I find it ironic that the CIA didn't bother to have it's systems secured/verified by the NSA. I'm sure the CIA thought that they were good enough, coming from an organization that was infiltrated from its inception, their hubris isn't surprising.
CIA hacking unit failed to protect its systems, allowing Vault 7 disclosure
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Re: CIA hacking unit failed to protect its systems, allowing Vault 7 disclosure
#22No government will push to improve door locks unless that government isn't the most capable of defeating those locks. It's a cost/benefit function.
Right now, improving software security is a net loss for the US. So it won't happen when the US is controlling the computer and software industry.
So I'm not surprised to see even the best experts being beaten so easily.
Re: CIA hacking unit failed to protect its systems, allowing Vault 7 disclosure
#23Re: CIA hacking unit failed to protect its systems, allowing Vault 7 disclosure
#24Re: CIA hacking unit failed to protect its systems, allowing Vault 7 disclosure
#25Earlier quoted context omitted.
What would be a less gimmicky setup?
Allowing Blue Team to fight back maybe? Or to be able to actively track the red team instead, using an active defense, instead of only passive defense? Moreover, the outcomes are different for both teams: - RedTeam success => they are seen as "real" hackers/heros and the BlueTeam are the poor incompetent - RedTeam fail => the BlueTeam did "only" its job, the investments in cybersec for the company paid off... so the…
Re: CIA hacking unit failed to protect its systems, allowing Vault 7 disclosure
#26Re: CIA hacking unit failed to protect its systems, allowing Vault 7 disclosure
#27Earlier quoted context omitted.
Let the non-red teams use pre-existing scripts, code, etc, to harden things. This of course would make the competition a level playing field and would make it much less fun for the red team. Attendance would drop off quickly and companies would no longer sponsor these events, as the primary purpose is to recruit people out of college.
Actually, this could be made like "CS:GO" competition: - RT is the terro - BT is the AT The RT has to "plant" an exploit. The BT can either block/track the RT or "diffuse" (find/disable) the exploit. The "maps" would be the kind of system: - an AD behind a firewall - a WebServer with datas to extract from a backend DB - and so... The sponsors could sell either the skills of their pen-testers to hire, or their solutio…
Re: CIA hacking unit failed to protect its systems, allowing Vault 7 disclosure
#28Words can't describe how normal that is. Exploit tools are require local systems to be super open in order to be frictionless. Even in the consumer industry; anyone remember all those very silly people who installed backtrack2 (precursor to kali, based on slackware not debian) to their main drive and then went to defcon and got rekt because their OS was insecure (and couldn't be updated!) Exploit development is a gla…
Yes, but your "local system" that receives traffic or whatever doesn't need to be the one having access to all your data…
Re: CIA hacking unit failed to protect its systems, allowing Vault 7 disclosure
#29Earlier quoted context omitted.
What would be a less gimmicky setup?
Allowing Blue Team to fight back maybe? Or to be able to actively track the red team instead, using an active defense, instead of only passive defense? Moreover, the outcomes are different for both teams: - RedTeam success => they are seen as "real" hackers/heros and the BlueTeam are the poor incompetent - RedTeam fail => the BlueTeam did "only" its job, the investments in cybersec for the company paid off... so the…
On the other side the attackers have the more exciting job and only need one success which they can achieve by using whatever means they see fit.
You'll see this outside of IT just as well, like in sports. Goalkeepers (defenders) vs. strikers come to mind but at least there they all operate within the same set of rules.
Re: CIA hacking unit failed to protect its systems, allowing Vault 7 disclosure
#30Words can't describe how normal that is. Exploit tools are require local systems to be super open in order to be frictionless. Even in the consumer industry; anyone remember all those very silly people who installed backtrack2 (precursor to kali, based on slackware not debian) to their main drive and then went to defcon and got rekt because their OS was insecure (and couldn't be updated!) Exploit development is a gla…
> Exploit tools are require local systems to be super open in order to be frictionless. Yes, but your "local system" that receives traffic or whatever doesn't need to be the one having access to all your data…
Once deployed your self-produced tools which have very little security protection themselves can be pilfered. Bonus points for tapping into the software deployment platform and downloading everything.