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What Gödel Discovered

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Re: What Gödel Discovered

#21

This is remarkably well done. I'm reading Hofstadter's Godel, Escher, Bach and found this at the perfect time. Thanks for the write up!

Man, I just searched about that book, and it is like there is a world I don't know anything about. Would you mind sharing the names of your favorite books?

See also I Am A Strange Loop by Douglas Hofstadter, and The First and Last Freedom by Jiddu Krishnamurti.

Re: What Gödel Discovered

#22

Something I've always been curious about: does Gödel's theorem imply an infinity of inconsistent statements, or is the "this statement cannot be proven..." statement the only one? If it's the latter, then of what practical significance is the singularity? If a system is incomplete only in that regard, couldn't one redefine incompleteness to exclude it, and render the system complete for all practical purposes?

I think this partially answers your question: One thing people try to do to "fix" the incompleteness is to just add the Godel sentence as an axiom of the mathematical system. However, each time you do this, you can create yet another new Godel sentence for the new system with the new axiom. Since it's a diagonalization argument, no amount of adding of new axioms can permanently "fix" the system and make it complete -- there will always be new Godel sentence that is true but not provable.

Re: What Gödel Discovered

#25
> For example, a gentleman called Frege discovered that he could craft a theory of sets, which could represent just about everything. For numbers, for example, he could do something like this: [ 0 is {}, 1 is {{}}, 2 is { {{}} {} }, etc. ]

I don’t know Frege too well, but believe this is due to von Neumann, not Frege:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ordinal_number#Von_Neumann_def...

Re: What Gödel Discovered

#26

Something I've always been curious about: does Gödel's theorem imply an infinity of inconsistent statements, or is the "this statement cannot be proven..." statement the only one? If it's the latter, then of what practical significance is the singularity? If a system is incomplete only in that regard, couldn't one redefine incompleteness to exclude it, and render the system complete for all practical purposes?

Others have explained why you can't wave away inconsistency (principle of explosion) nor incompleteness (adding new axioms just creates a new axiomatic system with its own Godel sentences). However you might also find it interesting what incompletenesses exist in our own mathematical system (ZFC) -- the most well-known example is the Continuum Hypothesis[1]:

> There is no set whose cardinality is strictly between that of the integers and the real numbers.

Or to put it another way, there exists no intermediate type of infinity between countable infinities (the set of integers) and uncountable infinities (the set of real numbers).

The CH is independent of ZFC -- both CH and its negation can be included as new axioms to ZFC and both versions are logically consistent if and only if ZFC is -- meaning that being able to prove the CH is an incompleteness in ZFC.

[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continuum_hypothesis

Re: What Gödel Discovered

#27

> This proof showed that “1 + 1”, does indeed equal “2”. It took 2 volumes to get here. I know this seems logical to mathematicians, but it feels to me like having to take 2 volumes to prove something than any child knows intuitively is... I don't know what word I am looking for... obsessive?

They didn't set out to explicitly prove 1+1=2, they just got around to it after 2 volumes, it didn't require 2 volumes of background. A direct proof of 1+1=2 is pretty short in most logical systems.

Re: What Gödel Discovered

#28

Something I've always been curious about: does Gödel's theorem imply an infinity of inconsistent statements, or is the "this statement cannot be proven..." statement the only one? If it's the latter, then of what practical significance is the singularity? If a system is incomplete only in that regard, couldn't one redefine incompleteness to exclude it, and render the system complete for all practical purposes?

It implies an infinity of inconsistent statements. I'm not a mathematician, but the way I understand it is to do an analogy with the halting problem: for any programming language that is powerful enough you can build a program where you don't know if it's going to halt or not.

About avoiding singularities, the GEB book (Godel,Escher,Bach) mentions at the beginning: mathematicians like Russel tried to avoid paradoxes by moving them out of the system, but Godel shown that it doesn't work if you want a complete and consistent system (complete and consistent are technical terms, Wikipedia does a good explanation: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurt_Gödel#Incompleteness_theo...).

Also related to your question: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaitin%27s_constant

Sorry if I don't get the technical terms right, hopefully someone else in HN can explain this better.

Re: What Gödel Discovered

#29

> For example, a gentleman called Frege discovered that he could craft a theory of sets, which could represent just about everything. For numbers, for example, he could do something like this: [ 0 is {}, 1 is {{}}, 2 is { {{}} {} }, etc. ] I don’t know Frege too well, but believe this is due to von Neumann, not Frege: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ordinal_number#Von_Neumann_def...

Correct. Frege (and then following him Bertrand Russell in Principia Mathematica) used a definition when a natural number n was the set of all sets with n elements. More info and contrast with the (later chronologically) Von Neumann definition: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Set-theoretic_definition_of_...

Re: What Gödel Discovered

#30

> For example, a gentleman called Frege discovered that he could craft a theory of sets, which could represent just about everything. For numbers, for example, he could do something like this: [ 0 is {}, 1 is {{}}, 2 is { {{}} {} }, etc. ] I don’t know Frege too well, but believe this is due to von Neumann, not Frege: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ordinal_number#Von_Neumann_def...

You might be correct, Frege defined it (roughly) in a similar way, you can read his original publication here:

https://ia800207.us.archive.org/22/items/diegrundlagende00fr...

It starts on book page 87, or PDF page 125.

Basically, what he seems to be doing is to define 0 as the number of "everything that is not equal to itself" ("die Anzahl, welche dem Begriffe 'sich selbst ungleich' zukommt"), and 1 to be the number of "everything that is equal to 0" ("die Anzahl, welche dem Begriffe 'gleich 0' zukommt"), etc.

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