Earlier quoted context omitted.
I had organized neighbors who broke WPA3 using tools, i disabled downgrade to WPA2 and they still broke it. I had one that setup an evil twin to catch my Linux login They stole the IP of one of boxes so they could get my login, and joined my network to setup the credential stealer. I caught this when my password didn't work at the ssh login. That was an apartment and they knew when I caught them. The problem is not w…
Is it possible that you have undiagnosed schizophrenia?
AirSnitch: Demystifying and breaking client isolation in Wi-Fi networks [pdf]
181–190 of 204 posts
Re: AirSnitch: Demystifying and breaking client isolation in Wi-Fi networks [pdf]
#182Earlier quoted context omitted.
I had organized neighbors who broke WPA3 using tools, i disabled downgrade to WPA2 and they still broke it. I had one that setup an evil twin to catch my Linux login They stole the IP of one of boxes so they could get my login, and joined my network to setup the credential stealer. I caught this when my password didn't work at the ssh login. That was an apartment and they knew when I caught them. The problem is not w…
Is it possible that you have undiagnosed schizophrenia?
It's probably a good idea for anyone to check themselves every now and then by playing Angel's Advocate just as much as they might play Devil's Advocate, but I don't think rejecting his premises out of hand with a drive-by diagnosis is all that helpful.
Re: AirSnitch: Demystifying and breaking client isolation in Wi-Fi networks [pdf]
#183Earlier quoted context omitted.
The Ars article mentions: “Even when HTTPS is in place, an attacker can still intercept domain look-up traffic and use DNS cache poisoning to corrupt tables stored by the target’s operating system.” Not sure, but I think this could then be further used for phishing.
DNSSEC prevents that if set up properly.
Re: AirSnitch: Demystifying and breaking client isolation in Wi-Fi networks [pdf]
#184Earlier quoted context omitted.
Is it possible that you have undiagnosed schizophrenia?
It's possible that he's taking "hope for the best, prepare for the worst" to its logical if unhealthy extreme by interpreting every ambiguous 802.11 frame as one with ill intent. However, just because he's paranoid doesn't mean there aren't misaligned people, devices, and applications out there probing networks. It's probably a good idea for anyone to check themselves every now and then by playing Angel's Advocate ju…
I had a stretch of a year or so a decade ago where I was going through something very similar, down to the belief a hacker group was targeting my WiFi network despite the great lengths I was going to secure it during the setup process inside an RF shielded area, yet they still kept "getting in" somehow... so I recognize the signs.
If OP can re-read their comment later on in a different mindset, they may start to notice things that felt so certain at the time don't actually add up logically in retrospect, that's how I ended up breaking out of it eventually.
Re: AirSnitch: Demystifying and breaking client isolation in Wi-Fi networks [pdf]
#185Earlier quoted context omitted.
DNSSEC prevents that if set up properly.
This is an on-path attacker. In end-user DNS configurations, attackers can simply disable DNSSEC; it's 1 bit in the DNS response header ("yeah, sure, I verified this for you, trust me").
Re: AirSnitch: Demystifying and breaking client isolation in Wi-Fi networks [pdf]
#186Earlier quoted context omitted.
This is an on-path attacker. In end-user DNS configurations, attackers can simply disable DNSSEC; it's 1 bit in the DNS response header ("yeah, sure, I verified this for you, trust me").
No, modern resolvers like systemd-resolved actually check the dnssec signatures on the client.
Re: AirSnitch: Demystifying and breaking client isolation in Wi-Fi networks [pdf]
#187Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's possible that he's taking "hope for the best, prepare for the worst" to its logical if unhealthy extreme by interpreting every ambiguous 802.11 frame as one with ill intent. However, just because he's paranoid doesn't mean there aren't misaligned people, devices, and applications out there probing networks. It's probably a good idea for anyone to check themselves every now and then by playing Angel's Advocate ju…
Fair enough, but in this case there are several massive red flags that OP was experiencing a variant of "targeted individual" delusion. (The confidence without evidence that their neighbor was a determined hacker group, using a complex zero-day to attack them at home personally, tie-ins to fear/belief of this being a widespread phenomenon). I had a stretch of a year or so a decade ago where I was going through someth…
Re: AirSnitch: Demystifying and breaking client isolation in Wi-Fi networks [pdf]
#188Earlier quoted context omitted.
This is an on-path attacker. In end-user DNS configurations, attackers can simply disable DNSSEC; it's 1 bit in the DNS response header ("yeah, sure, I verified this for you, trust me").
No, modern resolvers like systemd-resolved actually check the dnssec signatures on the client.
Re: AirSnitch: Demystifying and breaking client isolation in Wi-Fi networks [pdf]
#189Earlier quoted context omitted.
No, modern resolvers like systemd-resolved actually check the dnssec signatures on the client.
To check the DNSSEC signatures on the client, you have to do a full recursive lookup. You've always been able to run your own DNS cache, if you want your host to operate independently of any upstream DNS server. But at that point, you're simply running your own DNS server.
Re: AirSnitch: Demystifying and breaking client isolation in Wi-Fi networks [pdf]
#190Earlier quoted context omitted.
To check the DNSSEC signatures on the client, you have to do a full recursive lookup. You've always been able to run your own DNS cache, if you want your host to operate independently of any upstream DNS server. But at that point, you're simply running your own DNS server.
It's not necessarily equivalent to a recursive lookup, you can ask a cache for all the answers because you already know the root keys a priori. But yes, it does follow the entire chain of trust, that's the entire point of dnssec : if you don't do that the whole exercise is utterly pointless.
I agree with you, though. It's utterly pointless.