> the incentives are still structured the same, towards despoiling the commonsNo, they aren't; that's just the point. When the commons becomes unusable, nobody can exploit it any more. And if that happens quickly enough, the short term benefit of exploiting it is not sufficient to outweigh the long term cost of it becoming unusable. That seems to me to be happening in the case under discussion. And once it happens, there are only two options open: (1) figure out how to not exploit the commons, i.e., all the parties who want to use it have to come to agreement on how to use it sustainably; or (2) nobody gets to use it at all. If there are significant benefits to be gained by using the commons, as there certainly are in this case, there is a strong incentive for the parties to figure out how to do option #1 instead of just giving up and taking option #2.
> they keep fishing right into the collapse, they don't even stop when their haul declines, just invest more in becoming more efficient at depleting the commons faster.
The reason this works for overfishing (where it has indeed happened) is that fishing is not the only source of food. Once overfishing has completely depleted a fishery, people just switch to other food sources.
In this case, there is only one Earth orbital space, and it doesn't seem like there is any viable alternative to providing the kinds of services that are being provided by satellites. But if that turns out not to be the case, if some of the players are able to find alternatives, then yes, that would increase the likelihood that Earth orbital space would not be cleaned up by the individual market participants.