I think the entire discussion misses the even more important point - terrorists won't care whether encryption is backdoored or not. It's a good OPSEC to assume all communication is being listened to anyway, and to rely on steganography and disappearing in the noise. Bad guys will simply use the same backdoored crypto everyone else will be using, communicating in the same way they do today, because using the unbroken crypto will be easily detected as suspicious action.
A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists
191–200 of 282 posts
Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists
#192Earlier quoted context omitted.
That's a long term plan. People are clamoring for action 'now' and want this to end preferably next week. To tell them that there is no 7 day solution to this is going to be a very tough sell.
And if the seven day solution perpetually sows the seeds for future terror?
That's the default path.
Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists
#193Earlier quoted context omitted.
> So politicians and intelligence services calling for encryption want, institutionally, to keep people safe. How can tech companies do that without breaking or backdooring encryption? That's the real problem to solve, and the first person to figure out how to do that will be way ahead. I don't think this is a technical problem, and I don't think it's our responsibility to solve it. If the US wants to stop terrorism…
The US doesn't have to be harming countries to be the target of terrorists, it only has to be thought to. So unless your alternative is for the US to go out there and forcibly quell all dissenting speech... People are good at having enemies, whether they deserve them or not. There are people who would kill me right now having done nothing particularly wrong. There are even places where it is legal and encouraged to d…
>People are good at having enemies, whether they deserve them or not.
This statement would have more resonance if the US fell into the "or not" category. ISIS is basically America's Frankenstein[1].
[1] Yes, yes it was the doctor's name.
Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists
#194Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'd love to see what a detailed version of security policies and infrastructure look like in a world of backdoor-less strong encryption from Schneier, the EFF, the Hopkins crew, etc. Something that can be used to persuade, or at least influence policymakers by allowing them to see that another way is possible, one that allows security services to do their job in a way that allows them to feel that their work isn't fu…
I see where you're coming from, but at the same time, one does not need to formulate an alternate strategy to point out that the emperor has no clothes. Strong encryption cannot be back doored in an effective way, this is just a fact. Ignoring that fact because we wish it were otherwise, or asking the people that point out that fact what we're supposed to do in light of that fact, doesn't change that fact. The group…
I agree that we don't need to formulate a strategy to criticize. What I'm saying is that we're already fantastically good at that, and have articulated the negatives very well; I just don't think we've presented a credible, compelling vision that will get those in power to say "Ok, there's an alternative that might work. Let's try that instead of going down this other road that is only making people angry and/or probably won't have the desired outcomes anyway."
Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists
#195Earlier quoted context omitted.
Just because something isn't necessary doesn't mean we shouldn't do it. Your comment isn't necessary, and it isn't making a friend of me. Does this mean that it's your fault if I attack you? That you should have backed out and minded your own business? That's a stupid and suicidal policy. >Far from a mere "factor," it's been the single most consistent and driving force behind all terrorism against us. So you say. But…
"Just because something isn't necessary doesn't mean we shouldn't do it." So you're saying we should have committed mass murder and armed terror groups throughout the Middle East in the name of stealing resources or manipulating politics? Did you do any research to back this or are you writing up some far-fetched, sophist comment since you can't counter my points? "And I really don't see how people committing acts of…
I'm saying you're vastly underestimating how easy it is to maintain peace with other cultures. I'm saying what I said, not what you wish I'd said so you can believe I'm an evil fool.
>Did you do any research to back this or are you writing up some far-fetched, sophist comment since you can't counter my points?
No, I didn't do any research. I took a class on West Asia and North Africa in school. I lived in Iraq for a year.
But I don't think you've done any research, either. You're just saying talking points.
>Last I checked, the U.S. was still trying to screw with and control much of the Middle East instead of support them.
You checked? Let me know what you checked. Where you checked. Who you checked with.
>You won't see the U.S. truly fight oppression over there
Truly? Isn't there a term for this kind of waffling? "No true scotsman" or something?
> So, fighting one isn't fighting terrorism so much as fighting one group while putting another into power.
That's what fighting is. Any fight you do is going to put someone in power. It doesn't matter if you're fighting terrorism or not; that's the whole point of fighting.
Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists
#196Earlier quoted context omitted.
The only thing that can prove or disprove anything is the abundance of information, which we don't have. We have no idea how many attacks have been prevented (everyone likes to claim this is zero....but they do so without any evidence to support that, as relevant information is surely classified beyond Top Secret). We have only the slightest, tiniest, smallest idea of what the NSA and other intelligence organizations…
I call bull. The government has a strong incentive to prove to us that they are doing an effective thing, and obama and various other officials have been quoted saying from 54 down to various numbers of attacks, and their claims have been shown to be bogus. This argument is actually subject to Russel's Teapot, if you cant prove or disprove anything the burden of proof is on proving the thing. I have yet to see any ev…
As usual, arguments depending on an arbitrary ordering or arbitrary negation are nonsensical:
"Is mass surveillance useless? Unless you can prove it, it's obviously useful. See Russell's teapot."
(Russell's teapot doesn't apply anyway, because the thing to prove is falsifiable: governments /could/ release information about thwarted attacks, in case there are any.)
Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists
#197Earlier quoted context omitted.
I call bull. The government has a strong incentive to prove to us that they are doing an effective thing, and obama and various other officials have been quoted saying from 54 down to various numbers of attacks, and their claims have been shown to be bogus. This argument is actually subject to Russel's Teapot, if you cant prove or disprove anything the burden of proof is on proving the thing. I have yet to see any ev…
What incentive is that? The only people they have to prove their worth to are the people that have the power to shut them down. We as a society do not have that power, and that should be obvious by now. When a court decided what they were doing was illegal, less than a day later (probably the fastest anything has EVER happen in the legal system), another bench decided that what the NSA was doing was TOO BIG TO STOP.…
I don't entirely disagree with you, but how do you explain that the former director of the NSA is seemingly fully engaged in explaining and justifying their activities? It would appear that they do have at least some incentive, no?
Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists
#198So, here's my take on all this 'surveillance is good for you'. It more or less proves (to me at least) that the government(s) and the various secret services have absolutely no idea who to monitor specifically. So instead of targeting their operations they want to monitor all of us, just in case something of interest pops out that then allows them to focus their attention. It's a pretty scary thought: just imagine, a…
The only thing that can prove or disprove anything is the abundance of information, which we don't have. We have no idea how many attacks have been prevented (everyone likes to claim this is zero....but they do so without any evidence to support that, as relevant information is surely classified beyond Top Secret). We have only the slightest, tiniest, smallest idea of what the NSA and other intelligence organizations…
[deleted]
Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists
#199Earlier quoted context omitted.
You nailed it, I think. If surveillance works, then Paris, Beirut, Bagdad et al wouldn't have happed. Realizing it's a pipe dream, I'd love to see a world accept that we the west have done so much damage that nothing will stop terrorism. Accepting that means we can throw those wasted resources at things that have a better chance of working - throw the tech that detects copyright infringements at detecting pro-ISIL si…
> If surveillance works, then Paris, Beirut, Bagdad et al wouldn't have happed. I don't think surveillance is very good at preventing terrorism, but I think it could be useful to law enforcement after the fact to round up co-conspirators. I bet that once the identity of the Paris attackers was learned, the NSA pulled up a graph several levels deep of everybody they communicated it or associated with. It could very we…
They found one of the terrorists phones dumped in a garbage can outside the theatre they attacked, and got the address of their hideout from the messages, so used just regular police work.
All these guys were already on watch lists for fighting in Syria and returning just nobody seems to ever watch the watch list.
Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists
#200Earlier quoted context omitted.
And if the seven day solution perpetually sows the seeds for future terror?
That's the default path.
Unfortunately so.
I think the response should be a careful, cursory action that acknowledges the public demand for retaliation, but all else put into the long game of building resistance to radicalised violence - working on education, poverty, etc amongst the communities where agitators source members. We should be encouraging people to find common ground rather than react aggressively, even if that is the gut response.
I am very irreligious, but there was a great comment on HN the other day about a fairly orthodox Christian finding that they had more in common with a fairly orthodox Muslim colleague than with other atheist co-workers.
Often the political and public reaction after an event like this is to focus on differences (language, clothing like burkas, etc) rather than things like a love of family, of food, sport, music and so on.
I live in Australia and our new prime minister is far, far better at this than the previous us-vs-them dog-whistler.