At least one of the points in this article isn't true. The article states "RISC-V is not affected by the Meltdown and Spectre vulnerabilities... [because it does] not perform any speculative memory accesses" -- but that's only true for some designs, not anything done by the ISA. Many of the higher performance RISC-V designs do, in fact, do speculation. RISC-V BOOM[0], by Berkeley, is vulnerable to Spectre[1][2]. One…
What you say is true, but it's not the end of the story. Higher performance RISC-V CPU cores that do speculation are under development or in some cases have been announced but not yet shipped. They have the opportunity to design to avoid those vulnerabilities from the start, which is a lot easier than fixing things up afterwards -- or simply losing a lot of performance on already-shipped CPUs by turning features off.…
> - if loading a cache line causes another cache line to be evicted, keep both until it is known whether the load is supposed to execute
This sounds interesting. How do these countermeasures actually prevent Spectre V1? And if they do, why didn't Intel implement them? Seems like they are fully microarchitectural, and therefore opaque to the software world.