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“What Went Right and What Went Wrong”: Analysis of 155 Postmortems from Gamedev

research.microsoft.com

21–30 of 52 posts

Re: “What Went Right and What Went Wrong”: Analysis of 155 Postmortems from Gamedev

#21
post #18
post #14

Earlier quoted context omitted.

One of my friends who just left being full time in the game industry pointed out to me that the game industry is 10 years behind in software development best practices. Churn and burn (like many startups) is a daily reality.

If your friend was not very senior (10+ years experience), I would not believe what he says, since he probably did not have enough experience to judge the situation. I think the idea that the game industry is "behind" other fields is kind of comical, given that games are some of the most complex software in the world, and big game teams have only a few hundred people on them, and meanwhile something relatively trivia…

I would argue that crunch is at the root of good software development practices.

I've spent time in the industry and its behind in practices, wages and quality of life. There may be some smart, motivated people but the industry as a whole has not grown well.

Re: “What Went Right and What Went Wrong”: Analysis of 155 Postmortems from Gamedev

#22

The old post-mortems in Game Developer magazine were written almost in template form. Went right: 1) Great team/culture 2) Everyone put forth the effort (scheduled crunch) 3) Some amazing techwork or artwork or designwork etc... Went wrong: 1) Didn't anticipate x/y/z 2) Burnout (remember that crunch)? 3) Bad/lazy scheduling and/or capacity planning Kudos to the people who did this at MS but you're looking at tainted…

What are the real reasons for successes and failures? You left me hanging...

Re: “What Went Right and What Went Wrong”: Analysis of 155 Postmortems from Gamedev

#23
post #10
post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There's some world-shaking insight. The best piece of advice I can give is to never, ever give an estimate to stakeholders until you've worked on the estimate first. And don't finish an estimate until you've actually built some small proofs of concept. Your estimates will still be wrong, but they'll be much more accurate than some off-the-cuff number that your stakeholders will be building their various plans around.…

I think this is a symptom of a fear of "I don't know." If I could change one thing in dev cultures, I would instill a healthy respect for the sentence: "I don't know, but here's $how_I'll_find_out and here's $when_I'll_have_an_answer."

Exactly right. Too often I've seen people commit to a schedule where the milestones were of unknown difficulty. When cutting through a new jungle, you have no idea what is between you and your goal, so really all you can say is that the best you can hope for is X if this jungle happens to be like previous ones.

This is especially true in startup situations where you are learning technologies that may themselves not be complete, with people who are learning their own new things, to achieve a result which is only hypothetically possible. It drove my CFO nuts but rather than commit to a schedule for a big deliverable I would walk backwards from the end point and say, "These are the stops between where we are, and where we are going. We measure our progress by getting to each stop, but like a subway map there isn't a known amount of time between stops, only what the stops are." And he would come back with "well we only have money to get to this date, will it be done by then?" and then we would talk about the uncertainty between each of the milestones. At some point you can reach a common understanding of what the unknowns are and how discovering their value will inform on the difficulty of the next step.

That said, I've met managers who just say "Oh we will be done by %x date." and then basically worked the problem the same way I have.

If you're agile you can break down the intermediate stops as sprints but estimating the backlog is still the killer step.

Re: “What Went Right and What Went Wrong”: Analysis of 155 Postmortems from Gamedev

#25
post #18
post #14

Earlier quoted context omitted.

One of my friends who just left being full time in the game industry pointed out to me that the game industry is 10 years behind in software development best practices. Churn and burn (like many startups) is a daily reality.

If your friend was not very senior (10+ years experience), I would not believe what he says, since he probably did not have enough experience to judge the situation. I think the idea that the game industry is "behind" other fields is kind of comical, given that games are some of the most complex software in the world, and big game teams have only a few hundred people on them, and meanwhile something relatively trivia…

TDD might not apply well to games because they are used by big corporations for 15 or 20 years. It makes more sense when you're working with old legacy code and you want to add features to it. Unit tests are definitely not a all-around solution but they have their use cases.

Re: “What Went Right and What Went Wrong”: Analysis of 155 Postmortems from Gamedev

#26
In the past, Gamasutra has also published data indicating correlations between "biggest problems/biggest successes" and marketplace success.

The takeaways I remember about that: A good producer matters, a team of a least three people does better than one or two, and experience shipping stuff matters.

Re: “What Went Right and What Went Wrong”: Analysis of 155 Postmortems from Gamedev

#27

The old post-mortems in Game Developer magazine were written almost in template form. Went right: 1) Great team/culture 2) Everyone put forth the effort (scheduled crunch) 3) Some amazing techwork or artwork or designwork etc... Went wrong: 1) Didn't anticipate x/y/z 2) Burnout (remember that crunch)? 3) Bad/lazy scheduling and/or capacity planning Kudos to the people who did this at MS but you're looking at tainted…

I've been to an all-hands post-mortem where the director of engineering had to say "anyone with an opinion besides [name of director of engineering] sucks"?

Said director of engineering literally watched us blow milestone after milestone yet somehow the knowledge we were going to miss our commits (and not by a little) never propagated upwards to the ceo. Either that or the ceo didn't want to listen; it could be any combination of those two.

Either way, the engineers were pissed.

Incredibly poor milestone management and a failure to triage didn't end up in our fucking learnings document somehow.

Re: “What Went Right and What Went Wrong”: Analysis of 155 Postmortems from Gamedev

#28
post #14
post #4

The recommendations at the end of the pdf seem to be written by captain Obvious. They are so generic they can apply to about ANY project even non gamedev related.

One of my friends who just left being full time in the game industry pointed out to me that the game industry is 10 years behind in software development best practices. Churn and burn (like many startups) is a daily reality.

I got into professional game development in the last few years and found that the state of good, modern software engineering practices in the game world is years behind, say, web engineering.

Games are still all closed source. Game engineers prefer to sell their components for a pittance (for example, on the Unity Asset Store) instead of collaborating on GitHub. They really, really hate writing tests. There's a deep reliance on manual testing. They still have a "ship" culture ("who cares about the code, as long as we ship by the deadline?"), disregarding the fact that games run live for years now. Multiple managers actively fought me on doing code reviews (I was new-ish, I wanted my code to be reviewed). I saw and worked on games that had no codified version control branching strategy. No coding standards. Multiple issue tracking systems. A pathetic grip on sharing code among projects. Four implementations of a state machine in one game. It goes on.

I'd like to think it was just my employer's problem, but from talking to people who have been in games for a long time, it's endemic to the industry.

I'm now out of the industry :)

Re: “What Went Right and What Went Wrong”: Analysis of 155 Postmortems from Gamedev

#29
post #16

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I would assume it was (to most of them) but knowing and doing are two very different things (i.e. everyone knows smoking is bad for you and yet people still do it / start doing it). So to me the far more interesting and helpful question to answer is: Are there most efficient ways to keep people from making the same mistake over and over, other than repeating what everyone already knows, over and over? Identify the fo…

The best approach is to apprentice with someone who knows not to make them. If you can't do that, check in with someone regularly who: 1. Won't sugar coat feedback, 2. Has shipped games, 3. Has a healthy sense of humility, and 3. Is genuinely concerned about your success. I really like sitting on advisory boards in this role, but my secret to being good at it is that I regularly ask for feedback from others who are s…

Something about your last paragraph rubbed me the wrong way. Sorry.

> about 10X the competition

Steam added 1500 games in the first 7 months of 2015. Crunchbase had over 8000 investments in 2015. So I don't think that's true, even accounting for a Christmas peak.

> juggling massive game assets

Lots of data goes into games, lots of data comes out of websites. The difference to my eyes is that the industry has multiple, principled, well-understood frameworks to deal with the data problem and the games industry has...what? Maybe the state of the art has moved on in the last 5 years but when I left it was all "well it's just a DAG, how hard can it be to write a tool to recursively build it".

> a fraction of the budget, finance, and exit options

Being willing to work for less and with fewer resources is not a sign of good engineering practice. I don't know if I'd say it's the opposite but it's at best irrelevant.

> a tough frame rate budget

Not very different to needing to meet tough latency/error rate SLAs, except instead of failing TRC (or getting your exec producer to stare down MSFT/Sony), you'll just go broke. Oh, and you don't know what the SLA is, ever, so it's a continuous process of tradeoff.

> all issues GPU-ish (when was the last time you wrote a shader, Mr. Website Developer?)

Ignoring that some "website developers" (many of whom are not "Mr" - something else that the games industry does not do well at) do write shaders in the form of GPGPU optimization of ML tasks, obviously tasks differ. Let's not pretend that banging out something in Cg is PhD-level shit. It's not harder than writing a Spark job, for sure.

> having people with a huge range of technical skills requiring direct access to the source/asset repo.

You have Mr. Blow upthread sneering at Twitter for employing 4000 people to build something "trivial" but you think that each of those people have identical programming chops in every bit of the code they touch? If there's a single thing that argues against your idea it's this - the rest of the industry has become pretty good at modularizing areas of the business and auditing changes to it with code review, build/asset/deployment tagging etc. The last games company I worked at, someone stayed at the office until 5am before going on holiday for a week and sent an email that effectively said "I've rewritten quite a bit of the engine, you'll probably need to fix the build because I didn't test anything, see you in a fortnight". People gasp when gmail/twitter/facebook is down for half an hour but I've worked in places where there _wasn't even a canonical build_ that could be broken.

Re: “What Went Right and What Went Wrong”: Analysis of 155 Postmortems from Gamedev

#30

I found the Games Outcome Project to be much more rigorous(and anonymous) on the what practices help and hurt gamedev: http://gamasutra.com/blogs/PaulTozour/20141216/232023/The_Ga...

If you compare the conclusions, this topic's research, while obvious, is closer to reality that the one, which concluded that crunch literally "makes games worse" despite the fact that every single game, which made a significant critical/financial impact had a period of crunch.
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