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The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

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Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#21

Post by antonvs »

taneq wrote: post #18
yters wrote: post #17

How can such a theory be falsified?

Simple: Find something that the brain does that could not, in principle, be emulated by a Turing machine or equivalent. So far we don't know of any such thing (since quantum mechanics is computable and everything including the brain is ultimately quantum mechanics).

> So far we don't know of any such thing

That's not entirely correct. We don't know that a Turing machine can have conscious experience. There's no substantiated "in principle" explanation for that.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#22

Post by taneq »

antonvs wrote: post #21
taneq wrote: post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Simple: Find something that the brain does that could not, in principle, be emulated by a Turing machine or equivalent. So far we don't know of any such thing (since quantum mechanics is computable and everything including the brain is ultimately quantum mechanics).

> So far we don't know of any such thing That's not entirely correct. We don't know that a Turing machine can have conscious experience. There's no substantiated "in principle" explanation for that.

The definition of "a conscious experience" is so vague and circular that I'm not sure the question of "whether an X can have conscious experience" (where X is computer, dog, fish, human infant...) is even all that meaningful.

Either way we certainly don't have any indication that it is impossible in principle for a Turing machine to perform the same kind of calculation that gives rise to conscious experience in humans, or that this calculation would for some (supernatural?) reason not have the same outcome if performed by something other than a human brain.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#23

Post by yters »

taneq wrote: post #18
yters wrote: post #17

How can such a theory be falsified?

Simple: Find something that the brain does that could not, in principle, be emulated by a Turing machine or equivalent. So far we don't know of any such thing (since quantum mechanics is computable and everything including the brain is ultimately quantum mechanics).

If there is nothing that is uncomputable, then doesn't that mean the hypothesis is unfalsifiable?

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#24

Post by TuringTest »

antonvs wrote: post #21
taneq wrote: post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Simple: Find something that the brain does that could not, in principle, be emulated by a Turing machine or equivalent. So far we don't know of any such thing (since quantum mechanics is computable and everything including the brain is ultimately quantum mechanics).

> So far we don't know of any such thing That's not entirely correct. We don't know that a Turing machine can have conscious experience. There's no substantiated "in principle" explanation for that.

Yes, but we don't know how to check that an entity has a conscious experience, so we can not falsify that a Turing machine has one, either. That's the whole reason for the Turing Test, btw.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#26

Post by TuringTest »

taneq wrote: post #22
antonvs wrote: post #21

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> So far we don't know of any such thing That's not entirely correct. We don't know that a Turing machine can have conscious experience. There's no substantiated "in principle" explanation for that.

The definition of "a conscious experience" is so vague and circular that I'm not sure the question of "whether an X can have conscious experience" (where X is computer, dog, fish, human infant...) is even all that meaningful. Either way we certainly don't have any indication that it is impossible in principle for a Turing machine to perform the same kind of calculation that gives rise to conscious experience in human…

> I'm not sure the question of "whether an X can have conscious experience" (where X is computer, dog, fish, human infant...) is even all that meaningful.

I do know that I have a conscious experience, so that's quite meaningful - to me. I cannot check that any other being has similar feelings, so the doubtful question would be whether "an X other than me can have conscious experience"; but people with good manners make the polite assumption that it's also true for other similar beings.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#27

Post by finghin »

taneq wrote: post #18
yters wrote: post #17

How can such a theory be falsified?

Simple: Find something that the brain does that could not, in principle, be emulated by a Turing machine or equivalent. So far we don't know of any such thing (since quantum mechanics is computable and everything including the brain is ultimately quantum mechanics).

Restricting brain activity to computation it becomes more difficult to find exceptions to the argument. I think this is because computation is fundamentally quite alien to human minds, insofar as it is not an elementary, inescapable mental state. Many philosophers of mind (though not all, particularly not those who adhere to reductive physicalism and eliminative materialism) would characterise phenomenal consciousness and intentionality as these unavoidable mental properties.

It is worth mentioning that there are at least good reasons to reject nearly all of these theories (including physicalist and material thesis). Many aspects of each theories turn out to imply highly unintuitive effects. But I would recommend you read for yourself, since the mind-body problem is immense and very interesting at every step. The SEP articles on both of these[1][2] are quite good.

Elsewhere in this thread some have pointed out that the ontological assumptions of philosophers fade away as we approach the mind in our inquiry. This is at least partly because the mind stretches our understanding of knowledge and matter themselves, and to an even greater degree, our intuitions thereof.

[1] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/

[2] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/; see especially §4.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#28

Post by TheOtherHobbes »

joe_the_user wrote: post #2

It seems like basic materialism to claim that the brain could be simulated by a large enough Turing machine. But that claim would not necessarily imply that a Turing machine is a useful model for brain. A Turing machine isn't necessarily even used as the working model of a computer though it conceivably could be. Edit: My comment is basically asking what saying "the mind is a Turing machine" really means. It seems li…

Are you absolutely convinced that you can build a sentient mind out of clockwork parts?

Because that's what your interpretation of basic materialism implies.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#30

Post by omarhaneef »

In a different lifetime I got to take a few classes with Jerry Fodor, and although this publication references him extensively, one of his most succinct arguments for the computational theory of mind is only alluded to: the lack of alternatives.

Fodor was a snappy writer and talker. I urge you to view his videos if they can be found on YouTube. Unfortunately he passed away recently.

The argument goes something like this:

1. The computational theory of mind is the only remotely plausible theory of mind we have

2. A remotely plausible theory is better than none at all

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