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Frequent reauth doesn't make you more secure

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Re: Frequent reauth doesn't make you more secure

#181

There’s another closely related one, changing passwords periodically. A lot of infosec authorities move away from this. However, I always wonder, does it make sense for an org to stop with periodic password resets if: 1. the org is not very capable in detecting all account compromises; 2. in practice, users leak their passwords (e.g. by getting phished) and not all of them lead to direct intrusions, some credentials…

> I believe that in practice, forced password changes at least ensure that unknown compromised passwords will become outdated at some point in time, and I think that this is positive.

password

password1

password2

password!

Password1!

People get predictable on how they modify their passwords when that policy is instituted. Mostly because it's a royal pain in the ass to have to generate a new password AND remember it.

That was one of the reasons that browsers (etc) began offering users randomly generated passwords that either the browser, or a 3rd party tool/service recalling the password on demand.

However that then means the password to the browser/service becomes the unchanging password...

> Ultimately, I believe the best thing to do is to move to FIDO2-authentication here.

Passkeys are an attempt to circumvent this by having (effectively) a key that's attached to some physical device that the user must have access to to prove that they are the authorised user... but... people are circumventing those by storing them in cloud services... which means that the password to the cloud service is... yet again.. the weak point.

> But I do wonder what are other peoples takes on this topic?

For my money, the problem that's being attempted to be solved is unsolvable.

In the physical world we determine identity by citing documents that verify the identity as far as a trusted institution like a government or bank is concerned, and those documents are predicated on documents that may or may not exist (birth certificates) and the assurance that those documents are for the person presenting them, from other people that have been through the same procedure.

The digital world is even more difficult to prove identity with, because everyone looks exactly the same, ones and zeros, the order might be different from one person to another, but they're mutable.

Re: Frequent reauth doesn't make you more secure

#182

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I’m not sure how one changes the mind of auditors who are just there for a job and who aren’t actually interested in the field? IME, the only auditors who are knowledgeable are those overseeing the folks with checklists — and they rarely seem to have the time to correct the folks they’re overseeing.

In a free market, you don't - you start your own company that doesn't waste half of everyone's time on security, and do stuff twice as efficiently, for half the price and outcompete the other one. Then you get outcompeted by a company with no security at all, which is twice as efficient as you until they get hacked.

Good security, the stuff that actually stops you from getting hacked, shouldn’t be considered wasteful. And eliminating good security shouldn’t be considered an improvement in efficiency.

Ideally we should use the word “waste” to narrowly point at activities that are entirely pointless. Like requiring password rotation every 7 days.

Re: Frequent reauth doesn't make you more secure

#183

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Came here to say this, upvoted. Both Apple and Microsoft have "corporate IT" settings that can be used to turn off "trust my device", "remember me", etc. Auditors and CISO offices tend to lean in on checklist security - in other words it doesn't matter if it's actually more secure, it only matters that it passes the checklist audit. Many of the settings are user hostile and incentivize users to work around them. Maki…

I’m not sure how one changes the mind of auditors who are just there for a job and who aren’t actually interested in the field? IME, the only auditors who are knowledgeable are those overseeing the folks with checklists — and they rarely seem to have the time to correct the folks they’re overseeing.

Customers need to ask for these changes, which is why this is hard to solve. At least in my field, many of the measures we end up having to fall in line with are the result of our customers deciding that those who bid on their contracts must have these certain credentials. If those same customers had more competent decision-makers determining technical qualifications then this would be less of an issue. Unfortunately, that also means that we will be stuck with these audits in their current form until the vast majority of our customers first decide they’re not needed.

Re: Frequent reauth doesn't make you more secure

#184
post #178

I just can't stand email OTP. Before we had passwords, now we have passwords + email OTP. And doesn't matter if you forgot password - you will receive password reset to the same email. You already prove email ownership by resetting or using password - why sending another useless "security token" to the same email. Pure nonsense. Whoever designs all of this clearly has little idea of what they are doing :(

Email OTP can be useful as a layer in risk based authentication.

If someone tries to log on to your site from a low reputation VPN, throwing an email OTP challenge can give some assurance it’s a genuine user logging in. Rather than a spammer or something like that.

Re: Frequent reauth doesn't make you more secure

#185
post #63

The people who need to read these articles are the auditors. Until they change their expectations, the many businesses who have to pass audits are still going to be stuck doing a lot of things that are industry-standard but also very stupid. This is the case even for small businesses in certain fields where security audits are valued. We have at least half a dozen measures in place that we know aren't actually helpfu…

Came here to say this, upvoted. Both Apple and Microsoft have "corporate IT" settings that can be used to turn off "trust my device", "remember me", etc. Auditors and CISO offices tend to lean in on checklist security - in other words it doesn't matter if it's actually more secure, it only matters that it passes the checklist audit. Many of the settings are user hostile and incentivize users to work around them. Maki…

It seems like the problem here isn't the use of checklists, it's that the checklists in question contain questionable stuff like "enforce frequent reauth". Systematically checking for the presence of good things and the absence of bad things seems like a good idea both from a security and consistency perspective. Of course the trick is making sure your "good" and "bad" lists are well thought out and appropriately applied.

Re: Frequent reauth doesn't make you more secure

#187
post #69

My employer just started doing daily reauth for all microsoft logins (teams, ...). The worst thing is that it's just 24h not start of day, so it may just be five seconds before you want to join a meeting. They haven't found the setting for mobile yet, so I might just stop using desktop teams.

This also just happened to me too, except we only use Outlook. Web Outlook handles this state really poorly for some reason. It doesn't kick me out, it just pops up a little banner.

Re: Frequent reauth doesn't make you more secure

#188

I disagree with the general advise behind this, even when I'm in a household with trusted (most of the time) family members. Forcing a re-auth ensures that even if I forget to lock my machine/browser, someone can't snoop around. I want this to be the norm especially for my Macbook since for whatever reason, I might forget to lock or have some program running that'll force the laptop to not auto lock out (e.g. while d…

> Log out as soon as I close the tab

For a banking app, I think this is fine. A lot of people aren't aware closing a window isn't logging out. The rest of that is dumb, though.

Re: Frequent reauth doesn't make you more secure

#189
Forced password rotation and expiry seems the bigger problem; given that it causes people to get locked out so often, (e.g. if pw expires when on holiday), — often then requiring travelling to IT, or at least a few hours trying to get IT on the phone to reset, or chasing up colleagues who aren't locked out to get in touch with IT.

Many (most?) companies still do it, despite it now not being recommended by NIST:

> Verifiers SHOULD NOT require memorized secrets to be changed arbitrarily (e.g., periodically)

https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63b.html

Or by Microsoft

> Password expiration requirements do more harm than good...

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/admin/misc/p...

But these don't seem to be authoritative enough for IT / security, (and there are still guidelines out there that do recommend the practice IIRC).

Re: Frequent reauth doesn't make you more secure

#190
post #179
post #61

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's a good point on password usability. Signal app periodically prompts you for the encryption PIN to make sure you don't forget it. I think this should be handled out of band of the login process. Similar to "is xxx still your phone number?" -- companies could do periodic password hygiene and freshness checks. Context matters. Companies forget that people are trying to get something important done, and blocking the…

> Signal app periodically prompts you for the encryption PIN to make sure you don't forget it. At least Signal does not block the app until you enter the PIN. WhatsApp forces you to enter it before you can reach your messages, which not only is annoying when you're in a hurry, but also forces you to type the PIN even when you're in a place where it might be seen by someone else. On the other hand, on Signal it's poss…

good point
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