Live data from Hacker News

Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

bugs.xdavidhu.me

191–200 of 475 posts

Re: Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

#191
post #15

I was under the impression that decrypting storage actually requires the passcode of the phone, but this bug makes it look like the device is able to decrypt itself without any external input. Does anybody know more context about this? What's the point of encryption if the device can just essentially backdoor decrypt itself?

In the write-up search for the bit that says "and one time I forgot to reboot the phone". tl;dr: It's not an encryption bypass, it bypasses the lock screen once the phone has been unlocked once.

I wonder if this can bypass the "Lockdown" mode. I always recommended people switch the phone fully off in lieu of using Lockdown.

Re: Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

#192
> I decided to stick with my October deadline.

[...]

> I also decided (even before the bounty) that I am too scared to actually put out the live bug and since the fix was less than a month away, it was not really worth it anyway. I decided to wait for the fix.

I have gone through similar trepidation.

What were you scared of?

Re: Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

#193
post #136

I wonder how many LEO agencies are now digging androids out of the evidence closet.

Sounds like this only affects phones that have been unlocked since the last restart, so unless they have kept them plugged it is unlikely that this attack would be successful.

Re: Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

#195
post #185
post #136

I wonder how many LEO agencies are now digging androids out of the evidence closet.

LEO already have access to locked phones via stuff like GrayKey. https://www.grayshift.com/graykey/

I think it has problems in some cases, pin codes longer than 6 digits.

Re: Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

#196
post #136

I wonder how many LEO agencies are now digging androids out of the evidence closet.

Sounds like this only affects phones that have been unlocked since the last restart, so unless they have kept them plugged it is unlikely that this attack would be successful.

Ah, yep. I wonder how sophisticated (or not) a typical police department is with these kinds of procedures.

Re: Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

#197
post #59
post #43

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The security researchers only mistake was letting Google fart around for so long. You give them 90 days, then you go public. That is the policy Google Project Zero holds other companies to, so it is only fair to hold Google to the same standard. People using their device for high risk applications need to be informed in a timely manner, and Google needs to pay a reputational price for their negligence.

70,000 reasons to think long and hard about that appraoch though :-D

I suspect if he started the conversation with a 90 day disclosure window they would have offered him $100k immediately to extend the deadline. Of course, you'd have to consult a lawyer to make sure you don't technically cross the line into blackmail.

Re: Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

#198

> I decided to stick with my October deadline. [...] > I also decided (even before the bounty) that I am too scared to actually put out the live bug and since the fix was less than a month away, it was not really worth it anyway. I decided to wait for the fix. I have gone through similar trepidation. What were you scared of?

Security researchers (like the one here) don't want harm to come to people from their actions. If they announced the live bug before it was patched a lot of people and organizations might have been adversely by this before the fix was applied.

Re: Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

#199
When chosing a phone there should be a security metric reflecting how much time and money has been spent on security, researches and bug bounty programs. This error looks so trivial! As a long time Google Pixel user, I honestly don't feel the company did a good work protecting me.

Re: Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

#200
post #114
post #64

Earlier quoted context omitted.

On iPhone, keys are evicted from memory when the device is locked. Apps running behind the Lock Screen can only write files to special file inboxes (this is why the camera lets you take pictures while locked but doesn’t display earlier pictures, for example) You’re telling me that android keeps keys in memory for its entire uptime?

That's not really true at all - you can of course unlock your iPhone without entering PIN for every screen lock which should give you a clue that keys for disk encryption generally aren't purged when iPhone is locked. Some keys are, but not the ones that are the issue here. I've even seen conditions where iOS devices reboot and still retain keys.

Can you elaborate on those conditions? It's my understanding that this shouldn't be the case
Post reply on HN