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Edward Snowden Demonstrates How Easy It Is to Hack a Voting Machine

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Re: Edward Snowden Demonstrates How Easy It Is to Hack a Voting Machine

#191
post #69
post #48

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That's not a valid argument. Nothing is secure from all known threats. The question is how (in)secure is the system. In this case, the voting protocol doesn't provide a means of verification. Secure voting protocols have been around for quite a few years. jjuhl left this comment above https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13032602 Dan Boneh's Crypto 2 coursera course ( https://www.coursera.org/learn/crypto2# ) covers…

> Nothing is secure from all known threats. Of course. That's why it's important to reduce the attack surface. Adding electronics (or worse, software) adds a huge amount of attack surface. The attack could be at any point from the CPU-internals to the software. > the voting protocol doesn't provide a means of verification Yes. That's a feature. Any new system cannot re-enable voter coercion. > Homomorphic encryption…

> Adding electronics (or worse, software) adds a huge amount of attack surface. The attack could be at any point from the CPU-internals to the software.

You're missing the point. The voting protocol is built in such a way that you can verify that your vote was cast as intended, and that your vote was counted in the tally. Once everyone agrees on the voting protocol you don't need to trust someone else's electronics, you can do it on your own device, and use open source software.

> the voting protocol doesn't provide a means of verification Yes. That's a feature. Any new system cannot re-enable voter coercion.

You can have vote verification without enabling coercion. If you have a vote receipt it does not imply you can prove or disprove how you voted, but it does allow you to verify that your vote was included in the tally.

> More importantly, the reply by marten-de-vries[2] brings up a very good counter argument to any voting system based on fancy math: the general population won't accept it. The voting process doesn't work unless the population considers it legitimate, and it will be hard to convince them if they first have to learn enough math to understand homomorphic (or public-key) encryption.

I disagree. The general population doesn't know how RSA or AES work but we have HTTPS and the green-lock-thingy. You don't need to know how or why something works in order to reap its benefits.

Re: Edward Snowden Demonstrates How Easy It Is to Hack a Voting Machine

#192
post #78

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes but that is not the point. You can also add votes to electronic voting by just allowing someone to cast more votes at it. But the difference is that with paper voting, you as a single actor can only influence one voting booth, while as a hacker, you can manipulated thousands of voting machines. So the influence of a single actor could be much bigger. Furthermore, while you can manipulate a paper ballot, you can o…

>> ...with paper voting, you as a single actor can only influence one voting booth, while as a hacker, you can manipulated thousands of voting machines. That depends where the person is. The people managing the process, those doing the counting, have plenty of opportunity for large manipulations. There are safeguards, but the possibility remains and must be accounted for.

As I know it, you have 2-3 persons that count together one urn. That's not one person doing it. And you can do recounts. And adding large numbers of ballot papers is not easy because its marked how many there are in a ballot. (What is more effective is declaring a number of ballots invalid if they are not the right candidate but still, we are speaking about in extrem cases 100 votes, not possibly millions as would be possible in hacking an electronic voting machine)

Re: Edward Snowden Demonstrates How Easy It Is to Hack a Voting Machine

#193

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>> ...with paper voting, you as a single actor can only influence one voting booth, while as a hacker, you can manipulated thousands of voting machines. That depends where the person is. The people managing the process, those doing the counting, have plenty of opportunity for large manipulations. There are safeguards, but the possibility remains and must be accounted for.

One fake vote can be enough if winner takes all.

Sure, but that is a problem of "winner takes all" and not any voting method.

Re: Edward Snowden Demonstrates How Easy It Is to Hack a Voting Machine

#194

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Or just some kind of simple mechanical stamping or cutting machine that assures that each vote is registered in the same way but in an easily understandable and transparent format.

> cutting machine Do you remember "hanging chads"? But yeah, that's the crux of the idea: have a machine take the voter's choices, to effectively eliminate accidentally-spoiled ballots (the design of the "hanging chads" machines was sorely lacking on this point); but then have it produce a physical record, visually checked by the voter, to enable auditing & recounts. Counting the hard copies would be the definitive s…

The key to the system you describe is having the vote-punching machine right next to the vote-checking machine. That way if there's a hanging-chads issue you can catch it before it spoils more than a single vote. And the person just slides the vote down the 'discard' chute and gets a fresh one until they're happy with the results.

Have the checker mark the holes it detects with red ink or something, to make it clear to the user that the system detects their votes properly, and to provide a fallback. In the event another machine fails to count it, the user's intent is double-marked.

And then have the same style of vote-counting, where people manually scrutinize the votes, and have each party's representatives slide the votes into their counting machine. If the machines lose sync, you stop and figure it out at the point of the specific vote that fails to scan.

Re: Edward Snowden Demonstrates How Easy It Is to Hack a Voting Machine

#195
post #3

Why do Americans use voting machines exactly? I mean, it just prints out their choice at the end right? What benefit do they actually gain from having pressed buttons instead of using a pen? It just seems to fuel the hacking conspiracy every time a president is elected. In the UK we turn up, go into the booth with the paper slip, and tick our choice with a pen. Then we fold it and post it into a container which later…

So there's a couple thing to unravel here. First, each county in the US runs their elections separately so within a single state you might see a couple different systems. Some places like my area in North Carolina use a system like what you describe except the ballots are scanned through an optical scanner then stored in case there's the need to do a recount. There's no central board above the county level that the ballots would be sent to for counting.

Second electronic machines are popular because they speed the election counting and are cheaper to run because the election board doesn't have to print tens to hundreds of thousands of ballots. A good electronic voting machine reports the vote 2 ways digitally to some vote tabulator local to that voting place and with a paper record that can be audited. The paper print out their having printed in this video is the end of the night tally that'll be reported to the county/state board of elections to be combined with the rest of the results.

Third doing it on a centrally located machine instead of over the internet adds a lot of security to the process. Trying to properly secure single purpose hardware like a voting machine that can be kept in a monitored location is a much simpler task than trying to find a way to ensure the Joe/Jane Voter's computer isn't compromised when sending the data to their counties board of elections. Not to mention that by accepting votes over the internet you're opening yourself up to everyone being able to remotely attempt to exploit the system. At least with a voting machine only connected to other election hardware attacks are limited to someone that's physically at the voting location. It's also tricky to prevent double voting while maintaining complete anonymity.

Re: Edward Snowden Demonstrates How Easy It Is to Hack a Voting Machine

#196
post #184

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The problem is that if you can verify your vote you can be coerced into voting in a certain way. There would need to be some sort of plausible deniability built in.

Only you will be able to verify your vote. All votes are anonymous. You should be able to verify the very first vote as well and as a result of that verify the entire chain up to your vote. The last vote should also be verifiable to ensure that the chain is complete.

That doesn't solve the problem of verifiable votes. If you are able to verify your vote you can be coerced the verify it in the presence of someone else.

Re: Edward Snowden Demonstrates How Easy It Is to Hack a Voting Machine

#197

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You would still have to know where it was close.

A lot of online companies classify millions of people by lots of variables each day. You can pay for this information.

Thats not what we are talking about at all. You need access to these machines somehow it's not about classifying people it's about getting access to the ballot machines and altering them or their results. Quite a different task.

Re: Edward Snowden Demonstrates How Easy It Is to Hack a Voting Machine

#198

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A lot of online companies classify millions of people by lots of variables each day. You can pay for this information.

Thats not what we are talking about at all. You need access to these machines somehow it's not about classifying people it's about getting access to the ballot machines and altering them or their results. Quite a different task.

I think your parent was implying that some sort of classification would be used to predict where the vote would likely be close, so you would know which precincts to target. As I'm not the poster, this is just speculation of course, and can be worth the electrons used to transmit the comment :)

Re: Edward Snowden Demonstrates How Easy It Is to Hack a Voting Machine

#199
post #69

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Nothing is secure from all known threats. Of course. That's why it's important to reduce the attack surface. Adding electronics (or worse, software) adds a huge amount of attack surface. The attack could be at any point from the CPU-internals to the software. > the voting protocol doesn't provide a means of verification Yes. That's a feature. Any new system cannot re-enable voter coercion. > Homomorphic encryption…

> Adding electronics (or worse, software) adds a huge amount of attack surface. The attack could be at any point from the CPU-internals to the software. You're missing the point. The voting protocol is built in such a way that you can verify that your vote was cast as intended, and that your vote was counted in the tally. Once everyone agrees on the voting protocol you don't need to trust someone else's electronics,…

> You're missing the point. The voting protocol is built in such a way that you can verify that your vote was cast as intended

No, you're missing the point. You don't know that the crypto was calculated properly, because you are not going to be calculating the crypto by hand. Prove - in the voting booth - that someone hasn't changed the software to give you the wrong crypto token.

> If you have a vote receipt it does not imply you can prove or disprove how you voted, but it does allow you to verify that your vote was included in the tally.

Do you not see that this is is a contradiction? Someone coercing you simply demands that verification.

"Bring your verification receipt if you want to keep your job."

> HTTPS and the green-lock-thingy

TLS doesn't rely on the public understanding it for legitimacy. The public doesn't care about how it works; they care about if it's a reliable security feature. Legitimacy is lost if there are too many public failures.

Voting requires an understanding how the winner was decided. Your proposal will never be accepted if it is, in the eyes of the general public, a black box you submit your vote into that is only interpreted by a priesthood that they have to trust to interpret the votes. Adding up votes is understandable, but homomorphic encryption might as well be black magic.

This understanding is more important than ever, because we are currently experiencing a revolt against technocracy. Brexit and Trump are aspects of this revolt. If you think you can get the population to accept a voting protocol they don't understand, then you haven't been paying attention to the current political climate.

Re: Edward Snowden Demonstrates How Easy It Is to Hack a Voting Machine

#200

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think you're missing the point. Cute and Russia already benefited from the results of this election. A more divided Europe, check? A United States. that is looking to lessen its global role, check. A contentious, divisive circus of an election where a significant number of people have some doubts on the results, check. A splintering EU, check. A less unified NATO alliance with a weaker US role, under even more thre…

Trump hasn't even taken office yet so no blame can really be tied to him just yet. He's said quite a few silly things so far, but hasn't yet done any real damage. Most of the hysteria is being generated by the 24 cable news channels. I can't turn on CNN without another Trump-o-phobia headline on the screen. To be fair NATO/Europe have been having issues during the Obama administration. Brexit is just a symptom of a l…

> I personally think that Trump is picking his battles.

I think we should all do ourselves a favor and not try to divine what Trump is thinking. The guy is a total wild-card

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