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Sandstorm gets a security review

sandstorm.io

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Re: Sandstorm gets a security review

#21
post #16
post #6

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> SSRF is an extremely bad vulnerability; I'm not sure this blanket statement -- probably derived from the world of SaaS -- is necessarily helpful in the context of Sandstorm. Keep in mind that Sandstorm is meant to host internal-facing services. One doesn't normally expect that an external attacker will have authority to create a full user account and install their own apps, which is necessary to exploit this partic…

> Keep in mind that Sandstorm is meant to host internal-facing services. This is not really obvious from any of your marketing copy or documentation, nor would it be a realistic expectation if it were. I think you need to secure like your users don't know or understand your intentions.

Unfortunately, we've had trouble expressing what Sandstorm is in web page format, because it's so different from anything else out there. People tend try to pattern-match it to something else and get the wrong idea. This has been a constant struggle. But once you actually try it, I think it becomes a lot clearer.

There are literally two Sandstorm servers in the world that allow self-service creation of full user accounts (one of which is run by us). The rest are by invite only, which means that to launch an attack, you'd first have to trick the server admin into giving you an invite. That's certainly not impossible, but it is a significant barrier.

That said, again, I do agree this was a real problem -- we do think it's bad if invited users can compromise the server or its network. I'm not trying to claim otherwise, I'm just trying to put everything into full perspective and avoid hyperbole.

Re: Sandstorm gets a security review

#22

Was Cap'n Proto audited as part of this?

I'm honestly not sure. I haven't been able to read the original report (which is not in English). My guess is that it did not receive direct attention.

I note that Cap'n Proto did receive some scrutiny from security guru (and personal friend) Ben Laurie in the past:

https://capnproto.org/news/2015-03-02-security-advisory-and-...

My next job is at a company that is a heavy user of Cap'n Proto, so expect more progress on this front going forward.

Re: Sandstorm gets a security review

#23
post #7

It's amusing to see that it got a security overview _after_ it shutdown it's business operations. I am curious if it get a security review when it was a proper company given that their USP is security. I am still sad that the business didn't work out :( I thought there was going to be a follow up blog on where they ended up getting acqui-hired?

We actually didn't get acquihired -- Sandstorm is still an independent company, and I'm still the CEO and majority shareholder, but we no longer have paid employees. We're continuing to work on Sandstorm, and have even pushed some major new features in the last couple weeks (e.g. the Powerbox UI for connecting apps to each other and to the outside world with explicit user permission). What did happen is we're all get…

I wonder if you (core devs) could get full-time jobs to integrate Sandstorm with company infrastructures.

Re: Sandstorm gets a security review

#24
post #18
post #3

SSRF is an extremely bad vulnerability; it's usually game-over on penetration tests. The zip-file path validation bug is also bad. I'm pretty ambivalent about these "we got a security review, they said we're good" updates, even when they include the actual contents of the report (the final contents of the reports you actually see are almost always negotiated between the client and the testers). It is a real problem f…

> SSRF is an extremely bad vulnerability; it's usually game-over on penetration tests It's usually not. What can you do via HTTP protocol inside the network? Check out ssrf bible.

You can smuggle memcached text protocol over HTTP if you can insert a linefeed. I think tptacek meant "bad vulnerability" as in serious, not trivial.

Re: Sandstorm gets a security review

#25
post #3

SSRF is an extremely bad vulnerability; it's usually game-over on penetration tests. The zip-file path validation bug is also bad. I'm pretty ambivalent about these "we got a security review, they said we're good" updates, even when they include the actual contents of the report (the final contents of the reports you actually see are almost always negotiated between the client and the testers). It is a real problem f…

Agreed. It is difficult to properly set expectations for assessment results due to the cultural demand for a clean bill of health. No one wants to be sold "meaningful insight" into their security posture, they want to be sold a report that says no vulns are present after they're fixed.

Fundamentally, I believe the security consulting industry is due for a radical shift, probably instigated and led by Hackerone and Bugcrowd. Unfortunately there is a lot of inefficiency in the industry that allows consulting firms to exist as they do now.

For the most part, my clients come to me for an assessment because they have a measurable business need - lucrative customer A is demanding an external third party assessment. This is the primary use case for which I feel comfortable - my time at Accuvant (now Optiv) left me deeply uncomfortable with the rote way that security assessments could be nosebleed expensive for frankly questionable work (e.g. $10k/week/assessment for reviewing brochure websites for large companies - for the most part employees knew what they were doing, it was just overpriced and unnecessary).

In a lot of ways security assessments are inflated in price because they're somewhat like insurance. Truly exceptional vulnerability researchers could and probably should be earning half a million to a million a year. Watching them work is a beautiful blend of art and science. They are underpaid. On the other hand, merely competent or outright mediocre "penetration testers" are overpaid by way of de facto rent collecting.

If I were to run a productized software firm now and no particular customer demanded a third party assessment, I'd honestly never commission one. Instead, I'd open a bug bounty program and dial the rewards up, then welcome specific people to come find vulnerabilities (people like Frans Rosen of Detectify, Jack Witton of Facebook, Egor Homakov a competitor of mine and in this very thread ;) or Bitquark at Tesla - not sure of his real name off the top of my head).

I have utter confidence that for essentially everything but cryptanalysis, a generously priced bug bounty is plainly superior than any given firm's commissioned assessment in raw results. It's not quite as turnkey or comforting, but it's effective. Hackerone and Bugcrowd even field reports for managed programs these days. I believe this wholeheartedly enough that I would (and have in the past!) advise potential new clients against the interests of my firm in this direction if they didn't require the assessment for an external third party or regulatory compliance.

Once they really perfect the researcher signal/noise rating system, Hackerone and Bugcrowd are going to take the top 100-1000 researchers on either platform and wrap their current activities into a neat layer of turnkey abstraction, call it a formal assessment and legitimately disrupt the pricing of the security consulting industry.

Re: Sandstorm gets a security review

#26
post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> SSRF is an extremely bad vulnerability; it's usually game-over on penetration tests It's usually not. What can you do via HTTP protocol inside the network? Check out ssrf bible.

You can smuggle memcached text protocol over HTTP if you can insert a linefeed. I think tptacek meant "bad vulnerability" as in serious, not trivial.

SSRF usually happens inside a request library that doesn't allow linefeeds. SSRF in general is serious, but HTTP GET SSRF is useless on most hosts.

Re: Sandstorm gets a security review

#27
post #25
post #3

SSRF is an extremely bad vulnerability; it's usually game-over on penetration tests. The zip-file path validation bug is also bad. I'm pretty ambivalent about these "we got a security review, they said we're good" updates, even when they include the actual contents of the report (the final contents of the reports you actually see are almost always negotiated between the client and the testers). It is a real problem f…

Agreed. It is difficult to properly set expectations for assessment results due to the cultural demand for a clean bill of health. No one wants to be sold "meaningful insight" into their security posture, they want to be sold a report that says no vulns are present after they're fixed. Fundamentally, I believe the security consulting industry is due for a radical shift, probably instigated and led by Hackerone and Bu…

Worth noting that in the case of this security review of Sandstorm, the customer of the review was a Sandstorm user, namely the government of Taiwan, which probably means incentives were aligned better than if we had commissioned the review directly.

Re: Sandstorm gets a security review

#28
post #7

Earlier quoted context omitted.

We actually didn't get acquihired -- Sandstorm is still an independent company, and I'm still the CEO and majority shareholder, but we no longer have paid employees. We're continuing to work on Sandstorm, and have even pushed some major new features in the last couple weeks (e.g. the Powerbox UI for connecting apps to each other and to the outside world with explicit user permission). What did happen is we're all get…

I wonder if you (core devs) could get full-time jobs to integrate Sandstorm with company infrastructures.

Probably not -- finding a company willing to hire someone to deploy Sandstorm for them sounds at least as hard as finding a company willing to buy Sandstorm as a product and pay Sandstorm Inc. for support, which is what we had trouble with. I'm sure they exist but enterprise sales are non-trivial. :/

That said, my new employer is a big user of Cap'n Proto, a sub-project of Sandstorm.

Re: Sandstorm gets a security review

#29
post #6
post #3

SSRF is an extremely bad vulnerability; it's usually game-over on penetration tests. The zip-file path validation bug is also bad. I'm pretty ambivalent about these "we got a security review, they said we're good" updates, even when they include the actual contents of the report (the final contents of the reports you actually see are almost always negotiated between the client and the testers). It is a real problem f…

> SSRF is an extremely bad vulnerability; I'm not sure this blanket statement -- probably derived from the world of SaaS -- is necessarily helpful in the context of Sandstorm. Keep in mind that Sandstorm is meant to host internal-facing services. One doesn't normally expect that an external attacker will have authority to create a full user account and install their own apps, which is necessary to exploit this partic…

Understanding the importance and impact of pivot points in long term penetration seems to undermine "it's internal so it doesn't matter". Not that you're alone in that view but the "hard crunchy shell, soft chewy center" security model needs to die...
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