rather than with diesel fuel. This guaranteed that even if the underpowered Rumanian warheads penetrated the Bradley’s protective armor, no explosion would result. “What are you going to do about this, Jim?” Boyd asked. “If you let them get away with this, they will try something else.” Burton still believed his job gave him the authority to force the Army to live up to its word. He tried to use persuasion and logic with Army officials, but to no avail. When early tests detected large amounts of toxic gases inside the Bradley, the Army simply stopped measuring the gas. They jammed pigs and sheep inside the Bradley to test the effects of fumes after a direct hit. But the fumes had hardly dissipated before the Army slaughtered the animals without examining them"

Really makes you wonder what procurement is actually about. I believe this was the basis for the movie The Pentagon Wars which I haven't seen.

Re: The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]

#28
post #15
post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

We can revisit it after it is proven in combat, something that still has to happen.

The Israelis have released footage of shooting down two drones, so they have the first kills with the F-35. Obviously this was not against a maneuvering human pilot, but still important. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AdSFEpqwA6Q

They also have multiple (unproven but everyone knows who did it) strikes against iranian positions in syria and even in iran itself, it is rumoured. The ability to be invisible to radar is an absolute gamechanger.

Re: The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]

#29
post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

We can revisit it after it is proven in combat, something that still has to happen.

The F-35 has been proven in simulations with aggressor squadrons. The Air Force does that all the time: real aircraft in the air, real pilots, real weapons, they just don't actually shoot them for obvious reasons. But they have other ways of simulating kills. https://www.businessinsider.com/f-22-pilot-describes-going-u... Here's what a F-22 pilot (!) had to say about the F-35. "It is challenging, even flying the Rapt…

I think this combined with the carrier capability is the scariest for the enemy. You'll never be sure there aren't F-35s around.

Re: The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]

#30

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That tends to happen because military procurement is always a set of compromises, so there lies a tremendous amount of room for basically arguing about how to weigh the different requirements/criteria/mission sets. Also while the article vindicates Sprey's want of having a lightweight fighter, the reality is that while lightweight fighters did come, they quickly became exactly what Sprey would not have wanted (once t…

The Boyd biography by Robert Coram tells the story of the battle between the Fighter Mafia and the Bomber Generals. It also talks about, what I'd at best call regulatory capture. There was an outrageous series of events around procurement of the Bradley fighting vehicle. An excerpt from the craziness that ensued: "The Bradley was a tragedy waiting to happen. It was packed with ammunition, fuel, and people. The thinne…

My recollection is that Burton didn't understand the purpose of the tests nor the system he was raging against. If the Bradley was totally annihilated in the test, there'd be nothing to analyze and nothing would be learned (other than a Bradley is obviously not a tank, which is also why it was not called a tank). His objections were misplaced and so failed to have much influence outside of an entertaining film starring Cary Elwes.
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