$ time openssl rand -base64 1000000000 | tr a-z n-za-m >/dev/null
real 0m1.073s
user 0m1.327s
sys 0m0.644s
$ time openssl rand -base64 1000000000 | rot13 >/dev/null
real 0m19.225s
user 0m20.101s
sys 0m0.747sCircumventing Deep Packet Inspection with Socat and Rot13
21–30 of 39 posts
Re: Circumventing Deep Packet Inspection with Socat and Rot13
#22Re: Circumventing Deep Packet Inspection with Socat and Rot13
#23The method is interesting as a mental exercise and its archaeological interest. If you are a company employee be careful about trying these or any other type of tunneling or deep packet inspection circumvention methods. Some companies mention in their employment contracts these type of circumvention activities, unless explicitly allowed, are a firing offense.
Re: Circumventing Deep Packet Inspection with Socat and Rot13
#24This message is double rot13 encoded for your protection.
Re: Circumventing Deep Packet Inspection with Socat and Rot13
#25OP should use rot14, it's more secure. /s
Re: Circumventing Deep Packet Inspection with Socat and Rot13
#26Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don’t get the scenario he tested where he has access to both sides and can freely install cyphers on the server and what not. If you have just installed vpn endpoint and send whatever packets you feel like.
I think the point is that the perimeter security doesn't provide the security that the client imagined. Gaining root on any endpoint in the network (and then finding an endpoint you can control anywhere else on the internet) gives you a way in and out of the company network.
Re: Circumventing Deep Packet Inspection with Socat and Rot13
#27Earlier quoted context omitted.
Which would slow down inspection by a factor of 25 if it were to check the whole keyspace.
Where does the keyspace come from? rot13 has no keys. Of course you could do rot2 - rot24 and all the other combinations. Is that were the factor 25 comes from? The deep inspection needs to look only at the first couple of bytes of each new a TCP connection. So it's not that disrupting. After 2 bytes you can already skip for a vast fraction of other traffic.
Applying this to DPI wouldn't be too bad.
Re: Circumventing Deep Packet Inspection with Socat and Rot13
#28OP should use rot14, it's more secure. /s
double rot13 has an unfortunate meet-in-the-middle weakness but triple rot13 was invented for this very purpose. I hope he makes the upgrade.
Re: Circumventing Deep Packet Inspection with Socat and Rot13
#29They are clearly already whitelisting connections, but still allow unidentified connections through?! What sort of logic is that?
Re: Circumventing Deep Packet Inspection with Socat and Rot13
#30I love this! Using a 2000+ year cipher to circumvent Deep Packet Inspection seems almost poetic. I feel like the article missed out on mentioning one key thing: Using a deny-list doesn’t work. It’s much more viable to default block and allow the stuff you know you’ll allow. Defaulting to allow and blocking stuff you don’t want is how you end up being owned by rot13.
"The Six Dumbest Ideas in Computer Security"
> #1) Default Permit
> #2) Enumerating Badness