Earlier quoted context omitted.
I keep my messages and would like them to not go away.
Why?
Apple Platform Security (Jan 2026) [pdf]
191–200 of 205 posts
Re: Apple Platform Security (Jan 2026) [pdf]
#192Earlier quoted context omitted.
People don't always have enough Apple devices to justify confidence that they couldn't lose them all at the same time, which with ADP is a permanent death sentence if you don't have your recovery key. (Apple says you can also use a device passcode; I'm not sure if this works if the device is lost. Maybe it does?)
I have 2 or 3 yubikeys associated with my account. I think apple does a decent job at communicating the importance of having recovery keys to the point where they deter those who can’t be bothered. Yubikeys are great
Re: Apple Platform Security (Jan 2026) [pdf]
#193Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yes it is.
Is this what you consider discourse? At least justify your position, don't shit out some drive-by popular opinion that I can't even begin to respond to.
Re: Apple Platform Security (Jan 2026) [pdf]
#194Re: Apple Platform Security (Jan 2026) [pdf]
#195Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Can someone explain what the real difference is to a consumer user between an iPhone and a Pixel or a Samsung device? Across all services, push notifications, and device backups. By default, Apple offers you at no charge: email aliases, private relay, Ask No Track barrier. These are just the ones I can think of right now. I am sure there are more. A big thing with Apple is not that they offer different privacy serv…
Aren’t they part of iCloud+ only? Ask no-track can arguably compromise your privacy by fingerprinting. I agree that the privacy controls on Apple systems are well-organized. Still, it’s more important to have confidence that the privacy services are not smoke and mirrors with carefully carved-out loopholes. It’s one thing to provide something and hold the competitor as the litmus test, the other to sustainably live u…
Re: Apple Platform Security (Jan 2026) [pdf]
#196Earlier quoted context omitted.
The way I look at it is that there is certain software that other entities aren't willing to let you run without assurances that it won't be tampered with. You don't necessarily have a right to be able to use that software if you cannot provide it suitable accomodations. It's your choice whether or not you want to run it or not, anything else is simply entitlement. This may seem annoying if it's your bank, but ultima…
> It's your choice Ah, classic false choice. Do you know it is illegal to do cash transactions over a certain amount in most Western countries now? In my mind, if I have a right to do something (buy a home), and there is only one approved way to do it, then I automatically have the right to use the approved way. Similarly, having a government ID might technically be a choice now, but it won't be soon with all these a…
Having controls is part of participating in society. I don't believe you should be able to make large transactions in total anonymity either. It's robbing you of a freedom, but society has deemed it a worthwhile tradeoff for preventing crime via money laundering and what not.
Re: Apple Platform Security (Jan 2026) [pdf]
#197Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Well that’s what Americans voted for. Americans are not one person. > So I don’t think anyone cares Clearly they do. > every CEO (definitely not just Tim Cook) is schmoozing with Trump. Tim Cook was (supposedly) principled. I guess it's hard to pretend that you care about privacy or human rights while eating dinner next to bin Salman.
> Tim Cook was (supposedly) principled. I guess it's hard to pretend that you care about privacy or human rights while eating dinner next to bin Salman. I guess if you thought he had principles then yeah that could be disappointing. Personally I've never tried to moralize corporations though, I just assume the only principle that every company and CEO operates by is whatever increases the stock price.
Re: Apple Platform Security (Jan 2026) [pdf]
#198Earlier quoted context omitted.
Security is pointless if platform allows 90% users to be social engineered into running code disabling that security
What's funny is you could read that statement as being an argument for or against walled gardens, depending on what kind of social engineering is being referred to.
Re: Apple Platform Security (Jan 2026) [pdf]
#199Earlier quoted context omitted.
Enabling ADP breaks all kinds of things in Apple’s ecosystem subtly with incredibly arcane errors. I was unable to use Apple Fitness+ on my TV due to it telling me my Watch couldn’t pair with the TV. The problem went away when turning off ADP. To turn off ADP required opening a support case with Apple which took three weeks to resolve, before this an attempt to turn off would just fail with no detailed error. Other t…
That chimes roughly with my experience, but to be fair ADP is designed not just for encrypted backups, but to harden the ecosystem for people who may be under the greatest threat. Worth noting that it has been outlawed in the UK and cannot be enabled, which makes me think it's pretty decent
Re: Apple Platform Security (Jan 2026) [pdf]
#200Earlier quoted context omitted.
modeless linked to this article earlier today: https://james.darpinian.com/blog/apple-imessage-encryption/ My current understanding of the facts: 1. Google defaults to encrypted backups of messages, as well as e2e encryption of messages. 2. Apple defaults only to e2ee of messages, leaving a massive backdoor. 3. Closing that backdoor is possible for the consumer, by enabling ADP (advanced data protection) on your devi…
Enabling ADP breaks all kinds of things in Apple’s ecosystem subtly with incredibly arcane errors. I was unable to use Apple Fitness+ on my TV due to it telling me my Watch couldn’t pair with the TV. The problem went away when turning off ADP. To turn off ADP required opening a support case with Apple which took three weeks to resolve, before this an attempt to turn off would just fail with no detailed error. Other t…