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Apple Passkey

developer.apple.com

191–200 of 421 posts

Re: Apple Passkey

#191

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> The syncing of passkeys in iCloud solves this backup problem. But then apple has your keys....

I would assume that they are at least encrypted locally before being uploaded to iCloud. (But yes, Apple could always change things)

Don’t be so certain - we need more details from Apple on this. Last I checked iMessage was still (!) not encrypted when backed up to iCloud.

https://www.howtogeek.com/710509/apples-imessage-is-secure.....

Re: Apple Passkey

#192
post #46

This is based on the open standards WebAuthn and FIDO2, where the credentials (“passkeys”) are synced via iCloud Keychain. Currently you need remember to register at least 2 security keys, in case one is lost/misplaced. The syncing of passkeys in iCloud solves this backup problem. https://fidoalliance.org/apple-google-and-microsoft-commit-t...

>Currently you need remember to register at least 2 security keys, in case one is lost/misplaced. This is always my issue with 2FA or passwordless auth. You're forced to have 2 devices and are kind of screwed if you don't hvae two on you. I was on a trip and broke my iPhone. It had my plane tickets on it to get home. I was able to get a replacement from Apple, they just gave it to me and sent me on my way. When I tur…

Password managers like Bitwarden can do TOTP with syncing. Doesn’t help with Apple though which uses non-standard 2FA. I actually have some accounts using SMS still, because I can fairly easily get a replacement sim if the device is lost.

Re: Apple Passkey

#193

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> The syncing of passkeys in iCloud solves this backup problem. But then apple has your keys....

Passwords in iCloud Keychain are already E2EE, it seems reasonable the private passkeys would be too.

> iCloud ... backup

> E2EE

If you can lose all your existing devices, and can still restore your data, then that data isn't end to end encrypted.

I'm taking the "end" in e2ee to mean your devices. Nothing but your devices can decrypt your e2ee prospected data. If a new device can enter the circle of trust without an existing device's corporation then there is a backdoor.

I imagine icloud keychain supports synchronization rather than backup

Re: Apple Passkey

#194

Beta support for Passkey is already in the current macOS/iOS releases: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/authenticationserv... I am already using Passkeys on some websites.

Yes, it looks like it’s been around for a couple of months, after a somewhat quiet announcement. It’s the first I had heard of it though.

Since Fall 2019 actually! (at least that's when I first used it)

Re: Apple Passkey

#195
What I want is to use the device password instead of biometrics. So the device itself and its TPM are the FIDO authenticator, the thing I have in 2FA terms, and the device password is the thing I know. Personally, I feel I can better protect a password than my fingerprint. But I still want the benefits of 2FA and public key crypto where the app/website doesn’t receive any sensitive information. I’d be okay with pressing a button to prove user presence. I’d avoid syncing the keypairs between devices, instead enrolling a new keypair for each device. I guess that last part could be annoying but it’s pretty much how I use SSH today and it’s not that bad.

Re: Apple Passkey

#196

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's a password manager with cryptographic vendor lockin . There are definitely some benefits though, such as immunity from phishing. Surely we as the industry can bring them about in a way that doesn't involve cryptographic vendor lockin.

The industry doesn’t seem to have a working software solution for mobile phone authentication secrets that both is 1) immune to persuading a user to export their data (to get phished), and 2) allows a user to export their data at any time (to prevent lock-in). What would it look like to do #2 safely, without enabling the phishing that we see today with #1?

I get where you're coming from and you're not wrong, but at the same time, I don't buy this as an excuse for vendor lock-in here, because it seems like Apple is already backing up passkeys to iCloud.

If Apple has decided that the risk of getting your passkeys phished out of your Apple iCloud Account is outweighed by the benefit of users being able to restore/sync login details immediately when they buy a new iOS device and log into it, then I think it's reasonable for users to expect the same treatment and the same experience when they're moving away from iOS.

If Apple wasn't backing up any of the logins, and they had committed to when you trade in your phone and upgrade to the latest iPhone forcing you to manually re-create all of those keys one-by-one using your recovery option, then I'd accept not having an export option for Android/Linux/Windows. Otherwise, it will just seem really suspiciously convenient to me if they ultimately decide that exporting keys is acceptable risk unless it's to a competitor's device.

As far as I can tell, there hasn't been any official confirmation that users won't be able to export them to non-iOS devices, so maybe it's all worry over nothing. But I don't think security is a justification to apply restrictions specifically only on devices outside of Apple's ecosystem.

Re: Apple Passkey

#197
post #60

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Your first paragraph, restated, is that passwords are superior to tokens. Your "proper way" is absurd and nonsensical for the vast majority of users. The first time they get burned by this is the last time they'd rely on anything but the one memorized password they reuse everywhere.

MFA itself is absurd and nonsensical for the vast majority of users. It's security theatre unless you do it right, and if you're doing it right, it's — as you've said — too hard for most people to bother. Properly implemented, MFA is an Enterprise feature, not a personal feature. Like SAML SSO, or having audit-log APIs. The point of setting up MFA is to secure things that really need to be secure, where the person wi…

As far as I understand, the story is: casual users don’t choose unique passwords. MFA, even in its weakest forms like SMS, defends against credential stuffing. Indiscriminate credential stuffing attacks based on database dumps, etc. are common enough that this is worthwhile. FIDO/WebAuthn add protection against phishing (because the token is bound to the domain name). Phishing is also a common indiscriminate attack against casual users.

In a world where people used password managers correctly and all the time, this might be redundant, but we don’t live in that world.

Re: Apple Passkey

#198

How does this bode for anonymity and multiple identities? I'm imagining a world where all PCs/Macs/Smartphones have FIDO/WebAuthn and there's no other way to log in. Can I setup up multiple IDs on my iPhone and decide which services get to be associated with which id? I get that supposedly iPhone (etc) will (may?) give out a different number to each service but they'll still be associated with a single account at App…

> I'm imagining a world where all PCs/Macs/Smartphones have FIDO/WebAuthn and there's no other way to log in.

You won't have to imagine that for long, because that's the world we are sprinting towards.

Once practically everyone has accepted and adopted this system, governments (having already banned E2EE messaging apps by this point) will complain that Big Tech are allowing cyber-terrorists to maintain anonymous identities online and not doing enough to protect the children.

The offices of Apple, Google, and Microsoft would then receive calls from the national tax/anti-trust authorities saying the government was thinking of launching an audit/investigation into those companies and wouldn't it be a shame if something happened to their profit margin that year.

Within a few months we'd see these companies all "voluntarily" release software updates which add a "Citizen ID" field to every FIDO interaction, with those IDs being issued by a government API and verified using a bank card and facial recognition.

Re: Apple Passkey

#200

Earlier quoted context omitted.

How could one verify that? like for compliance audit?

https://support.apple.com/guide/sccc/introduction-sccccea618... Introduction to Apple security assurance As part of our commitment to security, Apple regularly engages with third-party organizations to certify and attest to the security of Apple’s hardware, software, and services. These internationally recognized organizations provide Apple with certifications that align with each major operating system release. …

Are such third parties listed? Can you inspect their reports? What testing methodologies are involved in order to issue such certifications? And can we see such certifications at all?
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