191–200 of 204 posts
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> The best you can do is use the SE to decrypt the key and then use the clear text key for encryption/decryption. AFAIK this is what "secretive" was doing all the time.
I'm pretty sure it creates SE resident keys, which can't be unwrapped by either userspace or the macOS kernel.
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I don't trust the NIST curves: they were generated in a dubious way which has been written about extensively elsewhere (the coefficients for P-256 were generated by hashing the unexplained seed c49d360886e704936a6678e1139d26b7819f7e90). I always avoid them unless I have to use them. It makes me sad when hardware forces me to use them. > I've heard people make the point before that EdDSA is not great for secure enclav…
https://romailler.ch/project/eddsa-fault/ I think this can be solved by using hedged eddsa (Signal does this)
If I understand correctly, this means you can't back up the private key, correct? It's in the Secure Enclave, so if you lose your laptop, you also lose the key? Since it looks like export only really exports the public key not the private one? Probably not the worst thing, you most likely have another way to get into the remote machine, or an admin who can reset you, but still feels like a hole. Or am I missing somet…
How can I get such a key into my iPhone too, so that I can sign emails and file and such with the same private key when I'm on my phone, and my public key is valid for all such operations ? Will iCloud take care of that ? And then I want it all usable from my (multiple) email clients...
Clearly I'm hazy on this stuff. But if I can export the private key from my Mac, is there any use for it on my iPhone, and any way to get it in there ?
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No. There is no way to import an existing key into the Secure Enclave. Only Apple is allowed to do that. The best you can do is use the SE to decrypt the key and then use the clear text key for encryption/decryption. This also means that passkeys on macOS/iOS are (at some point) exposed as clear text.
> The best you can do is use the SE to decrypt the key and then use the clear text key for encryption/decryption. AFAIK this is what "secretive" was doing all the time.
I would not trust it personally, specially since the Chip Security Act is looming https://www.centerforcybersecuritypolicy.org/insights-and-re...
classic hackernewers
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> How can the "cartel" "blacklist" anyone? All they have to do is publish a "best practices" statement or some RP certification program mandating attestation to be used (and some PR around how only "certified" RPs are secure) and job done. The only reason they didn't do that yet is that Apple is refusing to play ball and support attestation (but this may change). The threat was clearly there in the original Github is…
> Having to dump authenticator state at regular intervals [...] Again, you don't inherently have to do this if you only use non-resident keys (which many sites allow; my hardware authenticator does not even support resident keys). Synchronized resident keys are not the only possible WebAuthN implementation, even though they are getting currently heavily pushed by big stakeholders. The big advantage they come with, th…
I use an external keyboard, so reaching for the fingerprint reader isn't as easy as it would be if I just used the internal keyboard. Fine, ControlMaster is a good compromise. Except when git signing (every commit) is a requirement, you have to touch the reader every, single, time. That's fine when making routine commits, not so when rebasing. Ideally, I could tell the SecureEnclave to notify me, but don't require biometrics for the next 30 seconds or so, but since that's not a thing, that I'm aware of, I'd at least like to know when my git signing key is being used.