Wow - for a sales pitch fantastic. Many of these security issues leave you little to actually do. This write up provides an alternative. What’s super bad here is slack misleading about the cause wasting all the users time. Quick question, anyone use key base - can u give a quick review? Team currently use slack
Slack Security Incident
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Re: Slack Security Incident
#22The author would have done well by refraining from using this as an opportunity to make a sales pitch for their startup, as it detracts from an otherwise important message. Let me see if I have this right: Slack had a major security breach in 2015. Apparently someone installed malicious code that could even read password inputs in plaintext. They waited 4 years, after growing large and going public, to inform affecte…
Re: Slack Security Incident
#23Not only does Keybase not automatically update its client, there is no way to even figure out if your client is out of date and in need of security updates. Even if you look up the exact version of your installed client, which you can find, there is nothing on the website that says what the most recent version is. The only way to even get a hint is to look on GitHub, and even that isn't accurate; version 4.2.1 is the…
If there's a website option for any tool, I recommend using that over native. It's usually more performant and is less of a security risk. And it's always up to date.
Re: Slack Security Incident
#24However, for the issue mentioned in the post, wouldn't 2FA have saved him? Supposedly, the compromised credential is from 2015.
Re: Slack Security Incident
#25The author would have done well by refraining from using this as an opportunity to make a sales pitch for their startup, as it detracts from an otherwise important message. Let me see if I have this right: Slack had a major security breach in 2015. Apparently someone installed malicious code that could even read password inputs in plaintext. They waited 4 years, after growing large and going public, to inform affecte…
Would shareholders have a case to make for fraud here? Slack clearly didn't want this information getting out pre-IPO, as a security disclosure in this case would certainly impact public confidence in the company.
Re: Slack Security Incident
#26Re: Slack Security Incident
#27Not only does Keybase not automatically update its client, there is no way to even figure out if your client is out of date and in need of security updates. Even if you look up the exact version of your installed client, which you can find, there is nothing on the website that says what the most recent version is. The only way to even get a hint is to look on GitHub, and even that isn't accurate; version 4.2.1 is the…
Re: Slack Security Incident
#28As people are discussing Keybase for teams and whatnot - could anyone comment on Keybase for individuals, families, etc? My family are debating moving to Matrix (and away from iMessage). I had briefly debates Keybase due to some interesting features. Anyone have experience with Keybase for families and individuals?
disclaimer: I work for Keybase
Re: Slack Security Incident
#29As people are discussing Keybase for teams and whatnot - could anyone comment on Keybase for individuals, families, etc? My family are debating moving to Matrix (and away from iMessage). I had briefly debates Keybase due to some interesting features. Anyone have experience with Keybase for families and individuals?
Why move away from iMessage? It's end-to-end encrypted.
- iOS only
or
- an extremely-crypto/privacy-aware family who is concerned that although end-to-end encrypted, there is no out-of-band user-validated key exchange (e.g through a digit code or QR-Code) or prior validation (e.g per-key TOFU) of the other party's identity or update to their keys. Which means that theoretically Apple could insert a new key in the user's set (there is a key per user's device for perfect backward/forward secrecy†) anytime to MITM/intercept messages and you would not be able to monitor it††.
† This is obviously defeated by Messages in iCloud (which you can disable) but the iMessage protocol has this built in.
†† Of course if there was some feature like that, Apple could also make such a key hidden in some way because they also control the Messages app code.
Re: Slack Security Incident
#30Reminds me of the time Amazon learned that using S3 to host status indicators for S3 is a bad idea if S3 goes down.