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Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates

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191–200 of 375 posts

Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates

#191

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can do wildcard certs with LE, I run hundreds of k8s services all secured with LE and wildcard certs.

You can, but, you can't (by policy) distribute keys across multiple customers.

I have a nasty habit of requesting revocation of such compromised keys whenever I find them. CAs are required to revoke within 24 hours, I think, though unfortunately revocation is surprisingly ineffective.

Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates

#192
post #189

It’s disgusting. It’s not up to them to decide how long a certificate should be valid. Especially when they’re so expensive to buy and complicated to replace.

>Especially when they’re so expensive to buy and complicated to replace.

Letsencrypt is free and easy to replace (it's automatic, and takes maybe 5 minutes to set up on a new server). EV certificates might be harder, but I've heard good things about certsimple.

Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates

#193
post #105
post #97

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Honestly, my main issue is not even the price, it's that devices cannot be stand-alone anymore. That’s not true at all. I’ve created a CA and a script to generate and sign server certificates and I generated them left right and centre now for my very standalone, local network only with no access to the internet whatsoever services. I added my CA to my browsers and my iPhone and everything works perfectly.

Will you also add it to the iPhones of other people that would want to use the device? (Or more realistically, would they let you add it?)

This only applies if they want to access internal services without cert warnings, so asking them to install a cert seems reasonable?

Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates

#194
I can understand this can cause pain for existing deployments, but I don't see any reason not to use something like Let's Encrypt to issue 90-day certificates for new services/deployments. With certbot, renewals are automatic and with something like Caddy, the certificates can be managed across load balancers. I'm only talking about the web service here and not IoT or any use case that makes this sort of frequent renewals difficult.

Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates

#195
post #57

With the tightening of certificate trust, demise of self-signed certificates, etc., is there any remaining way to establish a consumer-oriented HTTPS server on a local network? Thinking of things like routers, printers, and self-hosted IoT devices here. Some of the label printers we support at work have simply atrocious workarounds to get them to work, and I'm wondering if it's the manufacturer's fault or if that use…

It’s a glaring security hole, IMHO. I create such devices and the only way I know is self-signed certs, but the browsers complain a lot about that. Ideally there’d be a way to sign .local domains with browsers handling it while letting people know to verify the identity of their local devices/services and that the identity isn’t verified by https like most sites. The issue lies between the browsers and https system.…

> It handles it by asking "Do you want to trust this new server?"

That's basically how it works though; your OS packages a group of trusted CA certs. You can add additional trusted CA certs, even ones minted by you to ensure your apps trust the connection

Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates

#196

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Sounds like CAs will be forced to keep shrinking cert length until everyone standardizes on 1 month. They no longer have any real power.

A less labor-intensive approach would be require CAs to revalidate the 'proof of ownership' basis of issued certificates monthly, and publish a revocation via CRL if the validation times out or fails for 1 month + 1 day. This would further encourage automation of the ecosystem without requiring redeployment in the cases where automated verification passes each month.

One of the arguments that I've seen for shorter-lived certs is that revocations aren't honored particularly well. If we could fix that, then your proposal would make sense (but I'm not sure that's doable)

Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates

#197

Earlier quoted context omitted.

s/web of trust/centralization/

s/centralization/validating ownership Without centralization I can MITM at the coffee shop and steal passwords.

WoT would fix that, unless the other coffee shop patrons have (directly or indirectly) trusted you.

Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates

#198

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Sounds like CAs will be forced to keep shrinking cert length until everyone standardizes on 1 month. They no longer have any real power.

A less labor-intensive approach would be require CAs to revalidate the 'proof of ownership' basis of issued certificates monthly, and publish a revocation via CRL if the validation times out or fails for 1 month + 1 day. This would further encourage automation of the ecosystem without requiring redeployment in the cases where automated verification passes each month.

>and publish a revocation via CRL if the validation times out or fails for 1 month + 1 day.

If you're in a position to MITM using a stolen certificate, you're probably also in a position to block the CRL response from going through. Since failing to get an updated CRL doesn't result in a security warning, your CRL proposal is essentially useless.

Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates

#199
post #189

It’s disgusting. It’s not up to them to decide how long a certificate should be valid. Especially when they’re so expensive to buy and complicated to replace.

For most people, they can be free, and replace themselves, thanks to Let's Encrypt and their automation tools.

Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates

#200

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Responsibilities have changed a bit. If you're going to host a website you are going to have to put a modicum of effort into ensuring that you are not harming others by doing so.

>are not harming others How is HTTP harmful when you visit my website about amateur radio? An expired cert is no more harmful than bare http in this non-commercial non-institional personal context. It's the one being discussed in this sub-thread in case you missed it and assumed the normal HN business context. The burden is real and completely unecessary for personal websites. This makes the web more commercial by im…

We have had this conversation to death: https://doesmysiteneedhttps.com/
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