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Tell HN: SMS-based two-factor authentication is not secure

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Re: Tell HN: SMS-based two-factor authentication is not secure

#21
post #9

I think crypto companies should block withdraws for a period of time after a password recovery. (OP, you are calculating your losses, but didn't specify what those losses were. Did the theif get your crypto?)

I have not regained access to my bitcoin account, in part because I have not contacted customer support to do so. I’ve been too busy regaining access and continuing to support my client base.

My account is locked, and I am pretty sure my funds are still there. It will be a significant loss, but not devastating as this was my non-primary investment account.

I still don’t know the full extent of my losses.

So far, my losses are primarily loss of billable time. I am not a litigious person, but I am also going to educate myself as to what ‘pain-and-suffering’ means. Both my personal and business bank accounts are ok. I now understand why banks do not use email addresses as the login id. The thief would not (easily) be able to align my email address with my bank login id.

Once through this, I plan disassociate any portion of my login id with my name.

Re: Tell HN: SMS-based two-factor authentication is not secure

#22
post #2

Your problem is not with SMS as a second factor though. (Unless you think the attacker had your password as well). It is with the use of SMS as a single recovery factor. The very things that make SMS a uniquely good second factor make it an awful only factor. Use of SMS for account recovery should in general (or at least for important accounts) have a delay (order of days) that allows the real user to intervene.

If the argument is "but you still have a password" it really kind of shows how weak SMS 2FA is. Compare that to a U2F token where you can very reasonably remove the password entirely and still be just as safe - it is itself just a strong auth mechanism, whereas SMS is adding extremely questionable value between the ability to phish SMS 2FAs or hijack the number. Even in a situation where the attacker would have neede…

> Compare that to a U2F token where you can very reasonably remove the password entirely and still be just as safe

Yeah, and it requires me to use a U2F token, which I can loose, etc. You have to balance security and usability, and SMS as a second factor seems like a perfectly reasonable balance.

Re: Tell HN: SMS-based two-factor authentication is not secure

#23

Not only is it not secure, it's not a constant for everyone. I moved countries and I am now locked out of my bank account abroad since they verify logins via OTP over SMS.

Why cancel your old phone number in that country when you still have a bank account there?

I suggest a bank which doesn't suck, such as bunq.

Re: Tell HN: SMS-based two-factor authentication is not secure

#24
post #7

That isn't 2FA. That is a single factor recovery process. SIM-swapping only defeats SMS-based 2FA if the attacker also has your password, which is difficult to accomplish if you are using good passwords that are unique.

I had to remove this detail from my original post as it was too long: Boost mobile is negligent and not following industry standards. Their whole security model is based on a 4-digit pin. At first I thought somebody had a script working its way up through all the combinations at the login screen, but I no longer feel that is the case. The fact that at least nine of us had this same issue within days makes me think th…

I don't have a source to hand, but I've heard from other post-mortems that in SIM-jacking attack the carrier has been socially engineered into not bothering with the pin, ongoing court cases RE negligence perhaps on-going.

Re: Tell HN: SMS-based two-factor authentication is not secure

#25
post #21
post #9

I think crypto companies should block withdraws for a period of time after a password recovery. (OP, you are calculating your losses, but didn't specify what those losses were. Did the theif get your crypto?)

I have not regained access to my bitcoin account, in part because I have not contacted customer support to do so. I’ve been too busy regaining access and continuing to support my client base. My account is locked, and I am pretty sure my funds are still there. It will be a significant loss, but not devastating as this was my non-primary investment account. I still don’t know the full extent of my losses. So far, my l…

If your crypto was stored on an exchange then this is par for the course; rule number one is that if you don't control the private keys, the coins are not yours.

You haven't even tried to regain access to it? Instead of spending time on HN you might want to reach out to Coinbase.

Re: Tell HN: SMS-based two-factor authentication is not secure

#26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If the argument is "but you still have a password" it really kind of shows how weak SMS 2FA is. Compare that to a U2F token where you can very reasonably remove the password entirely and still be just as safe - it is itself just a strong auth mechanism, whereas SMS is adding extremely questionable value between the ability to phish SMS 2FAs or hijack the number. Even in a situation where the attacker would have neede…

> Compare that to a U2F token where you can very reasonably remove the password entirely and still be just as safe Yeah, and it requires me to use a U2F token, which I can loose, etc. You have to balance security and usability, and SMS as a second factor seems like a perfectly reasonable balance.

> Yeah, and it requires me to use a U2F token, which I can loose, etc.

In which case there are much safer recovery mechanisms available. For example, a second U2F token, or handwritten backup codes.

> and SMS as a second factor seems like a perfectly reasonable balance.

My point is that it isn't. Unfortunately, today, identity is a true privilege - it pretty much requires purchasing multiple U2F tokens, and that's super shitty. That doesn't mean that SMS 2FA is a good idea - the fact that it can actually reduce your security is very problematic.

Re: Tell HN: SMS-based two-factor authentication is not secure

#27
post #2

Your problem is not with SMS as a second factor though. (Unless you think the attacker had your password as well). It is with the use of SMS as a single recovery factor. The very things that make SMS a uniquely good second factor make it an awful only factor. Use of SMS for account recovery should in general (or at least for important accounts) have a delay (order of days) that allows the real user to intervene.

This. SMS is a great second factor and is perfectly suitable to prevent the main attack that you want second factors to prevent: that is if your password appears in a password list for any reason it should stopp anyone from just running away with your account. Note that if you are targeted directly SMS is not going to help you much but in this case maybe your password can (depending on the capabilities of the attacker).

Now is SMS the best second factor? Of course not and a proper U2F token will be a lot more secure in many cases but for most people SMS should be perfectly suitable. All this of course requires the auth provider to be somewhat competent and not use SMS as an only factor in any circumstances.

Re: Tell HN: SMS-based two-factor authentication is not secure

#28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If the argument is "but you still have a password" it really kind of shows how weak SMS 2FA is. Compare that to a U2F token where you can very reasonably remove the password entirely and still be just as safe - it is itself just a strong auth mechanism, whereas SMS is adding extremely questionable value between the ability to phish SMS 2FAs or hijack the number. Even in a situation where the attacker would have neede…

> Compare that to a U2F token where you can very reasonably remove the password entirely and still be just as safe Yeah, and it requires me to use a U2F token, which I can loose, etc. You have to balance security and usability, and SMS as a second factor seems like a perfectly reasonable balance.

SMS is better than nothing, but you have a bunch of other better fallback alternatives before you should rely on it. You can support the enrollment of multiple hardware tokens (i.e., you keep one at home, and one on your person). You can have online push login approvals. You can have a TOTP code generator.

Re: Tell HN: SMS-based two-factor authentication is not secure

#29

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Compare that to a U2F token where you can very reasonably remove the password entirely and still be just as safe Yeah, and it requires me to use a U2F token, which I can loose, etc. You have to balance security and usability, and SMS as a second factor seems like a perfectly reasonable balance.

> Yeah, and it requires me to use a U2F token, which I can loose, etc. In which case there are much safer recovery mechanisms available. For example, a second U2F token, or handwritten backup codes. > and SMS as a second factor seems like a perfectly reasonable balance. My point is that it isn't. Unfortunately, today, identity is a true privilege - it pretty much requires purchasing multiple U2F tokens, and that's su…

> the fact that it can actually reduce your security is very problematic.

The only way it can ever actively reduce your security is if it's used as a single factor, as it was for the OP.

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