Live data from Hacker News

Taking control of all .io domains with a targeted registration

thehackerblog.com

21–30 of 258 posts

Re: Taking control of all .io domains with a targeted registration

#21
post #17

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes. It does. Someone noticed that the 4 of the 7 hostnames that were assigned for authoritative names servers for .IO were available for registration. They registered them, and started receiving DNS lookups for .IO hosts from what appears to be actual internet users. Since the user had 4 or the 7, its possible that the majority of DNS lookups for .IO hosts would be sent and answer by the author's systems. The author…

Couldn't you just use letsencrypt to create arbitrary SSL certs for the io domains you now own? Then https isn't going to help you much.

HSTS (correction: HPKP) preloading would help avoid that, and Certificate Transparency monitoring would help detect it, but yes, in general, if you control DNS for a domain, you can get a valid certificate for the domain.

Re: Taking control of all .io domains with a targeted registration

#22

This is a huge screwup on the part of the people who run the 'root' of .IO, and their entire operation should be severely scrutinized by ICANN. In my opinion almost all of the 'weird' TLDs which are country codes that are actually operated by a third party commercial service are 95% spam and junk registrations. .TV is a good example. Technical screwups aside, the existence of .IO and the fact that it "belongs" to the…

Bad actors are on those mailing lists too. What you describe would be the equivalent of mailing fulldisclosure with "Hi all, there might be more unregistered nameservers at .IO (or another 101domains-serviced TLD) that could be used to attack live traffic if anyone wants to grab those, kthx"

I'm fine with that happening, because the people who run .IO need to be spanked. If their customers are subsequently unhappy that their domain names have been hijacked, they can take it up with whatever corporate entity runs .IO. Same problem as publicly disclosing serious flaws with an SSL/TLS root CA.

Re: Taking control of all .io domains with a targeted registration

#23

I read this, but still don't fully understand the implications or impact for .IO TLD services and domain owners. From the OP's "Impact" section. > Given the fact that we were able to take over four of the seven authoritative nameservers for the .io TLD we would be able to poison/redirect the DNS for all .io domain names registered. Not only that, but since we have control over a majority of the nameservers it’s actua…

Yes. It does. Someone noticed that the 4 of the 7 hostnames that were assigned for authoritative names servers for .IO were available for registration. They registered them, and started receiving DNS lookups for .IO hosts from what appears to be actual internet users. Since the user had 4 or the 7, its possible that the majority of DNS lookups for .IO hosts would be sent and answer by the author's systems. The author…

[deleted]

Re: Taking control of all .io domains with a targeted registration

#24

I read this, but still don't fully understand the implications or impact for .IO TLD services and domain owners. From the OP's "Impact" section. > Given the fact that we were able to take over four of the seven authoritative nameservers for the .io TLD we would be able to poison/redirect the DNS for all .io domain names registered. Not only that, but since we have control over a majority of the nameservers it’s actua…

Yes. It does. Someone noticed that the 4 of the 7 hostnames that were assigned for authoritative names servers for .IO were available for registration. They registered them, and started receiving DNS lookups for .IO hosts from what appears to be actual internet users. Since the user had 4 or the 7, its possible that the majority of DNS lookups for .IO hosts would be sent and answer by the author's systems. The author…

HTTPS + HSTS + HPKP with restrictive settings might help against the attacker just getting another certificate.

Re: Taking control of all .io domains with a targeted registration

#25
So, the real question is: "How much should we freak out about this?"

If you scroll back a few months to Cloudbleed/Cloudflare we sort of collectively decided that because cache data containing sensitive info (passwords, tokens, whatever) might be accessible for your site using Cloudflare that everything should be revoked, force password resets, etc.

Now we have this vuln, which I'll dub "IOgate" because it's the cool thing to name these. We don't know if this has ever happened before, there clearly were not adequate safeguards in place, etc.

Should anyone operating a service using a ".io" TLD consider everything potentially compromised?

Re: Taking control of all .io domains with a targeted registration

#26

I read this, but still don't fully understand the implications or impact for .IO TLD services and domain owners. From the OP's "Impact" section. > Given the fact that we were able to take over four of the seven authoritative nameservers for the .io TLD we would be able to poison/redirect the DNS for all .io domain names registered. Not only that, but since we have control over a majority of the nameservers it’s actua…

Yes. It does. Someone noticed that the 4 of the 7 hostnames that were assigned for authoritative names servers for .IO were available for registration. They registered them, and started receiving DNS lookups for .IO hosts from what appears to be actual internet users. Since the user had 4 or the 7, its possible that the majority of DNS lookups for .IO hosts would be sent and answer by the author's systems. The author…

> HTTPS + HSTS would prevent the author from spoofing the DNS of that those sites and sending them to a server over HTTP thus avoiding the certificate errors

I'm not sure that's true. From a CA's perspective the attacker would own the redirected domain 4/7 tries, so they could probably convince at least one CA to issue them a valid certificate for it.

Re: Taking control of all .io domains with a targeted registration

#27
post #19

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes. It does. Someone noticed that the 4 of the 7 hostnames that were assigned for authoritative names servers for .IO were available for registration. They registered them, and started receiving DNS lookups for .IO hosts from what appears to be actual internet users. Since the user had 4 or the 7, its possible that the majority of DNS lookups for .IO hosts would be sent and answer by the author's systems. The author…

>HTTPS + HSTS would prevent the author from spoofing the DNS of that those sites and sending them to a server over HTTP thus avoiding the certificate errors. I'm confused, how would that help? Could the attacker (the author, in this case) not get a valid https certificate for these domains, returning spoofed DNS responses when the CA goes to validate it?

Depends, but for DV certificates, most likely. Certificate Transparency could/would help alert the original site if that was the case.

Re: Taking control of all .io domains with a targeted registration

#29

I read this, but still don't fully understand the implications or impact for .IO TLD services and domain owners. From the OP's "Impact" section. > Given the fact that we were able to take over four of the seven authoritative nameservers for the .io TLD we would be able to poison/redirect the DNS for all .io domain names registered. Not only that, but since we have control over a majority of the nameservers it’s actua…

Yes. It does. Someone noticed that the 4 of the 7 hostnames that were assigned for authoritative names servers for .IO were available for registration. They registered them, and started receiving DNS lookups for .IO hosts from what appears to be actual internet users. Since the user had 4 or the 7, its possible that the majority of DNS lookups for .IO hosts would be sent and answer by the author's systems. The author…

[deleted]
Post reply on HN