No Bitcoin (SV implemention) support I'm out https://bitsocket.org Message Bus for Bitcoin (SV)
Thanks for the constructive comment and plug of your product.
I'm not unwriter
Ledger Live: A mobile companion app for Ledger hardware wallets
21–30 of 58 posts
Re: Ledger Live: A mobile companion app for Ledger hardware wallets
#22I'm still very much in favour of managing my own private keys in an encrypted database on my desktop/laptop. I feel like everyone is blindly trusting these devices, having been scared in to it by horror stories of malware lifting keys off machines. I will eat my paper wallets if my meagre holdings are stolen from me like that.
I used both a "swarm of crypto clients" and ledger/trezor, and the thing about the latter is that not only is it more secure (and argue with that if you want), but also more convenient. To a regular user those devices are kind of Netflix/Spotify for crypto.
Re: Ledger Live: A mobile companion app for Ledger hardware wallets
#23I'm not able to find the md5 signature for Ledger Live: would you please help me?
A mobile app managing cryptocurrency, but does not sign all their release, and don't even react the situation quickly. Apparently they have no clue what they are doing in terms of security.
Since they also use react native, and npm is notorious for being exploit to distribute malware. I have a brief look at the package.json. Seems to be a typical javascript project where developers tend to put one more dependency for a simple feature rather than implementing themselves. So, if one of the hobbyist project owner's key is compromised or hand over their orphan project to somebody malicious to manage their npm, then they are screwed. Although same could apply to other language which have package management, npm is the worst among those. Do they ensure the dependencies are signed before building the binary? And always use the last known good version for building new binary? I really doubt.
Re: Ledger Live: A mobile companion app for Ledger hardware wallets
#24Earlier quoted context omitted.
A "secure", closed source processor. Given the Ledger bootloader had a rather nasty and bluntly obvious bug in it that allowed you to bypass all of the write protection and boot any firmware, I'd give them nearly zero chance of having got anything else right.
Let he who has never written software that had a bug throw the first stone...
Hi, I've written bootloaders before.I know that blacklisting addresses doesn't work, as many memory locations will be mapped multiple times. Strangely, most people that have worked with microcontrollers is aware of this, except for the people who wrote the closed source bootloader at ledger.
Re: Ledger Live: A mobile companion app for Ledger hardware wallets
#25I'm still very much in favour of managing my own private keys in an encrypted database on my desktop/laptop. I feel like everyone is blindly trusting these devices, having been scared in to it by horror stories of malware lifting keys off machines. I will eat my paper wallets if my meagre holdings are stolen from me like that.
Another interesting alternative is multisignature wallets, like the new Gnosis Safe: https://safe.gnosis.io/
An on-chain contract holds your funds and requires some number of signatures to authorize transactions (for personal use usually 2, i.e. one from your desktop computer and one from your phone). That way at least you know two separate devices would have to be compromised to cause loss of funds. This also allows for interesting key recovery strategies like having a third paper wallet that is also authorized. You could use that as a backup key that would allow authorization of a new key if your phone were stolen, etc.
Re: Ledger Live: A mobile companion app for Ledger hardware wallets
#26Good to see Bluetooth in the new hardware. Lack of real mobile support for hardware wallets has been by far the biggest pain point for me. (With regard to the best possible physical security, I would have preferred NFC over Bluetooth, but the latter is alright for everyday use.)
AFAIK given the Ledger's on-screen confirmation process it really doesn't matter what's the medium of communication between the host machine and the device. It could as well be sent via unencrypted http routed through China, then Russia and then an NSA server all while your host device is heavily backdoored. The supply chain attacks/evil maid attacks are a much bigger issue, as pointed out in other comments.
>>It could as well be sent via unencrypted http routed through China, then Russia and then an NSA server all while your host device is heavily backdoored.
As much as we'd like to believe this is the case, MITM (network or host) allows for replacement of destination addresses that show up on your screen. Redirected/malicious destination addresses showing up on your host screen will be cryptographically verified with Ledger's on-screen confirmation, but will not prevent you from sending your cryptoassets to the "wrong" endpoint.
I think this is much more of a reality if your host device is "heavily backdoored" than unencrypted HTTP, but could happen in either case. Another attack vector was BGP & DNS hijacking, which happened to My Ether Wallet in April 2018[1][2].
[1] https://qz.com/1261540/mew-ethereum-hack-the-internets-infra...
[2] https://doublepulsar.com/hijack-of-amazons-internet-domain-s...
Re: Ledger Live: A mobile companion app for Ledger hardware wallets
#27My greatest concern with the Ledger hardware wallet has been making sure the device hasn't been tampered with during shipment. Fortunately they provide a script to check hardware integrity, it's probably a good idea to run it before doing anything with the device. https://support.ledger.com/hc/en-us/articles/115005321449
Note that this doesn't actually do anything to attest the safety of the device, as has been pointed out in a CCC talk recently. It attempts to confirm that the code running on another processor is legitimate by asking it to read its entire flash to a "HSM" chip, which is obviously simple to deceive by reading back something that is not the processors flash. I personally think that this is deceptive and counter produc…
Remote attestation implementations via HSMs will always remain subject to a confused-deputy problem, but they're still leaps and bounds better than pure software solutions. Any threat you can describe that involves a facade hardware UI is much easier to implement in software, meaning that attackers are more likely to invest resources in software attacks (like spraying bad Electrum servers into the pool) than hardware attacks (like modifying hardware wallets and setting up a storefront on eBay).
Re: Ledger Live: A mobile companion app for Ledger hardware wallets
#28Earlier quoted context omitted.
A "secure", closed source processor. Given the Ledger bootloader had a rather nasty and bluntly obvious bug in it that allowed you to bypass all of the write protection and boot any firmware, I'd give them nearly zero chance of having got anything else right.
Let he who has never written software that had a bug throw the first stone...
> Let he who has never written software that had a bug throw the first object Object...
Re: Ledger Live: A mobile companion app for Ledger hardware wallets
#29I'm still very much in favour of managing my own private keys in an encrypted database on my desktop/laptop. I feel like everyone is blindly trusting these devices, having been scared in to it by horror stories of malware lifting keys off machines. I will eat my paper wallets if my meagre holdings are stolen from me like that.
I sort of agree with this. One caveat is that laptops are commonly compromised and your security would depend on nobody stealing keys/passwords needed to access your database/password manager/whatever. Having hardware token with paper backup, makes this harder. Having a lot of tokens creates a huge incentive for getting hacked. If you have non trivial amounts of tokens under your control, you need to consider all the…
Founder of StellarGuard here, so sort of in the same realm. Just wondering what additional features you'd want out of such a hardware token. Would it need to do the actual signing of transactions on the device for you to feel secure with it, or would generic U2F (Yubikey) + signing on the software be sufficient, assuming we could do it securely?
Re: Ledger Live: A mobile companion app for Ledger hardware wallets
#30Earlier quoted context omitted.
AFAIK given the Ledger's on-screen confirmation process it really doesn't matter what's the medium of communication between the host machine and the device. It could as well be sent via unencrypted http routed through China, then Russia and then an NSA server all while your host device is heavily backdoored. The supply chain attacks/evil maid attacks are a much bigger issue, as pointed out in other comments.
>> It could as well be sent via unencrypted http routed through China, then Russia and then an NSA server all while your host device is heavily backdoored. As much as we'd like to believe this is the case, MITM (network or host) allows for replacement of destination addresses that show up on your screen. Redirected/malicious destination addresses showing up on your host screen will be cryptographically verified with…
> but will not prevent you from sending your cryptoassets to the "wrong" endpoint.
Can you explain how's that a problem? The only thing you can do with a signed transaction is to either broadcast it or not.
MyEtherWallet suffers from the equivalent of supply chain attack here, where the JavaScript gets replaced with malicious code.