there's an endless supply of replies to comments like yours that go like "it will never be possible to fix every problem so the safest move is no move", and I
don't wish to be that kind of commenter, i.e. I think it is good to at least try and propose mechanisms -even flawed ones- so that at least the discussion of the problems continue and hopefully the mechanisms can be improved.
it is in this mindset that I am asking if we can adress the following issue: suppose the government or its postal system selectively withholds the goods payed for through cryptographic protocols, then buyer and seller lose.
again, I'm not trying to be destructive, just wondering out loud if we can generalize the kind of protocol you describe to include the transporter as an attacker in the attack model.
I think we could split up in 2 cases: transporters that are paid on the same cryptographic protocol/platform, and transporters that are paid outside. I believe it will be easier to solve the problem by restricting to transporters who get paid by the same contract/platform, since we could have the transporter deposit an insurance of same or higher value as the good to be transported, and upon arrival his pre-agreed transport cost and deposit are released?
Obviously the traditional postal system can not be forced to be paid through this platform, so this hole in the market would effectively create demand for crypto postage and hence create jobs.
I would like to see a more rigorous breakdown of such a protocol, and a censor-ship free listing of issues remaining with the protocol, so that the discussion on improvement can continue.
Also it seems like the first transporter does not need to be the same person as the last transporter, i.e. intermediary packet handoff could also be handled by the protocol such that the first transporter gets paid back his deposit after doing "his part" of the packet journey...