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Logistics, How Did They Do It, Part I: The Problem

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Re: Logistics, How Did They Do It, Part I: The Problem

#21

Post by gregsadetsky »

rich_sasha wrote: post #7
herodotus wrote: post #2

Are there any computer or table top war games that deal in a somewhat realistic way with logistics?

This one [1] is famously detailed. There are 23 pages in the manual dedicated just to logistics. A famous example of the level of detail is that Italian troops require an extra portion of water supplies to cook pasta. As per the linked article: > Reviewer Luke Winkie pointed out that "If you and your group meets for three hours at a time, twice a month, you’d wrap up the campaign in about 20 years. [1] https://en.wik…

192 pages total. Wow.

https://web.archive.org/web/20220608080417/https://www.spiga...

Re: Logistics, How Did They Do It, Part I: The Problem

#22

Post by secabeen »

gregsadetsky wrote: post #21
rich_sasha wrote: post #7

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This one [1] is famously detailed. There are 23 pages in the manual dedicated just to logistics. A famous example of the level of detail is that Italian troops require an extra portion of water supplies to cook pasta. As per the linked article: > Reviewer Luke Winkie pointed out that "If you and your group meets for three hours at a time, twice a month, you’d wrap up the campaign in about 20 years. [1] https://en.wik…

192 pages total. Wow. https://web.archive.org/web/20220608080417/https://www.spiga...

It's an open question how many actual complete games of this have been played. It certainly didn't get the level of playtesting by the designers that most other games did; they just didn't have time.

Advanced Squad Leader has more pages of rules, especially when you add the campaign options.

Re: Logistics, How Did They Do It, Part I: The Problem

#23

Post by msla »

Animats wrote: post #20

We can see this today with Russia's early Ukraine campaign. The attacking armored forces moved fast at first, but outran their logistics tail. Large military operations have reasonably well defended rear bases, a moving attack front, and a "communications region" in between. The communications region is vulnerable; the attackers don't yet have full control of that region. Both air and ground attacks on the communicat…

> So, having failed at a complicated, fast campaign, Russia has moved to a simpler form - bring up many troops and artillery and slowly pound the opposition into rubble. It's like WWI. That kind of war can go on for years if enough resources are available. It seems to be working for Russia.

"Working" to the extent a country with a GDP smaller than California's is in a war of attrition against NATO.

Re: Logistics, How Did They Do It, Part I: The Problem

#24

Post by pessimizer »

msla wrote: post #23
Animats wrote: post #20

We can see this today with Russia's early Ukraine campaign. The attacking armored forces moved fast at first, but outran their logistics tail. Large military operations have reasonably well defended rear bases, a moving attack front, and a "communications region" in between. The communications region is vulnerable; the attackers don't yet have full control of that region. Both air and ground attacks on the communicat…

> So, having failed at a complicated, fast campaign, Russia has moved to a simpler form - bring up many troops and artillery and slowly pound the opposition into rubble. It's like WWI. That kind of war can go on for years if enough resources are available. It seems to be working for Russia. "Working" to the extent a country with a GDP smaller than California's is in a war of attrition against NATO.

To be fair, the US has made a habit of losing against countries with GDPs closer to Ukraine than to Russia.

Re: Logistics, How Did They Do It, Part I: The Problem

#25

Post by sbierwagen »

msla wrote: post #23
Animats wrote: post #20

We can see this today with Russia's early Ukraine campaign. The attacking armored forces moved fast at first, but outran their logistics tail. Large military operations have reasonably well defended rear bases, a moving attack front, and a "communications region" in between. The communications region is vulnerable; the attackers don't yet have full control of that region. Both air and ground attacks on the communicat…

> So, having failed at a complicated, fast campaign, Russia has moved to a simpler form - bring up many troops and artillery and slowly pound the opposition into rubble. It's like WWI. That kind of war can go on for years if enough resources are available. It seems to be working for Russia. "Working" to the extent a country with a GDP smaller than California's is in a war of attrition against NATO.

Russia has a "smaller" GDP than California, but check the price of electricity in western Europe today. Few industries in Germany can survive energy prices tripling. It won't be much of a war of attrition with "NATO" if a bunch of NATO members drop out and pursue a separate peace.

Re: Logistics, How Did They Do It, Part I: The Problem

#27

Post by labster »

sbierwagen wrote: post #25
msla wrote: post #23

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> So, having failed at a complicated, fast campaign, Russia has moved to a simpler form - bring up many troops and artillery and slowly pound the opposition into rubble. It's like WWI. That kind of war can go on for years if enough resources are available. It seems to be working for Russia. "Working" to the extent a country with a GDP smaller than California's is in a war of attrition against NATO.

Russia has a "smaller" GDP than California, but check the price of electricity in western Europe today. Few industries in Germany can survive energy prices tripling. It won't be much of a war of attrition with "NATO" if a bunch of NATO members drop out and pursue a separate peace.

It’s too bad when countries like Germany haven’t learned to live within their means. Decades of mismanagement have a price.

Re: Logistics, How Did They Do It, Part I: The Problem

#28

Post by lobocinza »

herodotus wrote: post #2

Are there any computer or table top war games that deal in a somewhat realistic way with logistics?

Logistics (moving trucks with supply, building FOBs, resupplying troops, etc) are essential in Squad. It's a multiplayer action game and the closer that I got to "I feel like I'm in a modern combat and suffering from PTSD." You may also like Foxtrot, it visually isn't realistic but economy and logistics are everything. And Wargame: Red Dragon which is a RTS game and the closer that I got to understanding modern combat meta, equipment and tactics.

War is sad but it's funny that many of the things that I saw on Wargame are also happening on the Russia x Ukraine war. Like suicidal helo rushes, combats quickly protracting, bloody urban combats, advanced tanks being wrecked by cheap ATGM, artillery spam, counter-artillery duels and ammo reserves quickly running out. Though no game ever gets closer to the scale that is real war.

Re: Logistics, How Did They Do It, Part I: The Problem

#29

Post by shakezula »

pessimizer wrote: post #24
msla wrote: post #23

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> So, having failed at a complicated, fast campaign, Russia has moved to a simpler form - bring up many troops and artillery and slowly pound the opposition into rubble. It's like WWI. That kind of war can go on for years if enough resources are available. It seems to be working for Russia. "Working" to the extent a country with a GDP smaller than California's is in a war of attrition against NATO.

To be fair, the US has made a habit of losing against countries with GDPs closer to Ukraine than to Russia.

There’s gotta be some like inverse square law for how difficult a war is to win against a smaller and smaller nation.

Re: Logistics, How Did They Do It, Part I: The Problem

#30

Post by photochemsyn »

An interesting case of logistics deciding outcomes is the North Africa campaign in World War II. It's discussed in Daniel Yergin's "The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power" in some depth, and there are a few other sources.

Essentially, this is where the code-breaking efforts of Bletchley Park had a major result. The reason that Rommel had such shortages of fuel, according to Yergin and other sources, was that Enigma intercepts allowed the Allies to destroy several critical fuel convoys, limiting Rommel's maneuverability:

https://www.e-education.psu.edu/egee120/node/242

> "General Rommel was committed to a war of movement and boldness. In addition to his talent for tactics, he could also improvise. One thing he could not do, however, was fake the fact that mobile warfare was absolutely dependent upon ample supplies of fuel. Fuel supplies had to be delivered along very long supply lines."

> "The grand strategy failed due to a number of reasons including, Allied attacks on German fuel supply lines, the fierce Russian resistance, and Allied code breakers. Clearly, the bitter lesson learned by Rommel is illustrated by his statement, "The bravest men can do nothing without guns, the guns nothing without plenty of ammunition, and neither guns nor ammunition are of much use in mobile warfare unless there are vehicles with sufficient petrol to haul them around."

In particular see: https://www.nytimes.com/1974/12/29/archives/the-ultrasecret-...

> "During the campaigns in North Africa, Ultra kept Gen. B. L. Montgomery informed fairly exactly of Gen. Erwin Rommel's order of battle and, in some cases, of his plans. It also enabled the British to know when supply ships would sail from Italy - and to sink them, thus eventually starving Rommel of vital fuel."

My grandfather was shipped into North Africa after Rommel's defeat as part of the US Navy SeaBees construction battalion, to prepare for the Allied invasion via Italy. Ever since I learned about this, I've wondered whether without those Enigma intercepts and those sunked fuel tankers, how things might have turned out.

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