Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yes, I know that Solomonoff induction is completely impractical for real life machine learning. My point was that if you can survive in the simulation to the point where you see either the 0 or the 1, we don't have any way even in theory (let alone in practice) to guess the probabilities of seeing a 0 or 1, unless you use some sort of learning algorithm. You can use any learning algorithm for this; it doesn't have to…
But your argument seems to fundamentally rest on Solomonoff induction. Put any real algorithm in there, and now you need to ensure that 1. the biases of the algorithm encompass a hypothesis that matches the data and 2. the algorithm will be able to arrive at that hypothesis given a real data stream, and, ideally, a real amount of computation. Both of these are hard questions, in the strongest sense of the term. And o…
What learning algorithms can predict that our physics theories might not
21–30 of 35 posts
Re: What learning algorithms can predict that our physics theories might not
#22Earlier quoted context omitted.
But your argument seems to fundamentally rest on Solomonoff induction. Put any real algorithm in there, and now you need to ensure that 1. the biases of the algorithm encompass a hypothesis that matches the data and 2. the algorithm will be able to arrive at that hypothesis given a real data stream, and, ideally, a real amount of computation. Both of these are hard questions, in the strongest sense of the term. And o…
OK, I see what you're saying now. In that case, can you think of a better way of predicting whether you see a 0 or 1 in that situation?
Re: What learning algorithms can predict that our physics theories might not
#23Earlier quoted context omitted.
Could Solomonoff induction guess sequences of prime-numbers?
You can think of Solomonoff induction as a weighted set of experts. At each step, each expert makes a prediction, and the overall prediction is the one that gets the highest total weight. Then the true data comes in, and the weight of each expert is increased or decreased based on whether that expert was right or wrong. And here's the kicker, the experts are all possible prediction programs, initially weighted by 2^-…
Re: What learning algorithms can predict that our physics theories might not
#24Earlier quoted context omitted.
Could Solomonoff induction guess sequences of prime-numbers?
You can think of Solomonoff induction as a weighted set of experts. At each step, each expert makes a prediction, and the overall prediction is the one that gets the highest total weight. Then the true data comes in, and the weight of each expert is increased or decreased based on whether that expert was right or wrong. And here's the kicker, the experts are all possible prediction programs, initially weighted by 2^-…
Re: What learning algorithms can predict that our physics theories might not
#25Well, I must say that I'm pleasantly surprised with the comments so far. I was actually expecting that this would be quickly shot down as either unoriginal or fundamentally flawed. But instead it seems no one has caught on to what this post is actually claiming, so I suppose I should now be very blunt about it. At the beginning of the blog post, it claims that it explains 2 things: 1. where exactly might you be able…
It is not clear to me that you realize that Solomonoff induction is a mathematical argument, not a practical algorithm. To run it at the level of generality necessary to discover the laws of physics is computationally infeasible. In fact, it's one of those cases where calling it "computationally infeasible" is an inadvertent understatement of the problem, because English doesn't have gradations for this level of diff…
There may exist an alternate form of causality that isn't time bound, which may be exposed here over short periods of time. I would hesitate to judge it "computationally infeasible" until we know more. :)
Re: What learning algorithms can predict that our physics theories might not
#26I wasn't expecting this article to be about Sleeping Beauty problems and Solomonoff induction. There are people trying to apply real machine learning algorithms to real physics problems (e.g. [1][2]). This article is not about that. It should go without saying that Solomonoff induction is totally useless for practical applications, if interesting theoretically. Brute forcing the space of all programs is ridiculously…
Indeed, just like Turing machines and the lambda calculus. Still an important theoretical step though!
Re: What learning algorithms can predict that our physics theories might not
#27This is a very interesting article. Scott Aaronson touches on some of these ideas related to quantum cloning and the concept of "you" in his blog posts. I've always thought this kind of concept might define the limits of standard science, as currently practiced. Science requires reproducibility. But by whom? Well, other scientists of course. If every scientist tries your experiment and gets the same result, then you…
Actually, the reproducibility applies to the hypothesis (conclusion), not to the experiment. It's only that, since the observer is irrelevant, people simplify and call it "reproducing the experiment".
If your experiment depends on the observer, and you get to know that, that dependence will go on the conclusion, and the people reproducing your experiment will expect to see the result your hypothesis say they would, not the same one you got. If you have a correct predicting model, everybody will conclude it's correct.
Re: What learning algorithms can predict that our physics theories might not
#28Earlier quoted context omitted.
Could Solomonoff induction guess sequences of prime-numbers?
The output of a program could be infinite and thus it never halts. Without Chatlin's constant or the Busy Beaver values, brute forcing is not feasible in a countably computable universe. It is still interesting to talk about Oracles, ie. Somehow getting hold of Chatlin's constant and thereby easily solving the halting problem and being able to use the induction.
Re: What learning algorithms can predict that our physics theories might not
#29Earlier quoted context omitted.
It is not clear to me that you realize that Solomonoff induction is a mathematical argument, not a practical algorithm. To run it at the level of generality necessary to discover the laws of physics is computationally infeasible. In fact, it's one of those cases where calling it "computationally infeasible" is an inadvertent understatement of the problem, because English doesn't have gradations for this level of diff…
I would note that "computation" is work done over time. Causality. There may exist an alternate form of causality that isn't time bound, which may be exposed here over short periods of time. I would hesitate to judge it "computationally infeasible" until we know more. :)
And given that the topic in question is plumbing the depths of physics in the first place, this is perhaps a notch more important than it might otherwise be. How would we discover that physics has an infinite/acausal computation mechanism if we first must use Solomonoff induction to discover that, when we can only afford to use Solomonoff induction to discover that if we harness that computation?
Re: What learning algorithms can predict that our physics theories might not
#30Earlier quoted context omitted.
You can think of Solomonoff induction as a weighted set of experts. At each step, each expert makes a prediction, and the overall prediction is the one that gets the highest total weight. Then the true data comes in, and the weight of each expert is increased or decreased based on whether that expert was right or wrong. And here's the kicker, the experts are all possible prediction programs, initially weighted by 2^-…
More specifically, every incorrect expert is removed at each step, and the remaining experts have their probabilities uniformly rescaled to sum to 1.