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Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787

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Re: Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787

#21

Post by WalterBright »

xemdetia wrote: post #17
service_bus wrote: post #15

Unlike the security researcher, I do have access to multiple 787s as I am one of many people responsible for maintaining them. I'm obviously not going to attempt to exploit the firmware on an aircraft for obvious reasons, but the security researcher's notion that you can "pivot" from the in flight entertainment to anything to do with aircraft operation is pure fantasy. These systems are entirely separate, including t…

Would you say as someone who deals with these larger planes that at least the 787 current gen is closer to an older style chassis and body for cars? I have always imagined/assumed that 787's are not unique that they would be the same 'chassis' for a cargo plane or a passenger plane, and it really would have to do with how they fitted the plane for purpose? This is part of the reason why I agree with you, because I do…

Not sure what you mean, but aircraft stopped being "chassis and body" some time in the 1930's. That was the switch to a monocoque design with stressed skin.

Re: Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787

#22

Post by Hunisgung »

p_l wrote: post #8
sebazzz wrote: post #3

> That second barrier, the company argues, allows only data to pass from one part of the network to the other, rather than the executable commands that would be necessary to affect the plane's critical systems. Assuming planes don't use something like CAN-bus but regular TCP protocol, this can't really be true right? Perhaps they talk about which services are allowed to connect (listen for incoming connections).

AFDX protocol stack is unidirectional with no ACKs or anything like that, which makes use of physical data diodes trivial.

That is false. Apart from the hard-coded and restrictive network configuration, AFDX is basically UDP/IP. There are many uses of bidirectional application protocols (like TFTP).

Re: Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787

#23

Post by Hunisgung »

rootusrootus wrote: post #12
amluto wrote: post #10

There is IMO exactly one valid way to get data from the flight systems to the entertainment network: use a literal one-way connection. Not “the only supported requests are data retrieval.” Not “the software folks only transmit.” A bona fide physical connection where one side has a transmitter, one side has a receiver, and there is no physical mechanism to send any information whatsoever the other way. These devices a…

Aren't data diodes already a regulatory requirement for any connection between avionics and the IFE?

I guess they are a regulatory requirement because all of the modern aircraft have to request special conditions form FAA and EASA to justify why they do not comply with these requirements.

For example for the Airbus A350;:

> The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design feature. These proposed special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.

[1] https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2013/12/17/2013-29...

Re: Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787

#24

Post by jakeogh »

service_bus wrote: post #15

Unlike the security researcher, I do have access to multiple 787s as I am one of many people responsible for maintaining them. I'm obviously not going to attempt to exploit the firmware on an aircraft for obvious reasons, but the security researcher's notion that you can "pivot" from the in flight entertainment to anything to do with aircraft operation is pure fantasy. These systems are entirely separate, including t…

Thank you for commenting about it.

There are _always_ bugs in software. Your assertion that it's pure fantasy to pivot from the flight entertainment system goes against there near infinite space of sidechannel attacks and demonstrated attacks on even airgapped systems; it's almost a law of physics that you are wrong.

The "self promotion" angle was brought up last time this was discussed: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20657965 and it's an obviously pointless rebuttal.

Boeing: Please post the code. Lets read it. It's already out there: https://ioactive.com/arm-ida-and-cross-check-reversing-the-7...

Re: Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787

#25

Post by close04 »

xemdetia wrote: post #17
service_bus wrote: post #15

Unlike the security researcher, I do have access to multiple 787s as I am one of many people responsible for maintaining them. I'm obviously not going to attempt to exploit the firmware on an aircraft for obvious reasons, but the security researcher's notion that you can "pivot" from the in flight entertainment to anything to do with aircraft operation is pure fantasy. These systems are entirely separate, including t…

Would you say as someone who deals with these larger planes that at least the 787 current gen is closer to an older style chassis and body for cars? I have always imagined/assumed that 787's are not unique that they would be the same 'chassis' for a cargo plane or a passenger plane, and it really would have to do with how they fitted the plane for purpose? This is part of the reason why I agree with you, because I do…

They're more like the same airframe (fuselage, wings, undercarriage) with different fit an finish. Like different interior and possibly engines. The entertainment system is basically an add-on, it's separated both because it's not there in every configuration of the plane and also because it's supposed to be separated in order to be 100% sure that any failure there will not impact critical systems (like a short circuit, or an exploit). How exactly Boeing ensures this separation is another topic.

Re: Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787

#26

Post by jakeogh »

p_l wrote: post #9
sleavey wrote: post #4

It seems to me as someone with no experience of designing aircraft control software, avionics or anything to do with planes, that the entertainment system should be on a physically separate network to anything safety critical. Like, different everything: power supplies, switches, cables, control panels, the works. There should be no entryway into the flight control network except from the cockpit.

There are three separate networks, with data diodes used for cases where information flows between them. HW separation was enforced by FAA back when 787 was in prototype stage.

Where can one read about the 787 data diodes?

Re: Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787

#27

Post by jakeogh »

p_l wrote: post #13
ru999gol wrote: post #11

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If Boeing decides to cut costs by using a single network for their entertainment, communications and flight control, who is there gonna be to tell them no? You would assume there is some oversight by independent security researchers who review these planes security, but this assumption seems unsubstantiated. In reality, how is this separation of critical networks looking like exactly? MAC address filters? Are they ai…

Boeing actually attempted that on 787,with some VLAN trickery. FAA caught it and forced them to redesign the setup. As for actual AFDX networks - they have hardcoded forwarding tables and no MAC learning, and separation between networks tends to use data diodes

tends?

Re: Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787

#28

Post by Hunisgung »

service_bus wrote: post #15

Unlike the security researcher, I do have access to multiple 787s as I am one of many people responsible for maintaining them. I'm obviously not going to attempt to exploit the firmware on an aircraft for obvious reasons, but the security researcher's notion that you can "pivot" from the in flight entertainment to anything to do with aircraft operation is pure fantasy. These systems are entirely separate, including t…

> These systems are entirely separate, including the electricity that controls the systems.

This is not what Boeing said to the FAA 12 years ago when they asked to certify their network architecture

> The proposed architecture of the 787 is different from that of existing production (and retrofitted) airplanes. It allows connection to and access from external sources (the public Internet) and airline operator networks to the previously isolated Aircraft Control Domain and Airline Information Services Domain. The Aircraft Control Domain and the Airline Information Services Domain perform functions required for the safe operation of the airplane.

[1] http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library%5CrgSC.ns...

Re: Software Vulnerabilities in the Boeing 787

#30

Post by Hunisgung »

jakeogh wrote: post #26
p_l wrote: post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There are three separate networks, with data diodes used for cases where information flows between them. HW separation was enforced by FAA back when 787 was in prototype stage.

Where can one read about the 787 data diodes?

You can read about the fact that there are NO data diodes on the FAA website

> The proposed architecture of the 787 allows connection to and access from external sources (the public Internet) and airline operator networks to the previously isolated Aircraft Control Domain and Airline Information Services Domain.

> Capability is proposed for providing electronic transmission of field-loadable software applications and databases to the aircraft. These would subsequently be loaded into systems within the Aircraft Control Domain and Airline Information Services Domain.

[1] http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library%5CrgSC.ns...

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