> Instead, it would be best to assume that the user may be able to run untrusted code through these tools. So, running them in an isolated environment, with only the minimum information required to run the tools themselves, and not passing them any environment variables would be much better. Even if arbitrary code execution would be possible, the impact would be much less severe.
> For defense in depth, one should add a mechanism that prevents sending private information to an attacker-controlled server. For example, only allow outgoing traffic to whitelisted hosts, if possible. If the tool doesn’t require internet access, then all network traffic may even be disabled in that isolated environment. This way it would make it harder for an attacker to exfiltrate secrets.
I yearn to live in a world where this is the default or at least REALLY EASY to do, where you just fall into the pit of success.
And yet, we live in a borderline insane world where one key getting leaked can pwn a million repos - if nothing else, there should be one key per interaction with account/repo. Not to mention that Rubocop (and probably other tools, eventually) have arbitrary code execution as a feature.
I don't think that CodeRabbit messed up, as much as everything around them is already messed up.