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Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

sandervenema.ch

21–30 of 350 posts

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#21

There are several projects moving toward this. Matrix is probably the most well-known project, but its crypto isn't actually operational yet, AFAIK. Tox works now, but for all their talk of trying to be user-friendly, asking users to exchange long alphanumeric sequences inherently isn't. Psyc, maybe?

Matrix's protocol design is terrible for realtime messaging though (I'm sure there are other uses for which it's more adept); it's effectively a giant, inefficient, JSON datastore that syncs data everywhere. It's also pull based so it consumes battery like crazy. If that's what you need, fine, but for realtime messaging I'd argue that it's really unacceptable.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#22
EDIT: this isn't a response to most of the article, but specifically to the "Moving Forward" section, asking about alternative tools.

Come to the matrix!

https://matrix.org/

It's free -- all FOSS, including the entirety of the server -- and yes, all of it: proof by existence: several of my friends run their own.

It federates. I regularly join channels hosted on several different servers, and exchange messages without issue.

It's on every platform. I use it on the desktop, my android (cyanogen, without gapps, none the less!), and my ipad, every day.

It even has voice and video calling built in, using webRTC. This feature has been a little rough while it was in development, but I used it last week in a 1-on-1 call and had an effortless experience. The audio and video quality was on par with Google Hangouts.

Crypto is hard, but it's coming. The Matrix developers have huge respect for the axolotl ratchet design used in Signal. They've worked on making another implementation (in C, for easier linking in various languages, ostensibly) here: https://matrix.org/git/olm/

The deployment of that code to give full End-to-End encryption is a work in progress, but the beta is roughly functional. It includes everything you'd expect: communication works by default, but in an encrypted room, messages are flagged yellow if you haven't explicitly verified the sender's key. There's a key per device; it doesn't leave the device; and as soon as you verify that device/key, messages from it are green, and you're E2E secure.

Disclaimer: I have no direct association -- I became a Matrix convert after trying to write some XMPP client code about a year ago. I'm just really enthusiastic about recommending it because the tech is solid, the sync is good, it solves a problem, and the team hasn't stopped either: they been firing on all cylinders constantly since I started using Matrix.

I love Signal for their dedication to getting encryption right and the security of their users. But yes, I also share a lot of the concerns listed in this article. Most of all, I honestly believe federation is an imperative. So, while acknowledging Signal's history of outstanding security work... Hey, let's celebrate there's more than one game in town working on alternatives.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#23
post #7
post #4

I am also very unhappy with the direction Signal has gone, but there's currently no alternative. I'd be interested in contributing to work attempting to replicate it, though.

Why isn't there an alternative? Signal uses the Axolotl protocol for encryption. There are already several XMPP clients that support the OMEMO protocol which is based on Axolotl ( https://conversations.im/omemo/ ). And for Matrix (a modern alternative to XMPP) there's Olm which is also based on Axolotl.

At the risk of derailing this slightly, I wouldn't call Matrix a "modern alternative" to XMPP. The use cases are almost entirely different; Matrix isn't really suitable for realtime applications like XMPP is (because Matrix is all pull-based, so you have to query the server constantly to try and get messages in a reasonable time; this also means keeping the phone radio in active, high-battery-drain mode [pretty sure that's the technical term]).

Disclaimer: I do a lot of work on XMPP related things and rather like the protocol, so maybe I'm biased. I'm sure there are things for which Matrix is a better fit that I wouldn't use XMPP for too though.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#24

Unfortunately, Google has made it (almost) impossible to wake up the phone via some external event without using its proprietary GCM. Even though GCM is not part of AOSP, it has unique status on the platform that can't easily be replicated (without recompiling the kernel, etc like the article mentions). Before the days of doze mode & other battery optimizations, you could just listen & block on a socket, then let the…

Kind of tangential, but GCM is deprecated and you're supposed to use Firebase Cloud Messaging now: https://firebase.google.com/docs/cloud-messaging/

It's still just a JAR (no native components), so AFAICT there's no technical reason someone else couldn't do a similar thing with their own servers.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#25
Essentially this guy is saying, Signal is secure, it's mostly easy to use (with the exception of multiple phone numbers), and the only alternative he mentioned is a half broken clone. Is he seriously going to stop recommending it to people whose lives depend on secure communications because of some abstruse ideological point? In any case, Moxie's position is a reasonable one even though there are some arguments for federation.

While my current phone doesn't support Signal, once I get a new one I will continue to use it.

You might opine that allowing Signal clones would allow me to use the app, but they would almost certainly be maintained by people who aren't really crypto experts, and so it's better to operate as though I am broadcasting in cleartext than to pretend that I'm not and get burned.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#26
Signal is to get people from SMS and iMessage -> Signal. This means that cross platform communication becomes secure in transit.

Once Signal and others have really wiped out all the insecure messaging people are doing, then we can start with the identity problem with phone numbers. GCM, Contacts, etc are all related to this "phone number as identity" problem.

RCS is an unfortunate grab in this space, and we need to move fast before RCS is the default, and we're back to insecure messaging.

Email addresses are the best form of "federated identification" but are wildly insecure for communication. Here's to hoping we can get some better ones.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#27

- Lack of federation Use a federated secure protocol. Oh wait, there are none. Because if a problem appears you just can't fix it without breaking all federated clients. And then they will whine. - Dependency on Google Cloud Messaging Fair enough - Your contact list is not private Fair enough - The RedPhone server is not open-source While it would be nice that it was Open sourced I can understand them not releasing i…

There are really two federated protocols, xmpp and matrix. Matrix is pretty young but looks good, they just added e2e encryption.

Check out the Riot client, web, android and ios. The apps are even native.

Plus, you don't have to show your phone nr.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#28

Essentially this guy is saying, Signal is secure, it's mostly easy to use (with the exception of multiple phone numbers), and the only alternative he mentioned is a half broken clone. Is he seriously going to stop recommending it to people whose lives depend on secure communications because of some abstruse ideological point? In any case, Moxie's position is a reasonable one even though there are some arguments for f…

The biggest argument is that there is little of a difference between Signal and Telegram or Signal and WhatsApp for the user if they are forced to use the official servers, and those servers get to store their entire social graph.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#29
Any messenger, tied to phone number, is not safe. possible attacks are: 1) create copy of sim-card; 2) force mobile operator to intercept password-code, sent to your number, and "restore" password this way. It may sound ridiculous for you, but in Russia it's reality (both vectors), it's real cases from life. And when user really need safe messenger, all of them are too careless to implement really safe way of messaging. And if you think these vectors are not possible in your country - be sure, we were thinking the same way.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#30
post #11
post #2

What are your views about VoIP with ZRTP?

That's unrelated (off-topic) to Signal and what the blog post discusses, isn't it?

Though it wasn't explicitly mentioned in the blog post, Signal does support encrypted voice calls, so GP post isn't entirely off topic.
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