This post annoys me for describing a problem which other people might encounter with a good level of detail but uses “broken” to get clicks rather than the more accurate “I don’t understand or agreee with the security model”. As misnome and others have noted, if someone loads a malicious kext the only safe option is a complete wipe and reinstall – or depending on how much you trust Apple’s firmware signing, buying a…
The ‘app’ you can’t trash: how SIP is broken in High Sierra
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Re: The ‘app’ you can’t trash: how SIP is broken in High Sierra
#22This post annoys me for describing a problem which other people might encounter with a good level of detail but uses “broken” to get clicks rather than the more accurate “I don’t understand or agreee with the security model”. As misnome and others have noted, if someone loads a malicious kext the only safe option is a complete wipe and reinstall – or depending on how much you trust Apple’s firmware signing, buying a…
It's not just about malware. It's also really annoying if you need to uninstall a benevolent but buggy kext. And it's quite surprising that SIP+kext is a one way street (you can install while SIP is active, but you can't uninstall while SIP is active - hope you're not using a computer where someone else manages the mac firmware password, or you can end up shooting yourself in the foot).
Re: The ‘app’ you can’t trash: how SIP is broken in High Sierra
#23Re: The ‘app’ you can’t trash: how SIP is broken in High Sierra
#24Earlier quoted context omitted.
You can not trust the user. Never.
How does that work in parallel with "It's my device, I'll do what I want with it"?
And in the dev version protect the dev mode by some small ritual (like the 7-times tapping on About in Android).
Re: The ‘app’ you can’t trash: how SIP is broken in High Sierra
#25> when some malware does manage to slip an evil kernel extension past a user and is rewarded with the protection of SIP, neither the user nor any anti-malware tool will be able to remove that extension, unless the user restarts from a different boot volume, or KernelExtensionManagement allows it. But isn't that scenario "Game Over" anyway? At least installing kernel extensions is a process that is explicit and - impo…
You can not trust the user. Never.
Re: The ‘app’ you can’t trash: how SIP is broken in High Sierra
#26The article doesn't mention that this is not new; nor is it 'the' app you can't trash: it joins Safari, Finder, and most other 'Apple apps'. I find it quite surprising. Even when Windows defaulted to IE without choice, it could always be removed with 'Add or Remove Windows Features', as I recall.
Re: The ‘app’ you can’t trash: how SIP is broken in High Sierra
#27Earlier quoted context omitted.
> not just another 'trained to ignore' permissions dialog. I have never seen any user reading a dialog message if it has a button with label "ok", "cancel", "allow" or "next". Including a lot of developers/dev-ops.
The dialog for kernel extension doesn't contain any of those labels though. Instead it offers you to open the "Security" preference pane where some additional UI will be displayed. If you blindly click buttons you will not accidentally enable a kernel extension.
As someone who's gone poking around system internals for twenty-plus years... I can tell you that you're very wrong here. I've forgotten about more completely broken operating systems than I care to discuss, but many of them have ended with me poking around and blindly clicking buttons in a vain hope of getting the OS to do what I want it to do which is apparently frequently different from whatever OS producers want me to do.
Re: The ‘app’ you can’t trash: how SIP is broken in High Sierra
#28> when some malware does manage to slip an evil kernel extension past a user and is rewarded with the protection of SIP, neither the user nor any anti-malware tool will be able to remove that extension, unless the user restarts from a different boot volume, or KernelExtensionManagement allows it. But isn't that scenario "Game Over" anyway? At least installing kernel extensions is a process that is explicit and - impo…
You can not trust the user. Never.
Unfortunately, a lot of people still use computers instead of iOS devices explicitly because they want more control and power over what the machine is doing. Security is a lot harder to do in this case.
Ultimately, you can't protect a machine from an empowered user. The best you can hope for is to provide guide rails that make it easier to do the right thing, and harder to do the wrong thing.
Re: The ‘app’ you can’t trash: how SIP is broken in High Sierra
#29Re: The ‘app’ you can’t trash: how SIP is broken in High Sierra
#30-"MacOs is too closed! Apple lock the user" (Now you can install kernel extensions) -"It's insecure!
As a memorable saying goes: "The security people won't be satisified until everyone is living in prison."