Earlier quoted context omitted.
I can imagine that such an attack would be dealt with a mix of manual intervention and technical measures, something in between the Google.com search page outage that happens once in a blue moon, and the false routes for YouTube.com IPs that have been propagated several times during the past few years. Big companies that rely on Internet presence are quite pro-active, and there are teams of people whose job is to pre…
How exactly would that work. modify an instance of bind and check if the client is requesting to resolve 'google.com'? If true, then respond with the rouge IP? First we must make sure the client machine is set up to use our name servers, the ones we have control over.
You can just set up the zones in e.g. Your local network nameserver to say it's authoritative for google.com then send the traffic to wherever you want. Many companies do this on a large scale on their internal networks for the purpose of having easy-to-use names (that can have the nodes behind them changed out without changing anything else) using, mostly for backward-compatibility or legacy reasons, the same domains / zones that may resolve externally to different RRsets. This is known as split-horizon DNS: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Split-horizon_DNS