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How did LastPass master passwords get compromised?

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21–30 of 189 posts

Re: How did LastPass master passwords get compromised?

#21
post #20

This is exactly why I have never used LastPass, and have always stuck with KeePass (and KeePassXC). It is much more secure to keep all of my passwords locally than in the cloud.

The main feature that cloud solutions provide is the ability to share passwords to specific teams and users within an organization.

Re: How did LastPass master passwords get compromised?

#22

The article suggests that hashing (PBKDF2) is done client-side only, and that LastPass stores this hash directly. If true, this is very bad. However, LastPass claims that PBKDF2 is also used server side: > We then take that value, and use a salt (a random string per user) and do another 100,000 rounds of hashing, and compare that to what is in our database. https://blog.lastpass.com/2015/06/lastpass-security-notice/…

I wish there was a good way to implement this sort of double hashing in web apps. Doing the extra salted hash client side ensures that the value the server sees is globally unique, even when the user is reusing passwords across sites. Unfortunately the only way I know how to implement that is to have the server send JS down to the browser that instructs it to perform the hashing. For certain types of compromises serv…

Everything you explain points at no need to do client side hashing: what exact attack vector would be stopped by having it? (The only thing you bring up is reuse of passwords, but then you explain how that would be easily exploited if server was compromised, and it's even easier if client is)

I would imagine most developers unfamiliar with encryption would assume that client hashing is sufficient and not bother with server side hashing which is the only one that ensures privacy in case of compromise on the server side (nothing really stops client side compromise).

Re: How did LastPass master passwords get compromised?

#23

The article suggests that hashing (PBKDF2) is done client-side only, and that LastPass stores this hash directly. If true, this is very bad. However, LastPass claims that PBKDF2 is also used server side: > We then take that value, and use a salt (a random string per user) and do another 100,000 rounds of hashing, and compare that to what is in our database. https://blog.lastpass.com/2015/06/lastpass-security-notice/…

Which to me begs the question: then why hash client-side at all? What are the threats it protects against?

Re: How did LastPass master passwords get compromised?

#24
post #21
post #20

This is exactly why I have never used LastPass, and have always stuck with KeePass (and KeePassXC). It is much more secure to keep all of my passwords locally than in the cloud.

The main feature that cloud solutions provide is the ability to share passwords to specific teams and users within an organization.

PassBolt comes to mind.

Re: How did LastPass master passwords get compromised?

#25
So this blog seems to completely ignores LastPass statement from 2021-12-28:

> Our investigation has since found that some of these security alerts, which were sent to a limited subset of LastPass users, were likely triggered in error. As a result, we have adjusted our security alert systems and this issue has since been resolved.

Source: https://blog.lastpass.com/2021/12/unusual-attempted-login-ac...

Source2: https://twitter.com/troyhunt/status/1476296988001849345?s=21

Re: How did LastPass master passwords get compromised?

#26
post #25

So this blog seems to completely ignores LastPass statement from 2021-12-28: > Our investigation has since found that some of these security alerts, which were sent to a limited subset of LastPass users, were likely triggered in error. As a result, we have adjusted our security alert systems and this issue has since been resolved. Source: https://blog.lastpass.com/2021/12/unusual-attempted-login-ac... Source2: https:…

LastPass's statement is extremely vague. _Why_ were these alerts triggered in error? What error triggered them?

Re: How did LastPass master passwords get compromised?

#27
post #25

So this blog seems to completely ignores LastPass statement from 2021-12-28: > Our investigation has since found that some of these security alerts, which were sent to a limited subset of LastPass users, were likely triggered in error. As a result, we have adjusted our security alert systems and this issue has since been resolved. Source: https://blog.lastpass.com/2021/12/unusual-attempted-login-ac... Source2: https:…

That statement is too squirrelly for me to trust if my passwords were stored with them.

“SOME of these security alerts” “were LIKELY triggered” “HAS BEEN solved” (Emphasis mine)

How can the issue be definitely solved if you aren’t sure that they were actually triggered in error, if they were in error then it’s only some of them.

Re: How did LastPass master passwords get compromised?

#28
post #25

So this blog seems to completely ignores LastPass statement from 2021-12-28: > Our investigation has since found that some of these security alerts, which were sent to a limited subset of LastPass users, were likely triggered in error. As a result, we have adjusted our security alert systems and this issue has since been resolved. Source: https://blog.lastpass.com/2021/12/unusual-attempted-login-ac... Source2: https:…

Which is exactly what you say when facing an existential crisis. If you have a master password leak you either:

  1. lie about it and the truth never comes to light
  2. lie about it and get caught and the consequences are the same as if you came clean
If LP suffered a master password leak then there is no benefit to telling the truth.

Re: How did LastPass master passwords get compromised?

#29

The article suggests that hashing (PBKDF2) is done client-side only, and that LastPass stores this hash directly. If true, this is very bad. However, LastPass claims that PBKDF2 is also used server side: > We then take that value, and use a salt (a random string per user) and do another 100,000 rounds of hashing, and compare that to what is in our database. https://blog.lastpass.com/2015/06/lastpass-security-notice/…

Which to me begs the question: then why hash client-side at all? What are the threats it protects against?

From what I understand: you still need the master password locally to decrypt the individual passwords. A hash won't provide that. All you're doing here is logging into LastPass.
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