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The Bomb Didn't Beat Japan

foreignpolicy.com

191–200 of 223 posts

Re: The Bomb Didn't Beat Japan

#191

Earlier quoted context omitted.

In talking about causality, the article makes two counterfactual claims: had the Soviets not invaded Manchuria, Japan would not have surrendered and had the bombs not been dropped, Japan would have surrendered. (In my opinion, the first claim is well-defended, the second less so). Since the bombs were dropped and the Soviets did invade, any discussion of these possibilities is a little speculative.

This seems reasonable—thanks. Can you quote where the article actually claims those two things? I'm curious, and I don't disbelieve you, but I really don't want to have to go back and comb through the whole thing again :)

This section, primarily, argues that the atomic bomb created a political out for the Japanese government:

> Attributing the end of the war to the atomic bomb served Japan's interests in multiple ways. But it also served U.S. interests. If the Bomb won the war, then the perception of U.S. military power would be enhanced, U.S. diplomatic influence in Asia and around the world would increase, and U.S. security would be strengthened. The $2 billion spent to build it would not have been wasted. If, on the other hand, the Soviet entry into the war was what caused Japan to surrender, then the Soviets could claim that they were able to do in four days what the United States was unable to do in four years, and the perception of Soviet military power and Soviet diplomatic influence would be enhanced. And once the Cold War was underway, asserting that the Soviet entry had been the decisive factor would have been tantamount to giving aid and comfort to the enemy.

It basically argues, yeah, both Stalin AND the bomb likely contributed to a surrender. This part is not cited as well, however. It relies on implication based on the dissonance between records before the surrender and statements by the Japanese government after the surrender.

Re: The Bomb Didn't Beat Japan

#192
> It could not have been Nagasaki. The bombing of Nagasaki occurred in the late morning of August 9, after the Supreme Council had already begun meeting to discuss surrender, and word of the bombing only reached Japan's leaders in the early afternoon -- after the meeting of the Supreme Council had been adjourned in deadlock and the full cabinet had been called to take up the discussion. Based on timing alone, Nagasaki can't have been what motivated them.

I've not read the whole thing (just starting work, have it marked for later) so I may be jumping the gun with this comment, but that paragraph jumped out. A lot of arguments I see for why dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary seem fairly rooted in hindsight - this doesn't make the arguments wrong, but it does mean we can't judge the decisions made on these metrics because at the time people did not have that hindsight to help them.

Did they know that the effect of soviet actions would be so detrimental to Japan long-term?

Did they absolutely know that Japan, or one of its allies, didn't have something up its sleeve had the potential to turn that situation around? Or that a sudden change of fortunes wouldn't disable a large chunk of the relevant forces against Japan such that they could pull themselves "back into the game"?

No one thing beat Japan. War isn't about doing the one thing that will probably stop an enemy: it is about trying to make sure they stop and stay stopped long enough for you to solidify your position and deal with your other problems (particularly, in a large war, battles on other fronts). This often means hitting an enemy while they are down just in case. Rule 4: The double-tap.

Of course as taps go dropping a nuke over a civilian target is at best morally dubious, this is undeniable IMO, but I find a lot of the arguments against to be ill considered from the point of view of what people making the decisions at the time definitely knew, definitely knew that they knew, and the long list of things that they could not confirm so strongly.

Re: The Bomb Didn't Beat Japan

#193
post #167

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Did you even read the article, Daniel? Contrary to your assertion, the essay is not asking "What if action X did not end the war in the Pacific?". It is stating - categorically - that the commonly accepted narrative is based on an insufficient accounting of the facts, and that this narrative is unsustainable in the face of a more complete record of what actually happened. Here's the key passage: "It didn't take a mil…

It's also noteworthy that the Japanese troops in Manchuria were, from most accounts I've seen, their most veteran land-based army. And the soviets, having fought the Germans for the past 6 years, basically cut through them like butter. That will make you reconsider your position.

^except that's wrong. The best of the Kwangtung army stationed in Manchuria was already shifted to Kyushu and the southern islands of Japan to prepare for the possible US invasion.

>"Most of Japan's best troops had been shifted to the southern part of the home islands. Japan's military had correctly guessed that the likely first target of an American invasion would be the southernmost island of Kyushu. The once proud Kwangtung army in Manchuria, for example, was a shell of its former self because its best units had been shifted away to defend Japan itself."

It wasn't that the best troops were defeated; just that Japan couldn't fight a war on two fronts. Once the Soviet Union invaded, they had no other viable options other than surrender or fight a losing battle.

However, even if the author's analysis is correct, I still think it best to believe that the nuclear weapons were the main cause but the other variables also influenced the outcome.

Re: The Bomb Didn't Beat Japan

#194
post #157
post #103

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yet until a credible leadership figure actually _offered_ unconditional surrender, it was going to be war as usual. But it wasn’t. The A-bombs were quite unusual. They were extraordinary weapons, and would have required extraordinary justifications to use on the military, let alone on civilians. (To the argument that it wasn’t possible to target the military apart from civilians: that’s exactly why nuclear weapons ar…

You have the privilege of tarring the commanders of US forces as war criminals "of the highest gravity" because of the sacrifices US soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines made during WW2. If you haven't already, do some research on how the Japanese fought at Okinawa. At the defensive plans they had in place for defending the Home Islands. The toll of an invasion would have been horrendous for both sides. This is with…

The United States dropped two very big bombs on cities. Cities, not military installations. That's very close to being a war criminal in my opinion, realities of war be damned.

Edit:

> You have the privilege of tarring the commanders of US forces as war criminals "of the highest gravity" because of the sacrifices US soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines made during WW2.

In reality, we Europeans have the privilege because of United Kingdom, Soviet, United States, Canada, Finland, and countless volunteers and freedom fighters from the occupied areas. I appreciate the sacrifices, suffering and determination from a nation I so admire; in fact we celebrate it once a year, but please remember that United States were never alone in the fight.

Re: The Bomb Didn't Beat Japan

#195
post #113

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Here's the opinion of the leader of the US military at the time Yes, later Leahy apparently said, "It is my opinion," not, "At the time we all believed" ["that the Japanese were defeated and ready to surrender...."] I'm willing to believe that some, maybe including Leahy, thought the US had only to stand back and wait for the inevitable surrender, with no ratcheting up of force necessary. But, at the same time, someb…

Estimated casualties were thought to be up to a million people. The US ordered 500,000 Purple Hearts in anticipation of that, so many that those ones are still being given out today.

It bears remembering that a million is small in comparison to the number of casualties the soviet union had already taken at that point.

Re: The Bomb Didn't Beat Japan

#196
The speed at which the Soviets defeated the Japanese in Manchuria is what motivated the USans to drop the atomic bomb, to end the war quickly and keep the Soviets out of a post war Japan.

Re: The Bomb Didn't Beat Japan

#197

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The further we get away from the events of those times the easier it is to second guess those decisions and not be challenged by someone with first hand knowledge of the events. Great observation, summarizes one of my main quarrels with people trying to reimagine history.

The weird thing about this is that I've read excerpts from Trumans diary and I've read the result of the US Strategic Bombing Survey that was done at the time and both either say outright or strongly imply that the atomic bombing was not necessary to achieve the surrender of Japan. This is stuff written either immediately before the bombing or shortly afterwards. It's only now that people have had years of believing…

Just wanted to add a reference and quote:

> Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.

>

> United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 1946 : http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS-PTO-Summary.html

Re: The Bomb Didn't Beat Japan

#198
I wasn't aware that US carpet bombed 66 major cities full of civilians. That's kinda hard to spin as life saving solution. A-bomb was most wonderful political invention. Much better than technical one.

Re: The Bomb Didn't Beat Japan

#199

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This comment is contentless. It doesn't address a single specific thing the article says. Instead it offers woolly generalities ("Japan was threatened on many fronts and made the best choice it could. That much is clear") and platitudes ("all of the actions, taken together, were the reason for the war to end. Yes, Stalin played a big role. But it's not an either-or situation"). It sounds like it's saying something; i…

The last section of the article actually argues against the article's stated conclusion, and it supports the statement you've replied to. This section, in particular: > Attributing the end of the war to the atomic bomb served Japan's interests in multiple ways. But it also served U.S. interests. If the Bomb won the war, then the perception of U.S. military power would be enhanced, U.S. diplomatic influence in Asia an…

The article presents the bomb as being a useful excuse for both the Japanese and the US after the decision to surrender. E.g:

> 'During the early days of the occupation, many Japanese officials worried that the Americans intended to abolish the institution of the emperor. And they had another worry. Many of Japan's top government officials knew that they might face war crimes trials (the war crimes trials against Germany's leaders were already underway in Europe when Japan surrendered). Japanese historian Asada Sadao has said that in many of the postwar interviews "Japanese officials... were obviously anxious to please their American questioners." If the Americans wanted to believe that the Bomb won the war, why disappoint them?'

Re: The Bomb Didn't Beat Japan

#200
post #103

Earlier quoted context omitted.

When I read these revisionist pieces, I often see the same phrase you quoted: "ready to surrender." If someone is "ready to surrender," what does that mean? Well I'll tell you what it certainly doesn't mean: It doesn't mean that they've _actually_ surrendered. What a lot of revisionist writings gloss over is that yes, certain parts of the Japanese leadership were "ready to surrender." But it is well documented that s…

Yet until a credible leadership figure actually _offered_ unconditional surrender, it was going to be war as usual. But it wasn’t. The A-bombs were quite unusual. They were extraordinary weapons, and would have required extraordinary justifications to use on the military, let alone on civilians. (To the argument that it wasn’t possible to target the military apart from civilians: that’s exactly why nuclear weapons ar…

> But it wasn’t. The A-bombs were quite unusual. They were extraordinary weapons, and would have required extraordinary justifications to use on the military, let alone on civilians.

They were extraordinary weapons, but as the article points out: The bombing campaigns were not, other than in doing the damage with much fewer bombs. Japan had seen similar levels of destruction in dozens of cities that summer, and was running out of larger undamaged cities.

With that context, they should require extraordinary justification to use, but no more so than the previous months of firebombing, and the focusing on the use of a nuclear bomb vs. "just" the fire bombing is detracting from the issue of how much of that overall bombing should have been acceptable and how much of it was necessary or served much purpose.

I don't want to excuse the A-bombs, but the article does make a compelling argument that they were not qualitatively different in the suffering caused.

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