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Expanding Project Glasswing

anthropic.com

181–190 of 261 posts

Re: Expanding Project Glasswing

#181

I'll share the first-hand account I recently got from someone else. > We've used it at work > it is... not as hype as everyone is concerned about > I'd argue the framework around it for security scanning is the arguably more useful side of the tool, definitely doesnt take a huge model to get all the issues it flagged on our systems > For us, it absolutely flooded us with noise > I mean hundreds if not thousands of fa…

I thought one of the advantages of Glasswing was that it could produce a PoC for you. Was it producing working PoC's?

Re: Expanding Project Glasswing

#182
post #40

It’s clear that Anthropic has run out of the compute capacity needed to serve Mythos publicly. They’re using security concerns to mask their inability to deliver the model at scale, while still trying to maintain their lead over OpenAI. As a result, they’ve chosen to release it privately under the banner of an “ethical” rollout.

Jack Clark, co-founder of Anthropic said the following at an Oxford lecture last week ([0], at around 10 and 12 mins): "It's a technology that we do not fully understand because it's more grown than made. And it is a technology that you can concoct plausible scenarios where it could kill every single person on the planet. So to think building this technology is without risk would be an act of hubris or insanity. [...…

It's worth noting that Clark's career started in PR and journalism.

Re: Expanding Project Glasswing

#183
post #180

I'll share the first-hand account I recently got from someone else. > We've used it at work > it is... not as hype as everyone is concerned about > I'd argue the framework around it for security scanning is the arguably more useful side of the tool, definitely doesnt take a huge model to get all the issues it flagged on our systems > For us, it absolutely flooded us with noise > I mean hundreds if not thousands of fa…

This reminds me of when I added Snyk to our CI/CD and brought development to a standstill

Same pattern. Scanners flag everything. The problem is there's no layer between findings and everyone's inbox. Prioritization is harder than detection.

Re: Expanding Project Glasswing

#184

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I find this kind of rewrite both disrespectful and completely useless. Useless because the difficulty isn't getting to a working state but maintaining it. You now have to build a community around it to make any of this worthwhile. What would this software be worth if security issues weren't patched and bugs weren't fixed? You can't do this alone. And I find it disrespectful because people have spent decades building…

Hmm I view open source as purely positive sum. Valkey was forked from Redis in the first place. But this is more about memory safety - you can have immense respect for the giants who built these tools but also be worried that memory safety might become an even bigger deal. If someone found a memory zero day in nginx or openSSL for example that is a very big deal! I think this is one strategy we should look into, hope…

And what if someone gets pwned by a bog standard logic or input validation bug in your slopped together "nginx" that is not present in the original?

Re: Expanding Project Glasswing

#185
post #33

In case the topic of memory safety is interesting to anyone I've been experimenting with using AI agents to port common web infra projects to safe/ performant Rust. Somewhat inspired by the Bun port - was thinking that at some point memory safety might be such a big deal that people just need drop in replacements. - Valkey/ Redis port here https://github.com/ianm199/valdr (passes ~99% of single node test suite, real…

Respectfully, as an OSS maintainer (not to the scale of nginx or valkey, of course)... if a third-party used an AI agent to rewrite my software in a different language, that gives me absolutely no reason to support that new project. It is in all respects foreign code in a language I may or may not be familiar with, and worse yet, if I were to take over, I'd be responsible for maintaining the whole black box forever m…

seems like it could be a decent opportunity for a bad actor to slip in something nefarious as well. We all know that nobody is reviewing a >>500k loc diff. For something like the Bun rewrite, where plausibly the person driving the agent(s) didn't want to sneak in something nefarious things might be ok. That seems significantly less true when you cannot trust the person driving the agent(s)/producing the >>500k loc diff.

Re: Expanding Project Glasswing

#186

I'll share the first-hand account I recently got from someone else. > We've used it at work > it is... not as hype as everyone is concerned about > I'd argue the framework around it for security scanning is the arguably more useful side of the tool, definitely doesnt take a huge model to get all the issues it flagged on our systems > For us, it absolutely flooded us with noise > I mean hundreds if not thousands of fa…

why are folks looking at the output of the first pass?

my understanding, and experience, is that you 1. run a bunch of sessions with small permutations to create variety, 2. run more sessions dedupe reports into a smaller collections of potential vulns, 3. run a handful of agents at max effort to write PoCs + write-ups, 4. rank findings, 5. finally look at what, if anything that, was found. maybe ask questions, try and understand if the PoC is running against a realistic setup.

until you can confirm a vuln report is valid, you must assume it is invalid.

Re: Expanding Project Glasswing

#187

Earlier quoted context omitted.

We don't need to squash all of them, we need to squash all of them that are practically findable by current and very near term frontier models.

Also impossible imo so it's moot.

Because you think that current models can, in a practical sense, find an infinite number of vulnerabilities, or you think that they can find so many that it isn't possible to fix them?

In other words: do you think that the impossibility lines in exhausting the number finds or does the impossibility lie in fixing them?

In either case, do you think that this was also true pre-AI? That is to say: it was not possible to, given some set of practical resource constraints, find and fix all the vulnerabilities that a similarly-resourced group would find?

If so, then would you say that you just fundamentally don't believe in secure software and the only defense is lack of attention?

Re: Expanding Project Glasswing

#188

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The week before they released Mythos to governments they had all their source code stolen. It's all about improving their image and creating propoganda.

It wasn't "all their source code", it was the source code to Claude Code: not really any of their internal secret sauce, at least directly.

it wasn't stolen either. an employee accidentally included a source map file with the release.

Re: Expanding Project Glasswing

#189
post #128

In the meantime, not everyone with actual access to the model are all that impressed. https://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/116679693992983945

“Cybersecurity weather person and award winning shitposter.” why are they someone we should pay attention to the opinion of?

The most intelligent person involved in the highest level projects at my current company introduces themselves as an out of work circus clown.

There is an incredible amount of competency signaled by someone who was given access to this model but doesn’t treat their online presence like a professional resume.

Re: Expanding Project Glasswing

#190

I'll share the first-hand account I recently got from someone else. > We've used it at work > it is... not as hype as everyone is concerned about > I'd argue the framework around it for security scanning is the arguably more useful side of the tool, definitely doesnt take a huge model to get all the issues it flagged on our systems > For us, it absolutely flooded us with noise > I mean hundreds if not thousands of fa…

It seems like there is a genuine communication breakdown between management and engineering. Engineers know that there are vulnerabilities all over the place and that there have been for ages and that where the rubber hits the road every vulnerability does not represent a successful exploit by some nefarious actor. Management can often treat cybersecurity like a black box that represents millions upon millions in lia…

I had a geniunely surreal conversation with the security team the past week, it went like:

'Hi, we are reaching out to you because our tool flagged a large data transfer between such and such services'

'Wait, the source endpoint is an internal service, the target endpoint is an internal S3 bucket (I was doing a routine DB backup) Neither are reachable from the internet. How is it a security issue?'

'Our tool has flagged it'

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