Earlier quoted context omitted.
You're literally talking about how I should regard the hypothetical answers that might be produced by something that I think doesn't exist. There's a pretty clear case of putting the cart before the horse here. On being presumptive about what things can exist, that's the whole point of constructivism. Things only exist when you can construct them. We start with things that everyone accepts, like the natural numbers.…
> Things only exist when you can construct them. This is exactly what I’m saying is presumptive! If constructivism is to earn the merit of being less presumptive by virtue of not assuming the existence of various things, it should also not assume the non-existence of those things. Which, I think many visions of constructivism do earn this merit, but not your description of it.
What makes you presume that you have any business telling someone with different beliefs from you, what is OK to believe? You may believe in the existence of whatever you like. Whether that be numbers that cannot be specified, or invisible pink unicorns.
I'll be over in the corner saying that your belief does not compel me to agree with you on the question of what exists. Not when your belief follows from formalism, which explicitly abandons any pretense of meaningfulness to its abstract symbol manipulation.