Earlier quoted context omitted.
You can do wildcard certs with LE, I run hundreds of k8s services all secured with LE and wildcard certs.
You can, but, you can't (by policy) distribute keys across multiple customers.
Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates
191–200 of 375 posts
Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates
#192It’s disgusting. It’s not up to them to decide how long a certificate should be valid. Especially when they’re so expensive to buy and complicated to replace.
Letsencrypt is free and easy to replace (it's automatic, and takes maybe 5 minutes to set up on a new server). EV certificates might be harder, but I've heard good things about certsimple.
Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates
#193Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Honestly, my main issue is not even the price, it's that devices cannot be stand-alone anymore. That’s not true at all. I’ve created a CA and a script to generate and sign server certificates and I generated them left right and centre now for my very standalone, local network only with no access to the internet whatsoever services. I added my CA to my browsers and my iPhone and everything works perfectly.
Will you also add it to the iPhones of other people that would want to use the device? (Or more realistically, would they let you add it?)
Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates
#194Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates
#195With the tightening of certificate trust, demise of self-signed certificates, etc., is there any remaining way to establish a consumer-oriented HTTPS server on a local network? Thinking of things like routers, printers, and self-hosted IoT devices here. Some of the label printers we support at work have simply atrocious workarounds to get them to work, and I'm wondering if it's the manufacturer's fault or if that use…
It’s a glaring security hole, IMHO. I create such devices and the only way I know is self-signed certs, but the browsers complain a lot about that. Ideally there’d be a way to sign .local domains with browsers handling it while letting people know to verify the identity of their local devices/services and that the identity isn’t verified by https like most sites. The issue lies between the browsers and https system.…
That's basically how it works though; your OS packages a group of trusted CA certs. You can add additional trusted CA certs, even ones minted by you to ensure your apps trust the connection
Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates
#196Earlier quoted context omitted.
Sounds like CAs will be forced to keep shrinking cert length until everyone standardizes on 1 month. They no longer have any real power.
A less labor-intensive approach would be require CAs to revalidate the 'proof of ownership' basis of issued certificates monthly, and publish a revocation via CRL if the validation times out or fails for 1 month + 1 day. This would further encourage automation of the ecosystem without requiring redeployment in the cases where automated verification passes each month.
Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates
#197Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates
#198Earlier quoted context omitted.
Sounds like CAs will be forced to keep shrinking cert length until everyone standardizes on 1 month. They no longer have any real power.
A less labor-intensive approach would be require CAs to revalidate the 'proof of ownership' basis of issued certificates monthly, and publish a revocation via CRL if the validation times out or fails for 1 month + 1 day. This would further encourage automation of the ecosystem without requiring redeployment in the cases where automated verification passes each month.
If you're in a position to MITM using a stolen certificate, you're probably also in a position to block the CRL response from going through. Since failing to get an updated CRL doesn't result in a security warning, your CRL proposal is essentially useless.
Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates
#199It’s disgusting. It’s not up to them to decide how long a certificate should be valid. Especially when they’re so expensive to buy and complicated to replace.
Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates
#200Earlier quoted context omitted.
Responsibilities have changed a bit. If you're going to host a website you are going to have to put a modicum of effort into ensuring that you are not harming others by doing so.
>are not harming others How is HTTP harmful when you visit my website about amateur radio? An expired cert is no more harmful than bare http in this non-commercial non-institional personal context. It's the one being discussed in this sub-thread in case you missed it and assumed the normal HN business context. The burden is real and completely unecessary for personal websites. This makes the web more commercial by im…